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ABSTRACT 
Threats to computerised information systems are always on the rise and compel organisations 
to invest a lot of money and time amongst other technical controls in an attempt to protect 
their critical information from inherent security risks. The computerisation of information 
systems in secondary schools has effectively exposed these organisations to a host of 
complex information security challenges that they have to deal with in addition to their core 
business of teaching and learning. Secondary schools handle large volumes of sensitive 
information pertaining to educators, learners, creditors and financial records that they are 
obliged to secure. Computerised information systems are vulnerable to both internal and 
external threats but ease of access sometimes manifest in security breaches, thereby 
undermining information security. Unfortunately, school managers and users of 
computerised information systems are ignorant of the risks to their information systems 
assets and the consequences of the compromises that might occur thereof. One way of 
educating school managers and users about the risks to their computerised information 
systems is through a risk management programme in which they actively participate. 
However, secondary schools do not have the full capacity to perform information security 
risk management exercises due to the unavailability of risk management experts and scarce 
financial resources to fund such programmes.  
 
This qualitative case study was conducted in two secondary schools that use computerised 
information systems to support everyday administrative operations. The main objective of 
this research study was to assist secondary schools that used computerised information 
systems to develop a set of guidelines they would use to effectively manage information 
security risks in their computerised information systems. This study educated school 
managers and computerised information systems users on how to conduct simple risk 
management exercises. The Operationally Critical Threats, Assets and Vulnerability 
Evaluation for small-scale organisations risk management method was used to evaluate the 
computerised information systems in the two schools and attain the goals of the research 
study. Data for this study were generated through participatory observation, physical 
inspections and interview techniques. Data were presented, analysed and interpreted 
qualitatively.  
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This study found that learners‟ continuous assessment marks, financial information, 
educators‟ personal information, custom application software, server-computers and 
telecommunication equipment used for networking were the critical assets. The main threats 
to these critical assets were authorised and unauthorised systems users, malware, system 
crashes, access paths and incompatibilities in software. The risks posed by these threats were 
normally led to the unavailability of critical information systems assets, compromise of data 
integrity and confidentiality. This also led to the loss of productivity and finance, and 
damage to school reputation. The only form of protection mechanism enforced by secondary 
schools was physical security. To mitigate the pending risks, the study educated school 
managers and users in selecting, devising and implementing simple protection and mitigation 
strategies commensurate with their information systems, financial capabilities and their level 
of skills. This study also recommended that secondary schools remove all critical computers 
from open-flow school networks, encrypt all critical information, password-protect all 
computers holding critical information and train all users of information systems of personal 
security.  
 
The study will be instrumental in educating school managers and computerised information 
systems users in information security awareness and risk management in general. 
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1.1. INTRODUCTION 
The ability of an organisation to fulfil its mission depends on the meaningful and 
productive utilisation of its assets (Anderson & Choobineha, 2008). Computerised 
information systems (CISs) are now common assets that South African secondary schools 
utilise to fulfil their missions in service delivery. These computerised information systems 
are exposed to information security risks and their survival depends on the quality and 
effectiveness of risk management programmes that secondary schools implement. 
 
Risk management comprises of a number of steps of which risk assessment and analysis 
are the most important and focal ones (Karabacaka & Sogukpinar, 2003). The outcome of 
risk assessment and analysis plays an important role in risk management in an organisation 
that uses information systems (Jenkins, 1998; Alberts & Dorofee, 2001; Siu, 2007; Yeha 
& Chang, 2007). Management uses risk assessment and analysis outcomes to decide on 
whether to accept or mitigate identified information security risks. The choice of risk 
mitigation strategies by an organisation is a crucial step towards an organisation‟s quest to 
deploy, implement and manage its information security tools (Beachboard, Cole, Mellor, 
Hernandez & Aytes, 2008). The complexity of establishing completely secured 
information systems is an adequate contribution to the complications of information 
securities in secondary schools‟ CISs. There is no doubt that those secondary schools 
using CISs experience information security risk problems similar to other small-scale 
organisations. Lack of sound risk management programmes is cited as a major 
contributory factor to information systems security risks in small-scale organisations 
(Beachboard et al. 2008). The possibility of secondary schools overlooking this essential 
information security requirement is high. In the event of threat attacks occurring, 
secondary schools may be prompted to use unsanctioned risk management techniques or 
even be compelled to abandon the programmes altogether. This is likely to jeopardise 
CISs thereby affecting important administrative operations and overall service delivery. If 
this situation continues unabated, it can eventually have negative impact on secondary 
schools‟ administrative operations especially those that depend on CISs.  
 
This qualitative case study was designed to assist secondary school managers and CISs 
users on developing guidelines that they would use to manage information security risks 
their CISs. The managers and users of CISs were to be educated on how to conduct 
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information security risk management exercises using the Operationally Critical Threats, 
Assets and Vulnerability for small organisation (OCTAVE-small) risk management 
method. The study was carried out in two secondary schools in the Thohoyandou Cluster, 
Vhembe District, where CISs were being used. 
 
This chapter serves as an introduction to the research study. The chapter is structured on 
subtopics covering different important aspects of the study. The introduction puts the 
research into perspective by highlighting the need for small-scale organisations to be 
proactive in addressing information security risks that affect their CISs. A preliminary 
literature review provides the background of the study and it briefly examines what has 
been already published in information security and risk management. The literature review 
is intended to inform the reader of the risk management frameworks and methodologies in 
use today, their merits and demerits as applied in various organisational contexts. The 
chapter then elucidates the motivation, research context and the problem statement of this 
research study. Research objectives which guide this study are stated immediately after the 
problem statement. Risk management methodologies, research strategy and data collection 
techniques to be adopted in this study are also briefly discussed. This chapter also 
examines research ethics in order to inform the readers how human beings (subjects) 
would be protected during data collection. The overall layout of the dissertation is also 
given to guide the reader on the number of chapters that constitute the dissertation and 
what each chapter covers. Important issues discussed in this chapter are summarised in the 
conclusion. 
 
1.2. RESEARCH BACKGROUND  
Rapid changes in computing technologies tend to have a bearing on computing 
environments in organisations which use CISs. Some of the changes are accompanied by 
positive information security results while others lead to a variety of security risks which 
adversely affect the existing information systems (Karabacaka & Sogukpinar, 2003). An 
organisation whose operations depend on CISs requires a secured computing environment 
to achieve its missions. Unlike in the past, where information security was the 
responsibility of information security experts, non-experts are now required to actively 
participate in creating secure computing environments for their organisations (Steve, 
2007). This involves the development of a general understanding of information security 
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risks and the application of risk management methodologies in work places (Karabacaka 
& Sogukpinar, 2003). Organisations which implement participatory risk management 
methodologies stand better chances of succeeding in countering risks (Alberts & Dorofee, 
2003) than those relying on technical expertise only (Canavan, 2001; Doherty & Fulford, 
2006; Caballero, 2009). Such organisations derive considerable benefits from their CISs. 
Secondary schools, may benefit from these methodologies if they properly implement 
information security risk management programmes initiated by school managers and users 
of CISs. 
 
1.2.1. Information security  
Information plays a vital role in the existence of any organisation and it should always be 
secured (Gerber & von Solms, 2001). The benefits of information security are in 
supporting the mission of an organisation to achieve its objectives (Stoneburner, Goguen 
& Feringa, 2002; Steve, 2007; Yeha & Chang, 2007). Information security is the 
protection of information systems against unauthorised access to or modification of 
information, whether in storage, processing or transit, and against the denial of service to 
authorised users, including those measures necessary to detect, document, and counter 
such threats (Yeha & Chang, 2007). The major goal of information security in an 
organisation is to preserve the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information 
(Theoharidou, Kokolakis, Karyda & Kiountouzis, 2005). Confidentiality is the protection 
of information against theft and eavesdropping and integrity refers to the protection of 
information against unauthorised modification and masquerade (Elky, 2006). Availability 
is the dependable access of users to authorised information, particularly in light of attacks 
such as denial of service (DoS) against information systems (Chen, 2009). Information 
security requires a range of skills and knowledge that are rarely found in small-scale 
organisations such as secondary schools, an issue being addressed by this research study. 
 
Research in information security indicates that small-scale organisations seldom deploy 
proper information security controls regardless of the availability of guidelines to this 
effect (Dimopoulos, Furnell & Barlow, 2003; Beachboard et al. 2008). Management in 
small-scale organisations are prepared to invest more resources in protecting computing 
infrastructure without assessing the risks to their critical information (Dimopoulos et al. 
2003; Panda, 2009). Whether management in small-scale organisations deliberately prefer 
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to protect computing infrastructure, or it is due to a lack of security risk management 
knowledge, the reason for this is yet to be established (Stoneburner et al. 2002, Siu, 2007; 
Steve, 2007). It seems that management in small-scale organisations, including secondary 
schools may have a narrower view or have no knowledge of information security. This 
may prohibit the prospects of conducting risk management programmes in these 
institutions.  
 
1.2.2. Risk management  
Risk management is a systematic and analytical process whereby an organisation 
identifies, reduces and controls its potential threats and losses (Stoneburner et al. 2002). 
According to Hoo (2000), risk management is a policy process wherein alternative 
strategies for dealing with risks are weighed and decisions about acceptable risks are 
made. A well-managed information system is always supported by a sound risk 
management plan intended to identify, reduce and maintain risks to acceptable levels 
(Yeha & Chang, 2007). Therefore, risk management is an on-going process that attempts 
to identify threats or reduce their impact whenever an attack occurs. Risk management is 
an iterative process with well-defined steps, which when taken in sequence, supports 
better decision-making by contributing a greater insight into risks and their impacts (Hoo, 
2000). Large organisations include their risk management plans in their security policies 
(Alberts & Dorofee, 2001; Beachboard et al. 2008). This is different from small-scale 
organisations such as secondary schools that may have problems in formulating workable 
risk management plans and fail to implement them.  
 
1.2.3. Risk management methods 
Risk management methods can be quantitative or qualitative depending on the risk 
assessment and analysis applied (Mazareanu, 2007; Ganthan, Rabiah & Zuraini, 2009). 
These methods apply different techniques and therefore require different expertise. 
Quantitative risk management methods use numerical results that express the probability 
of each risk factor and its effects on the objectives of the organisation (Mazareanu, 2007). 
Popular examples of quantitative risk assessment and analysis methods are the Annualised 
Loss Expectancy (ALE) and the Livermore Risk Analysis Methodology (LRAM) (Rainer, 
Snyder & Carr, 1991; Elky, 2006; Beachboard et al. 2008). Quantitative methods are 
regarded as being more objective than qualitative methods because they depend on easily 
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verifiable mathematical formulae (Rainer et al. 1991; Mazareanu, 2007). These methods 
are suitable for large information systems infrastructure supported by strong human and 
financial resources (Elky, 2006; Panda, 2009). Quantitative methods rely on estimations of 
the probability of damages or loss of information systems assets (Beachboard et al. 2008; 
Ding, 2002). This makes quantitative risk methods problematic to use in small-scale 
organisations such as secondary schools where there are no risk management experts to 
perform such complex estimations. A risk management exercise conducted using a 
quantitative method is generally more expensive and demands greater experience and 
advanced tools than those conducted using qualitative methods (Rot, 2008). Due to these 
constraints, small-scale organisations, such as secondary schools lack the capacity to use 
quantitative risk management methods, hence qualitative methods become an alternative. 
 
Qualitative risk management assesses the effects of the identified risk factors and then 
creates priorities used to decide on how to solve the potential risk factors, depending on 
the impact they could have on the information systems (Panda, 2009). Most qualitative 
methods can be modified for easy use with any expertise available in an organisation 
(Panda, 2009). Generally, qualitative methods tend to be simpler to implement than 
quantitative methods because they express risks in terms of simple descriptive variables or 
adjectives instead of precise monetary terms, therefore, requiring less time, finance and 
effort to implement (Mazareanu, 2007). This argument arises from the fact that qualitative 
methods utilise the security jargon which non-technical people may be familiar with 
(Rainer et al. 1991; Mazareanu, 2007). Furthermore, qualitative methods are based on 
judgment, intuition and experience of the team that conducts the risk management exercise 
(Rainer et al. 1991). This makes qualitative risk management methods a better choice for 
use in secondary schools where there are no risk management personnel. 
 
Popular examples of qualitative risk management methods are Hazard And Operability 
study (HAZOP), Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) or Failure Mode and Effects 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and United Kingdom (UK) Government's Risk Analysis 
and Management Method (CRAMM) (Karabacaka & Sogukpinar, 2003; Yazar, 2004; 
Elyse, 2007; Panda 2009). Another example is Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and 
Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001; Panda, 2009). Some of 
these qualitative risk techniques pose serious problems in small-scale organisations in that 
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they either require highly trained technical teams to perform risk assessment and analysis, 
are labour intensive or have strong financial basis (Karabacaka & Sogukpinar, 2003; 
Yazar, 2004; Elyse, 2007; Panda 2009). Secondary schools hardly have such expertise and 
financial bases to undertake such endeavours and as a result, this makes the use of these 
methods unaffordable and unsuitable for secondary schools. Contrary to some of the 
qualitative methods, the OCTAVE method does not require highly technical people or 
strong financial support to be implemented (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002; Alberts & Dorofee 
2004; Panda, 2009). This is likely to make OCTAVE to be the most appropriate 
information security risk management method for use in organisations where there are no 
experts in information security risk management (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001; Panda, 2009). 
 
The choice of a risk management method depends on the understanding and appropriate 
application of that method in a given organisational context (Mazareanu, 2007; 
Beachboard et al. 2008). This area is considered to be difficult particularly to resource and 
expertise-constrained small and medium-sized enterprises (Karabacaka & Sogukpinar, 
2003: Siu, 2007). This situation could be worse in secondary schools where personnel with 
baseline computing skills are only concerned with the use of CISs regardless of the 
perennial security risks associated with these information systems assets. In light of this, 
secondary schools need assistance from within or outside to initiate and guide them in 
performing risk management for their CIS.  
 
Some risk management techniques are either too difficult to be understood or to be used 
by small-scale organisations, subsequently these organisations resort to unendorsed 
methods or avoid carrying out risk management exercises completely (Alberts & Dorofee, 
2001; Beachboard et al. 2008). To encourage secondary schools to perform risk 
management, a simple and participatory risk management method in the qualitative 
category namely, OCTAVE should be used. Unlike other risk management methods which 
focus much on technical risks, OCTAVE deals with organisational risk in addition to 
technical risks (Ganthan et al. 2009). 
 
1.2.4. Overview of the OCTAVE-small risk management method 
Secondary schools require risk management methods that enable managers and users to be 
acquainted with their information systems security issues so that they can improve their 
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information security posture without relying much on outside experts. The OCTAVE 
method has been identified as the most appropriate method for this purpose because it is a 
process-driven method which identifies, prioritises and manages information security risks 
within an organisation‟s information system (Alberts & Dorofee, 2004; Panda, 2009). 
OCTAVE is designed to provide complete information about information 
security risk management for a given organisation (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002). 
The OCTAVE risk management process is self-directed because it encourages people 
from within the same organisation to collaboratively assume the responsibility of setting 
the organisation‟s security strategy (Panda, 2009; Tiwari, 2010), an outcome this 
study attempts to achieve. 
 
Variations of the OCTAVE method offer an organisation a choice of risk management 
techniques suitable to that organisation depending on the size and layering of its 
information systems (Panda, 2009). Secondary schools have a flat-layered hierarchical 
structure, therefore, their information systems could be assessed and analysed using 
OCTAVE for small-scale organisations (OCTAVE-small) risk management method. 
Alberts and Dorofee (2002) and (Sosonkin, 2005) argue that by implementing OCTAVE-
small risk management process, an organisation tends to benefit from the catalogue of 
practices, threat profile and catalogue of vulnerabilities. These catalogues can act as 
references for secondary schools which decide to embark on information security risk 
management exercises using personnel with baseline computing skills. 
 
This study capitalises on the flexibility of OCTAVE-small which can be customised to suit 
secondary schools‟ unique information systems risk environments, security, objectives and 
the level of skills available. The customised OCTAVE-small method to be used in this 
study will be based on four processes unlike the conventional three-phased OCTAVE-
small. This is intended to make the risk management exercise user friendly and interesting 
to the school personnel and at the same time achieving research objectives. OCTAVE-
small is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.  
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1.3. RESEARCH CONTEXT 
Schools in Vhembe District have computerised records management systems that form the 
core of their information systems. These information systems are supported by local area 
networks (LANs). Normally the LANs are connected to the Internet to provide access to 
the web. Personnel with baseline computing skills and knowledge administer these CISs. 
Educators and learners access these facilities, especially when browsing the web and 
accessing e-learning materials or entering marks on the databases. Administrative 
computers holding vital school information are also part of these LANs. There is a high 
likelihood that critical information in secondary schools is exposed to risks from these 
internal users and/or unknown external intruders.  
 
Under these circumstances, schools are most likely to find it difficult to secure their 
information systems against multiple threats they could be exposed to. Risk assessment 
and analysis are critical activities in identifying information assets, the risks to those assets 
and procedures to mitigate the risks to the assets (Marchany, 2003). Due to lack of 
expertise in risk management in schools, the possibility of conducting risk management 
exercise is remote. This means that school management and users would remain ignorant 
of the risks to which their information systems are exposed to.  
 
1.4. MOTIVATION FOR THIS STUDY 
This study was motivated by the following observed factors: 
 The proliferation of CISs in secondary schools may have implications for 
information security in these organisations. There could be a high prevalence of 
information security breaches in schools that management and users are not aware 
of. These breaches could compromise information confidentiality, integrity and 
availability in secondary schools CISs and need to be identified and mitigated.  
  
 The Internet has become part of the information systems in schools and there is 
clear evidence that organisations can operate effectively by capitalising the 
efficiency and communications capabilities provided by the Internet (Wack, Tracy 
& Souppaya, 2003; Steve, 2007; Al Saif, 2009). At the same time, the Internet has 
become one of the biggest potential sources of threats that may put an 
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organisation‟s information system at risk due to multiple information security 
breaches by intruder attacks and malware infections (Wack et al. 2003; Al Saif, 
2009). Unauthorised users capitalise on unsecured networks to gain access to the 
Internet or other vital information systems without being detected. The majority of 
schools that use CISs may hardly have the capabilities of detecting security 
violations of this nature.  
 
 An upsurge in the number of computer users with different motives, translates to 
an increase in information security risk in secondary schools. For example, Park, 
Min, Lee, Lee and Lee (2006) emphasise that a large proportion of reported 
information security breaches within an organisation are due to computer users‟ 
intentionally and unintentionally motives. In secondary schools, the extent to 
which these users contribute to information security breaches intentionally or 
accidentally deserves research attention.  
The cited factors are indicators that as secondary schools thrive on CISs they also need to 
conduct information security risk management exercises to ascertain their CISs security 
status.  
 
1.5. THE PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Secondary schools hardly have any information security personnel to help them perform 
risk management exercises and to secure their critical CISs assets against risks they are 
exposed to. If this situation persists unabated, these CISs face disastrous consequences that 
could subsequently lead to their inevitable collapse. Therefore, to sustain the continued 
use of CISs in secondary schools, there is a dire need to educate school managers and CISs 
users on how to conduct risk management exercises and also to recommend 
implementable risk mitigation strategies. This research focuses on information security 
risk management in secondary schools‟ CISs implementing the Operationally Critical 
Threats, Assets and Vulnerability Evaluation for small-scale organisations (OCTAVE-
small) risk management method. 
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1.6. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This study was guided by one main research objective and three sub-objectives stated 
below.  
1.6.1. Main research objective 
The main objective of this research study was to assist secondary schools that used CISs to 
develop a set of guidelines they would use to effectively manage information security risks 
in their computerised information systems. 
1.6.2. Sub-objectives 
The research sub-objectives were: 
1. To systematically gather data on critical assets and information security controls in 
CISs in secondary schools; 
This sub-objective is explored in chapters 3,4, 6, 7 and 8 of this study. 
2. To identify an easy to use risk management methodology that non-technical personnel 
in secondary schools can utilise.  
A number of subsections in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 have been dedicated to the risk 
management process from a theoretical and a practical standpoint. It is in Chapter 7 
that this study performs the risk assessment and analysis on data collected from 
various sources.  
3. To deduce generic guidelines that could be followed during information security risk 
management at a secondary school that take into account CISs users who are not 
experts in risk management. 
 Conventional mitigation strategies are discussed in Chapter 4. In chapters 7 and 8, the 
study proposes a number of simple protection and mitigation strategies for 
implementation at secondary school level. 
 
1.7. ASSUMPTIONS, DELINEATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
An overview of research assumptions, delineations and limitations is outlined below. 
 
1.7.1. Assumptions 
This study assumes that 
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 school managers and users of CISs would voluntarily participate and cooperate by 
providing the researcher with all vital information needed for the success of this 
study; 
 participants would be familiar with the research instruments to be used in this 
study; and 
 the participants‟ perspectives would be meaningful, knowable and be made 
explicit that they affect the success of this study positively. 
 
1.7.2. Delineations 
This research focused mainly on information security risk management for CISs in 
selected secondary schools. Any other forms of risks to the school information systems 
outside computerisation were not investigated. Only the OCTAVE-small risk management 
method was used in this study. Population samples were drawn from the current regular 
users of CISs. Only secondary schools took part in this research study. 
 
1.7.3. Limitations of the study 
There are a number of factors over which the researcher has no control and which may 
affect the outcome of this research. The following factors are considered as limitations to 
this study:  
 environment, behaviour or event of interest could be inaccessible and observation 
simply becomes impossible or difficult (Foster, 2006). Accessibility to CISs and 
users may be restricted by school management for their own reasons; 
 the presence of an outsider in the school could be regarded as an intrusion and 
cause the observed sample members to behave otherwise. This may cause the 
account of observed behaviour to be an inaccurate representation of how the 
subjects behave naturally (Ritchie & Lewis, 2005); 
 time allocated to the researcher to collect data in schools may be insufficient. 
Schools may limit the time the researcher takes for collecting data at a particular 
instance; and 
 school management may also interfere with data collection processes as they 
redeploy resources as per demand. 
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1.8. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
This section examines research and methodology design for this research study. 
 
1.8.1. Research methodology and design 
A research methodology is a strategy of inquiry which moves from the underlying 
philosophical assumptions to research design and data collection (Myers, 2004). Research 
design and data collection techniques depend on the research methodology adopted for a 
particular problem. Choosing the most appropriate research method from multiple 
methods is a difficult task (Ritchie & Lewis, 2005; Foster, 2006; Babbie, 2007; Denzin & 
Lincolin, 2008). The choice of a research method is subject to the nature of the research 
problem, or the social phenomena to be explored (Noor, 2008). This study uses a 
qualitative case study research strategy, an in-depth examination of a single or more 
related instance(s) of some social phenomenon such as a village or family (Myers, 2004; 
Babbie, 2007; Gray, 2009). Information security risk management in schools is a social 
issue because it has a direct or indirect effect on how schools with CISs conduct their 
everyday business and how the inherent risks are likely to affect the society.  
Currently, research interests in information systems have shifted from technical to 
organisational issues (Myers, 2004), making the case study research strategy particularly 
well-suited for information security risk management in secondary schools. Additionally, 
a case study is a naturalistic and interpretive method concerned with understanding the 
meaning with which people attach to actions, decisions and values within their social 
worlds (Denzin & Lincolin, 2008).  
 
The OCTAVE-small risk management method will be used in two secondary schools in 
Thohoyandou Cluster of the Vhembe District. Risk assessment and analysis was 
conducted in terms of physical, human, malicious and natural disaster threat sources on the 
CISs of those selected schools.  
 
1.8.2. Population and sampling procedures 
A population is a group of individuals who have the same characteristics (Cresswell, 
2005). The population for this research would be consisted of those individuals who use 
CISs in secondary schools. Ritchie & Lewis (2005) recommend the use of non-probability 
sampling method for selecting the population samples for a qualitative research. Non-
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probability sampling allows the researcher to select individuals and sites because they are 
available, convenient, and represent some characteristics the researcher wants to study 
(Cresswell, 2005; Leech & Onwuegbusie, 2007). In a secondary school setup, the main 
users of CISs were office educators who had more-or-less similar computing skills and 
knowledge. The samples were drawn using purposive sampling strategy, a non-probability 
sampling method in which the units to be observed were selected on the basis of the 
researcher‟s judgement on which ones were the most useful or representative (Creswell, 
2005; Babbie, 2007). This study collected data, presented and analysed it as outlined in 
subsection 1.8.3 below. 
 
1.8.3. Data collection, analysis and presentation 
This section outlines data collection, presentation and analysis which were important 
aspects of this study. 
 
1.8.3.1.Data collection 
Data collection involves applying the instruments to the sample or cases selected for the 
investigation (Merriam, 2009; Mouton, 2009). Studies in qualitative research indicate that 
most of the qualitative data are non-numeric (Myers, 2004). Consequently, qualitative 
research relies on data collected from a small number of individuals or sites (Myers, 
2004), through interviews, observational, fieldwork and archival research techniques 
(Tere, 2006; Denzin & Lincolin, 2008). 
 
In this case study, data were gathered using observation checklists, inspection checklists 
and interview schedules. Effectively, these techniques allowed close contact between the 
researcher and the research participants, making them interactive and developmental, 
simultaneously allowing emergent issues in computerised information security to be 
explored deeper (Creswell, 2005; Ritchie & Lewis, 2005). Semi-structured interviews and 
participatory observation were the main data collection techniques for this research. 
 
1.8.3.2. Presentation of data and reporting on findings 
Results from this research are presented on tables and reports. Reporting of findings is 
done through narrative and descriptive discussions. These summarise the findings from the 
data analyses with respect to each sub-objective. 
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1.8.3.3. Data analysis 
In this study, audiotaped interviews were transcribed and then analysed using qualitative 
description with constant comparison and inductive data analysis technique. This also 
applied to textual data from interviews and notes from participatory observation which 
were analysed using a qualitative techniques as recommended by Cresswell (2005) and 
Werlinger, Hawkey, Botta, & Beznosov (2009).  
 
1.9. RESEARCH ETHICS 
Conducting a research with human beings as subjects brings forth ethical issues that have 
to be addressed from the onset (Ritchie & Lewis, 2005; Marshall & Rossman, 2006; 
Babbie, 2007). Research ethics refer to moral principles guiding the researcher to conduct 
a research in a way that goes beyond adopting the most appropriate research methodology, 
but conducting a research in a responsible and morally defensible manner (Gray, 2009). 
The ethical issues this research study took into account were consent of individual 
participants, protection of identity through practising anonymity and confidentiality of 
participants, protection of participants and other researchers from harm, and avoiding the 
use of deception (Ritchie & Lewis, 2005; Babbie, 2007; Gray, 2009). Furthermore, the 
researcher abided by the requirements of the citation of other researchers‟ work and 
reporting accurate results and research findings. Written permission to conduct research 
with different subjects in selected schools was granted by the relevant education 
authorities. The participants were adults from selected schools and their consent was 
sought well before hand. 
 
1.10. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION 
This research seeks to underpin the process of information security risk management in 
CISs in South African secondary schools. The research study provides a set of guidelines 
that secondary schools would possibly utilise to manage information security risks in their 
CISs. The study would also strive to support and promote active participation in risk 
management by users with baseline information technology skills using generic protection 
and mitigation strategies improvised by schools. Instead of over-relying on large 
organisations for risk management, schools would be able to improvise information 
security solutions peculiar to their own computing environments. Therefore, the set of risk 
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management guidelines deduced in this study might be expanded and adopted by primary 
and secondary schools that use CISs across South Africa.  
 
1.11. RESEARCH PLAN 
The purpose of a research plan is to guide the researcher in completing set tasks in a given 
time frame. The research plan for this study is depicted on Table 1.1 below. 
Table 1.1: Research Action Plan 
Research Activity Date of completion 
Final Research Proposal 3 October 2011 
Chapter 2: Research methodology 01 March 2012 
Chapter 3: Information security overview 01 June 2012 
Chapter 4: Risk management process 02 July 2012 
Chapter 5: Risk management methodologies 30 August 2012 
Chapter 6: The OCTAVE method 30 October 2012 
Chapter 7: Data Collection, presentation, analysis and interpretation 
Designing Instruments and pilot study 30 November 2012 
Data collection, analysis and interpreting results 30 May 2013  
 Chapter 8: conclusion 30 August 2013 
First final draft 30 September 2013 
Second final draft 30 October 2013 
Third final draft 15 November 2013 
Submission  February 2014 
 
1.12. PUBLICATIONS 
The following peer-reviewed publication was derived from this research study. It was 
published and presented at an International Conference Information Security for South 
Africa 2013 where valuable feedback and comments were attained and incorporated in this 
study. Moses Moyo, Hanifa Abdullah and Rita Nienaber, 2013, Information Security 
Risk Management in Small-scale organisations: A Case Study of Secondary Schools‟ 
CISs. In Proceedings of 2013 Information Security for South Africa, (ISSA 2013, #70) 
IEEE Catalog Number, CFP13661-CDR, ISBN 978-1-4799-0809-7 (14 - 16 August 
2013).  
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The research paper was presented at ISSA conference on the 14th of August 2013. The 
Abstract of this paper was also presented at the South African Institute for Computer 
Scientists and Information Technologists (SAICSIT) Masters and Doctoral Symposium on 
the 1st of October 2012. The researcher has an additional publication. Moyo, M and 
Abdullah, H. 2013. Enhancing and Enriching Students Reading Experience by using 
Social Media Technologies, Mousaion South African Journal of Information Studies 31 
(2) 2013, page 135 – 56, ISSN 0027-2639  
 
1.13. DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS 
This study uses a number of terms or concepts that readers may be familiar or unfamiliar 
with. Some of the terms have different meanings from those they denote in this study. This 
subsection is dedicated to definitions of key terms used in this study. 
Computerised information system: This is a computer-based information system that 
processes data into information useful in the support operations of an organisation and 
decision making by management.  
Information security risk analysis: information security risk analysis is a multi-step 
process of determining exposure to security threats that an organisation faces (Goel & 
Chen, 2008). 
Information security risk: Information security risk is any possible threat that exploits 
vulnerability in an information asset of an organisation to cause disruption to the 
organisational routines and processes in one way or the other (Tiwari, 2010).  
Information security: Information security is the practice of ensuring that information is 
only read, heard, changed, broadcast and otherwise used by people who have the right 
to do so (Kite, 2009). It is the preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability 
of information (Theoharidou et al. 2005) 
Information system asset: Information system asset refers to any company-owned 
information system or hardware that is used in the course of business activities (Rouse, 
2007). An information system asset is anything of value that an organisation needs to 
accomplish its mission (Ciechanowicz, 1997). 
Information system: Information system is the collection of technical and human resources 
that provide the storage, computing, distribution, and communication for the 
information required by all or any part of an organisation (Rouse, 2008). 
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Risk assessment: Hoo (2000) regards risk assessment as the process of identifying, 
characterizing, and understanding risk; that is, studying, analysing, and describing the 
set of outcomes and likelihoods for a given endeavour. 
Risk management: Risk management process is defined as a systematic application of 
management policies, procedures and practices to the tasks of establishing the context, 
identifying, analysing, evaluating, treating, monitoring and reviewing risk (AS/NZS 
ISO 31000:2009, 2009).  
Risk mitigation: The process by which an organisation introduces specific measures to 
minimise or eliminate unacceptable risks associated with its operations (Goel & Chen, 
2008).  
Risk: A risk is the potential for an unwanted event to occur and is a function of the 
likelihood of that unwanted event occurring and its consequences (Siu, 2007). A risk 
can be an event, occurrence or actions that may prevent an organisation from realising 
its ambitions, plans and goals (Alhawari, Karadsheh, Talet & Mansour, 2012). 
Security control: A security control is an action, process, device, or system that can 
prevent, or mitigate the effects of, threats to a computer, server or network (Meier, 
Mackman, Dunner, Vasireddy, Escamilla & Murukan, 2006). The process by which an 
organisation introduces specific measures to minimise or eliminate unacceptable risks 
associated with its operations.  
Small-scale organisation: A small organisation is a privately owned or government 
organisation with full time employees between ten and eighty people.  
Threats: A threat is a natural or man-made occurrence, individual, entity, or action that has 
or indicates the potential to harm life, information, operations, the environment, and/or 
property (Elky, 2006; Metras, 2008) 
Virus: A virus is a computer program designed to disrupt computer operations by 
replicating and inserting its copies into other computer programs, data files, or the boot 
sector of the hard drive. 
Vulnerability: Vulnerability is a combination of the attractiveness of a facility as a target 
and the level of deterrence and (or) defence provided by the existing security controls 
(Renfroe & Smith, 2011). Vulnerability is the degree to which the exposed elements of 
an information system will suffer a loss from the impact of a hazard. 
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Worm: This is an independent program which replicates from computer to computer 
across the network connections and always clogging networks and information systems 
as it spreads.  
 
1.14. STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation is organised into eight chapters grouped into four parts, I, II, III and IV. 
Each chapter discusses important aspects of the research study. The outline of the research 
is given below and diagrammatically depicted on Figure 1.1. 
 
PART I: INTRODUCTION  
This section consists of chapters 1 and 2, the introduction and the research methodology 
respectively.  
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter introduces the research and places it into perspective by addressing key 
aspects namely research background, context, motivation, statement of the problem, 
objectives, assumptions, delimitations, limitations and research ethics. The chapter also 
gives the outline of the research 
Chapter 2: Research methodology  
This chapter discusses the methodology, research strategy, design, data collection and 
analysis techniques and tools. The case study research methodology has been discussed 
from both theoretical and practical views. This chapter also justifies qualitative research 
methodology, strategy, design and data collection techniques and analysis. 
PART II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section comprises of Chapter 3, 4 and 5. Each chapter deals with a specific and 
important topic which contributes to the overall outcome of this research study. 
Chapter 3: Information Security Risks Overview 
This chapter is on information security and key concepts vital to this research study. 
The need to maintain or reduce risks in CISs is tied to the major goals of information 
security namely, confidentiality, integrity and availability. The chapter demonstrates 
the link between various information security concepts: assets, risk, threats, 
vulnerabilities, exposures, controls and risk management. 
Chapter 4: Risk management process  
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Chapter 4 is a detailed examination of scholarly work focusing on information security 
risk management. Attention is given to risk management process and its components; 
risk assessment, analysis, and mitigation as exemplified AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 risk 
management framework. 
Chapter 5: Risk management methodologies 
Chapter 5 discusses quantitative and qualitative risk management methodologies. 
Merits and demerits of each category of methods are also discussed in detail in order to 
justify the use of a qualitative risk management method namely, OCTAVE-small. 
 
PART III: EMPIRICAL STUDY 
This section discusses OCTAVE-small risk management and demonstrates how it will be 
used in this research study. The discussions are linked with those made in Section I 
particularly Chapter 2, Research Methodology. Data are presented, analysed and 
interpreted qualitatively. 
Chapter 6: The OCTAVE-small methodology 
This chapter deals with the practical aspects of data collection in schools. It describes 
how the OCTAVE method will be used in conjunction with the research tools discussed 
in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 7: Data presentation, analysis and interpretation  
A rigorous analysis of data is carried out using narrations and constant comparison 
methods. Trends and themes are identified and discussed. Results are presented 
following each data analysis technique. 
 
 
PART IV: CONCLUSION  
In this section, the findings are stated, discussed and conclusions made. Reflections and 
recommendations for further research are put forward. 
Chapter 8: Contribution and Conclusion 
This chapter discusses research findings and then state conclusions from these findings. 
The researcher reflects on the research contribution and gives recommendations for 
further studies. 
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Figure 1.1: Outline of research chapters 
1.15. CONCLUSION 
Schools as emerging users of CISs should play a key role in information security within 
and outside their premises. This chapter has highlighted the need to conduct information 
security risk management exercises in secondary schools‟ CISs. The chapter introduced 
the problem of information security risks that secondary schools may be experiencing. The 
research is intended to educate school managers and CISs users in conducting simple risk 
management programmes on their own. To achieve this, a qualitative case study would be 
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carried out in two selected secondary schools in which the OCTAVE-small method would 
be implemented. The chapter further discussed the motivation, context and problem 
statement of this study. Research objectives were also stated in order to guide the research 
study. Preliminary literature review on issues in information security risks and risk 
management is also documented. Data collection techniques have been identified as 
participatory observation, physical inspections and interviews. Purposive sampling would 
be used to select secondary schools and also the subjects of this research. The structure of 
the dissertation is also outlined and depicted diagrammatically in Figure 1.1. 
 
This study is an initiative to enlighten school managers and CISs users on information 
security risk management. It is anticipated that the findings of this study will play a crucial 
role in information security risk management in South African schools and could assist 
these organisations in performing risk management exercises in their CISs on regular 
bases.  
 
The next chapter, Chapter 2 discusses research methodology, a crucial component of this 
study. It also discusses the research strategy, methods and data collection tools. It also 
justifies the selection of the qualitative case study. 
  
24 
 
CHAPTER 2 
2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Research in any given field of study utilises research methodologies, models and strategies 
based on different philosophical foundations and forms of reality. These philosophical 
assumptions play a crucial role in making a researcher and readers understand the overall 
perspective from which the study is designed and carried out (Krauss, 2005).  
 
Chapter 2 delineates the research methodology followed in this dissertation and also 
explores some contextual factors that affect and influence the choice of a research 
methodology. The chapter justifies the use of the qualitative research methodology that 
implements an interpretive case study strategy in which data generating methods are 
participatory observation, physical inspection and interview. Research instruments to be 
constructed and used in this study are also introduced. This study intends to implement the 
research process suggested by Oates (2006), shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
This chapter‟s structure consists of a brief introduction, a detailed discussion of the 
research methodology under different subsections, namely choosing a research 
methodology, qualitative research methodology, criteria for qualitative research 
methodology, research paradigm and data analysis method. The scope of the study and 
conclusion are also presented as the penultimate and ultimate sections of the chapter. 
  
2.2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this research study was to assist secondary schools that used CISs to 
develop a set of guidelines they would use to effectively manage information security 
risks in their computerised information systems. This study was also intended to enlighten 
secondary school management and users on the essence of information security. The 
research study was performed in two selected secondary schools in Thohoyandou Cluster, 
Vhembe District. The Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation 
for small-scale organisations risk assessment and analysis method was used to study CISs 
in the sampled secondary schools. For this research study to be successful, it utilised an 
information systems research process suggested by Oates (2006) depicted 
diagrammatically in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1: The research methodology model  
Source: Oates (2006) and Nienaber (2008) 
At this stage, the research route is indicated by shaded components of this diagram. 
 
2.2.1. Choosing a research methodology 
This research study utilised a case study research strategy based on qualitative data 
analysis techniques. The choice of a research methodology was determined by the research 
problem being dealt with; in this case, the information security risk management in 
secondary schools‟ CISs. This decision was based on the recommendations by a number 
of research studies that emphasise the importance of selecting a research methodology by 
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first looking at the phenomenon being researched (Cavaye, 1996; Krauss, 2005; Noor, 
2008; Mouton, 2009). These authors suggest that the research methodology employed in a 
research study should focus on a particular phenomenon of interest. Instead of being 
committed to a particular paradigm, the determining factor should be focusing on what the 
researcher is attempting to achieve (Cavaye, 1996; Mouton 2009). Echoing the same 
sentiments, Noor (2008) argues that the choice of a research methodology depends on both 
the nature of the research problem or the social phenomena being explored and the 
research environment in which this takes place. The argument is that focusing on the 
social problem being studied rather than the methodology, enables a researcher to select a 
more appropriate methodology for an inquiry (Falconer & Mackay, 1999). 
 
In an attempt to assist secondary schools to perform risk management exercises for their 
CISs, this research study adopted a research methodology that enabled data collection 
from these sites while the information systems assets were in use. The researcher gathered 
data from the information systems assets, the users and the environment in which they 
were being used. The research methodology used in this study was intended to provide the 
researcher with an opportunity to collect data in the natural settings of the systems, and 
then interpret it according to the meanings the users attached to these data. The qualitative 
research methodology was found to be suitable, especially in the interpretive paradigm. 
The basis on which the qualitative research methodology was chosen is discussed in 
subsequent subsections.  
 
2.2.2. Qualitative research methodology overview 
A number of authors such as Myers and Avison (2002), Goldkuhl (2012) and Myers 
(2011) encourage the use of a qualitative methodology when the research study attempts to 
understand or promote knowledge construction through social meanings attached to 
human experiences. In this study, the use of a qualitative research methodology in 
information security risk management with non-technical personnel in schools provides 
the researcher with an opportunity to understand the risks associated with these 
information systems from the users‟ point of view and related empirical evidence. The 
research strategy and methods used in this study lead to the understanding of the context 
of information systems in secondary schools and how the risks affect the context in which 
these information assets are used. 
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Qualitative research is an inquiry process of understanding a social or human problem 
based on building a complex, holistic picture, formed with words, reporting detailed views 
of informants, and conducted in a natural setting (Cresswell, 2005). A qualitative research 
methodology involves an interpretive and naturalistic approach to its subject matter in 
which researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of or 
interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them (Denzin & Lincolin, 
2008). The primary goal of a qualitative research approach is to describe and then 
understand as opposed to mere explaining social action (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). This 
presents the researcher with an opportunity to understand the meaning that people 
continually construct about an identified problem (Merriam, 2009), in this case how users 
of information systems make sense of security risks and their experience in information 
systems. Therefore, the purpose of qualitative research methodology in this research study 
is to adopt, create and use a variety of qualitative research methods to describe the rich 
interpersonal, social and cultural contexts in which CISs are used in secondary schools.  
 
2.2.3. Criteria for qualitative research 
Two domains need to be considered when developing a qualitative research design: the 
criteria for soundness and demonstrating that the proposed work would be useful to the 
research context and the initial research objectives or questions (Marshall & Rossmann, 
2006; Trochim, 2006). The criteria for soundness (objectivity) of qualitative research are 
related to, but defined very differently from those used in the quantitative research 
tradition (Golafshani, 2003; Trochim, 2006). The four main criteria for objectivity namely 
credibility, transferability, dependability and conformability as applied to qualitative 
research are described by Babbie and Mouton (2001), Marshall and Rossmann (2006) and 
Trochim (2006). Table 2.1 is an illustration of quantitative and qualitative notions of 
objectivity propounded by Babbie and Mouton (2001) and Trochim (2006).  
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Table 2.1: Quantitative and qualitative views of objectivity 
Traditional criteria for 
judging quantitative research 
Traditional criteria for 
judging qualitative research 
Internal validity Credibility, trustworthiness 
External validity Transferability 
Reliability Dependability 
Objectivity Conformability 
Source: Babbie and Mouton (2001) and Trochim (2006) 
A brief discussion of each qualitative notion of objectivity is given below. 
 
2.2.3.1. Credibility 
Qualitative studies use a number of terms such as quality, rigour, credibility and 
trustworthiness to describe research methodology validity (Golafshani, 2003). Credibility 
means accurate identification and description of the phenomenon by the research study 
(Yin 2003). This involves determining if the results of qualitative research are credible or 
believable from the perspective of the participants in the research (Trochim, 2006). The 
strength of a qualitative research study that seeks to explore a problem or process depends 
on its credibility (Marshall & Rossmann, 2006; Yin, 2003). Research credibility is ensured 
by clearly stating the parameters of the study such as the settings, population and 
theoretical framework (Trochim, 2006). In this research, credibility deals with the quality 
of data collected and the soundness of reasoning that lead to the conclusions based on the 
data. This study preserves credibility through a number of strategies namely: 
 a proper balance between the researcher‟s involvement in the research, influence 
on other participants and its effects on the data to be collected (Morse, Barrett, 
Mayan, Olson & Spiers, 2002);  
 the researcher avoiding preconceived ideas about the subject being studied during 
data analysis, but to concentrate on the empirical data gathered during the research 
(Golafshani, 2003);  
 providing justification in the event that the researcher develops alternative 
explanations and finding (Voss, Tsikriktsis & Frohlich, 2002); and 
 triangulation, the use of multiple data generating methods, for the researcher to 
consider observed phenomena from different perspectives (Cresswell and Miller, 
2000). 
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2.2.3.2. Transferability 
Transferability refers to the degree to which the results of qualitative research can be 
generalised or transferred to other contexts or settings that may be problematic (Marshall 
& Rossmann, 2001; Dooley, 2002; Trochim, 2006). Research transferability is enhanced 
by thoroughly describing the research context and the assumptions that are central to the 
research (Marshall & Rossmann, 2001; Dooley, 2002). It is the responsibility of the 
researcher or person who wishes to transfer the results to a different context to make the 
judgment of how sensible the transfer would be (Trochim, 2006). This study uses a multi-
case or collective of cases to cater for transferability.  
2.2.3.3. Dependability  
Dependability is the ability of a research study to account for the ever-changing context 
within which the research occurs (Trochim, 2006). While quantitative approaches view 
reliability as based on the assumption of replicability or repeatability, qualitative 
approaches emphasise on dependability instead (Voss et al. 2002). A qualitative research 
is difficult to replicate, therefore, the need to emphasise on transparency and explicitness 
about the research processes to be conducted and justification of the choices of research 
methods and data collection tools (Golafshani, 2003). To achieve this, Yin (2003) and 
Trochim (2006) encourage the researcher to take responsibility in describing the changes 
that occur in the setting and how these changes would affect the way the researcher 
approached the study. For this research, measures for maintaining dependability involve 
systematically gathering data by means of prior identified key items in information 
systems users‟ activities and observable information security risks in the schools involved. 
This would extend to the processing of data using consistent coding systems and verifiable 
descriptions and interpretations. 
 
2.2.3.4. Conformability 
Conformability is the degree of neutrality or the extent to which the findings of a study are 
shaped by the respondents and not by the researcher‟s bias, motivation or interest (Lincoln 
& Guba, 1985), or the degree to which the findings of a research study could be confirmed 
or corroborated by others (Trochim, 2006). This means that the focus of the study should 
be evidence itself and not some inherent characteristics of the researcher (Marshall & 
Rossmann, 2006; Yin, 2003). Research conformability can be achieved by documenting 
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all the procedures for checking and rechecking the data throughout the study (Trochim, 
2006). This allows the researcher to conduct and examine the data collection and analysis 
procedures and make judgements about the potential for bias or distortion (Golafshani, 
2003; Yin, 2003; Trochim, 2006). Alternatively, the researcher can make the data 
available for scrutiny by research participants and other interested readers (Golafshani, 
2003). In this research study, participants will have access to all data collected so that they 
confirm the credibility of the data.  
 
2.2.4. Research paradigm 
A research paradigm is an all-encompassing principles system of interrelated practice and 
thinking that define the nature of enquiry along these three dimensions (TerreBlanche & 
Durrheim, 1999). A paradigm is a pattern, model or shared way of thinking (Bharadwaj, 
2000; Myers, 2004; Oates, 2006). Different philosophical paradigms hold different views 
on the nature of reality about the world (ontology) and the methods used to acquire 
knowledge about it (epistemology) (Nienaber, 2008; Myers, 2011). Each paradigm is 
implemented using related methodological approaches and strategies (Nienaber, 2008). 
Research in information systems is based on three main paradigms namely positivist, 
interpretive and critical (Bharadwaj, 2000; Myers, 2011). Existing literature on 
information systems research methodologies indicates that positivist and interpretive 
paradigms are the two major competing philosophical perspectives in use in this area 
(Myers, 2004). The same literature also reports that qualitative research is mainly 
influenced by interpretive philosophical perspective (Bharadwaj, 2000; Myers & Avison, 
2002; Weber, 2004; de Villers, 2005; Stockdale & Standing; 2006). Based on the research 
problem to be explored by this study, the interpretive paradigm has been identified as the 
most suitable philosophical assumption. 
 
Research studies that utilise interpretive paradigm emphasise the understanding of 
phenomena through the meanings that people assign to them (Myers, 2004; Warden & 
Wong, 2007). An interpretive researcher seeks to understand values, beliefs and meanings 
of social phenomena in order to gain a deep and sympathetic understanding of human 
cultural activities and experiences (Kim, 2003; Myers, 2004). This implies that, 
interpretive methods of research in information systems are designed to produce an 
understanding of the context of the information system, and the process whereby the 
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information system influences and is influenced by that context (Walsham, 2006; Nyame-
Asiamah & Patel, 2009). The interpretive perspective emphasises the creativity aspects of 
science and how scientific knowledge is built through subjective interpretations of 
observations in the context of the researcher's knowledge and mental models (Bharadwaj, 
2000; Goldkuhl, 2008; Myers, 2009). 
 
2.2.5. Preliminary literature review 
After identifying the research methodology, this study embarks on a preliminary literature 
review in the field of study in which the problem falls. This exercise is meant to ascertain 
the extent to which this problem has been addressed by previous researchers and also the 
gaps and outstanding issues to be addressed. This preliminary literature review helps in 
formulating research objectives for the study. Figure 2.1 shows the research process being 
followed in this study.  
 
2.2.6. Objectives 
This study was guided by objectives. The main objective and its sub-objectives are 
revisited below.  
 
2.2.6.1. Main objective 
The main objective of this research study was to assist secondary schools that used CISs to 
develop a set of guidelines they would use to effectively manage information security risks 
in their computerised information systems. 
2.2.6.2. Sub-objectives 
The research sub-objectives were to: 
1. systematically gather data on critical assets and information security controls in 
CISs of two secondary schools; 
2.  identify an easy to use risk management methodology that non-technical personnel 
in secondary schools can utilise.  
3.  deduce generic guidelines that could be followed during information security risk 
management at a secondary school that take into account CISs users who are not 
experts in risk management. 
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Having identified the research approach, paradigm and objectives for this study, it is 
important to discuss the research strategy to be used. In the following subsection, the 
researcher discusses the case study research strategy which is used in this study.  
 
2.2.7. Case study research strategy 
The development of a research strategy is based on the research paradigm that the research 
study adopts (Merriam, 2009). A research strategy is a set of guidelines and instructions to 
be followed in addressing a research problem (Mutchnick & Berg, 1996). The main 
function of a research strategy is to enable the researcher to maximise the credibility of the 
eventual results (Mouton, 2009). Commonly used research strategies are the survey, 
design and creation, experiment, case study, action research and ethnography (Oates, 
2006), shown on Figure 2.1. This research study utilises a qualitative case study research 
strategy. A case study is: 
 an empirical inquiry that investigates a new phenomenon within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident (Yin, 2003). 
 a research strategy used to generate an in-depth, multi-faceted understanding of a 
complex issue in its real-life context (Crowe, Cresswell, Robertson, Huby, Avery 
and Sheikh, 2011).  
Therefore, a case study is a practical-based research strategy in which a researcher studies 
contemporary issues in their natural settings with the intention of gaining an understanding 
of the complexities surrounding them.  
 
A case study can be used to study a single or a multiple of related cases of some social 
phenomenon such as a village or family (Babbie, 2007; Gray, 2009). This can also extend 
to schools which are social entities. There are three reasons that make a case study the 
most viable research strategy one could use in trying to solve a social problem. These 
include: 
 the opportunity for the researcher to study the phenomenon in its natural settings 
with the intention of understanding the nature of current processes in an area which 
has been barely studied previously (Shanks & Parr, 2003; Yin, 2003; Myers, 2011); 
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 the opportunity for the researcher to ask the „what, how and why‟ questions, with 
the intention to understand the nature and complexity of the processes taking place 
(Dooley, 2002; Yin, 2003; Creswell, 2005); and 
 the flexibility that the case study research strategy presents to the researcher 
(Creswell, 2005). 
 
The choice of a case study in this research indicates the researcher‟s interest in a specific 
phenomenon and wishes to understand it completely, not by controlling variables but 
rather by observing all of the variables and their interacting relationships as suggested by 
Dooley (2002). The case study allows the use of any data collection methods, triangulation 
(Shanks & Parr, 2003; Creswell, 2005; Goldkuhl, 2012; Yin, 2003; Myers, 2011). This 
study uses a multiple of research methods within the data-generation process namely, 
participatory observation, physical inspection and interview. These techniques are to be 
used in conjunction with a particular information security risk management technique 
namely, OCTAVE-small.  
 
The risk assessment and analysis method, OCTAVE-small, used in studying the 
information systems has a direct influence on the choice of the case study strategy. 
OCTAVE-small is a qualitative technique that requires data collection methods that allow 
the researchers to study the information systems through interactions with system users 
and the systems (Alberts and Dorofee, 2001). Such methods include observations, 
inspections, interviews and possibly workshops and brainstorming. This illustrates that 
this research methodology is suitable because the data collection techniques this study 
uses are similar to those used by the OCTAVE-small risk method. The OCTAVE-small 
method is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
 
The main criticism of a case study research is its inability to generalise findings (Shanks & 
Parr, 2003; Stockdale & Standing 2006). Secondly, the case study is criticised for being 
difficult to design and evaluate according to the criteria of the natural science model of 
research which emphasises on controlled observations, controlled deductions, replicability 
and generalisability (Yin, 2003; Cresswell, 2005; Myers, 2011). These concerns have been 
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discussed above under credibility, transferability, dependability and conformability in sub-
sections 2.2.3.1 to 2.2.3.4.  
 
A key feature of the design of the case study research is the number of cases included in a 
research study (Goldkuhl, 2008; Merriam, 2009; Myers, 2011). A case study research that 
intends to learn about a unique phenomenon utilises an intrinsic single case in which the 
researcher defines the uniqueness of this phenomenon which distinguishes it from all 
others (Crowe et al. 2011). Multiple cases are preferable when the purpose of the research 
is to describe phenomena, develop and test theories (Merriam, 2009; Myers, 2011).  
 
This research study utilises the collective or multi-case study framework that would enable 
the researcher to study two secondary schools. The two schools will be drawn from the 
Thohoyandou Cluster in Vhembe District. This is done in an attempt to generate a still and 
broader appreciation of a particular issue (Crowe et al. 2011), in this case information 
security risk management in CISs in secondary schools. 
 
2.2.8. Research design 
Research design is the overall strategy that the researcher utilises to integrate different 
components of the study in a coherent and logical way, thereby ensuring that one will 
effectively address the research problem; it constitutes the blueprint for the collection, 
measurement, and analysis of data (De Vaus, 2001; Trochim, 2006). This research study 
utilises a qualitative case study design described in the preceding subsections of this 
chapter. The design being used in this study takes into account how data were to be 
collected, instruments to be employed, how the instruments were to be used and the 
intended means for analysing data collected. Subsequent subsections elucidate on the 
components of research design used in this study. 
 
2.2.9. Qualitative data generation methods 
Data generation is a step that follows research design as shown in Figure 2.1. The 
underlying principle in generating data in a case study research is that of triangulation, the 
use and combination of different methods to study the same phenomenon (Voss et al. 
2002; Cresswell, 2005; Myers, 2011). This study uses a number of data generating 
methods namely participation observation, inspection and interview, which are the main 
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methods of collecting qualitative data in a case study (Dooley, 2002; Cresswell, 2005; 
Crowe et al. 2011). The selected data collection methods facilitate direct interaction of the 
researcher and individuals in the research sample on a one to one basis or in a group 
setting (Hancock, 2002; Stockdale & Standing 2006).  
 
Observation is a data collection technique in which the researcher collects data by 
watching the behaviours, events or noting physical characteristics in their natural setting 
(Creswell, 2005; Ritchie & Lewis, 2005, Evaluation Briefs, 2008). Participatory 
observation is the primary data generating method in this study. The use of participatory 
observation method gives the researcher an opportunity to collect data on a wide range of 
behaviours, to capture a great variety of interactions, and to openly explore the research 
topic (Hancock, 2002; Mark, Woodsong, Guest & Namey, 2005; Stockdale & Standing 
2006).  
 
In addition to participatory observation, this study utilises an interview designed to elicit a 
vivid picture of the participant‟s perspective on the research topic (Mark et al. 2005). 
Interviews are the means by which the researcher would best access case study 
participants‟ views and interpretations of actions and events (Darke, Shanks & Broadbent, 
1998; Merriam, 2009). Interviews also enable the researcher to collect data on 
perspectives of research participants which are different from those collected using 
participatory observation method. The interview enables research participants to talk about 
their personal feelings, opinions and experiences on a topical issue (Mark et al. 2005; 
Maxwell, 2008). The data from interview would aid the researcher in gaining insight into 
how users interpret risks associated with their information systems.  
 
Data collection methods used in a qualitative case study are time consuming and 
consequently data are collected from a smaller number of samples than when quantitative 
methods are used (Cresswell, 2005; Mouton, 2009). This study will use a purposive 
sample of two secondary schools which make use of CISs. Only the users of the CISs and 
of those computers they use form the population from which the research sample will be 
drawn.   
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Another major challenge of a qualitative case study relates to the researcher‟s ability to 
deal with large volumes of data (Cresswell, 2005; Merriam, 2009, Myers, 2011). This 
study utilises data management and analysis techniques suggested by Cresswell (2005), 
Oates (2006) and Merriam (2009) that include data preparation, data reduction, data 
analysis and interpretation or conclusion drawing. 
 
Data preparation is the structuring of data into a format ready for analysis (Nienaber, 
2008). Data from observations will be entered into computer files in tabular form while 
that from the interviews will be transcribed and then entered into computer files for easy 
readability and manipulation. After data preparation, the next step involves data analysis. 
 
Data analysis is the process of making sense out of the data by consolidating, reducing 
and interpreting what people have said and what the researcher has seen and read 
(Merriam, 2009). Thorough analysis of data brings forth a clear understanding of various 
elements of these data. During this process, data are inspected to determine relationship 
among concepts, constructs or variables (Nienaber, 2008). Therefore, the major objective 
of data analysis is to identify or isolate any clear trends, patterns or even themes in the 
data (Nienaber, 2008; Merriam, 2009).  
 
Qualitative data analysis consists of three concurrent flows of activities namely data 
reduction, data display and interpretation or conclusion drawing (Miles & Huberman, 
1994). These three activities are interwoven before, during and after data collection and 
preparation (Gerber, 2006). Figure 2.2 shows that qualitative data analysis is continuous 
and interactive.  
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Figure 2.2: Interactive model of qualitative data analysis  
Source: Miles and Huberman (1994) 
 
Data reduction is the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting and 
transforming qualitative data (Gerber, 2006). In this study data reduction will involve 
identification of broad themes within the research problem where relevant data would be 
further categorised and ordered by identifying broad categories and units as suggested by 
Marshall and Rossman (2006) and Nienaber (2008). This categorisation would be based 
on deductive approach, (data treatment guided by existing theories) or based on inductive 
approach where categories emerge purely from data explored (Nienaber, 2008; Mouton, 
2009). Data categorisation leads to establishing interconnections among the categories that 
would be used for analysis. 
 
Data display process involves assembling and organising information into accessible and 
compact form intended to draw conclusions (Gerber, 2006). To draw conclusions and 
verify the research findings, the researcher interprets the data in a more meaningful way. 
Data interpretation involves synthesising of research data based on identified trends, into 
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on observed patterns or trends in data (Nienaber, 2008). The researcher decides what the 
data mean (Gerber, 2006). Data analysis is based on a given method.  
 
2.2.10. Data analysis method 
The process of research presented in Figure 2.1 shows that this research study uses a 
qualitative data analysis method. This arises from the fact that this study will generate 
mainly qualitative data. The expected data forms would be mainly non-numerical, such as 
words, images, documents, tapes and researcher‟s notes on diaries and possibly memos 
(Cresswell, 2005; Nienaber, 2008; Merriam, 2009). This study uses data from 
participatory observation, inspections, interviews and possibly output documents from the 
CISs being studied. 
 
2.2. SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
This study addresses information security risk management in secondary schools‟ CISs.  
The purpose of the research study was to provide a set of guidelines to assist secondary 
schools to effectively manage information security risks in their computerised information 
systems. The study also established how secondary schools protected their CISs and then 
advocated for simple risk management solutions that non-technical personnel would easily 
apply to manage identified risks within their CISs. A case study research strategy was used 
and a risk management exercise was performed in two secondary schools‟ CISs using the 
OCTAVE-small technique. The study also concentrated on those information systems 
used for administrative purposes, their surroundings and the users of the systems.  
 
2.3. CONCLUSION 
A research study is normally conducted in the manner guided by the research methodology 
and philosophy subscribed to, the research strategy employed, data generating methods 
and research instruments utilised in the pursuit of the research objectives and the quest for 
the solution to the problem. The research methodology used in this dissertation has been 
implemented according to the research process suggested by Oates (2006). Table 2.2 is a 
summary of important components of the research methodology used. 
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Table 2.2: Dissertation research methodology 
Research methodology  This dissertation 
Research paradigm Interpretive 
Research strategy Case study 
Data generation methods Participatory observation, inspections, 
interview, documents 
Data analysis Qualitative 
 
This chapter expands on the research methodology ideas outlined in the introductory 
chapter. A detailed account of research methodology to be implemented in this study has 
been given. It also links the research objectives to the research methodology and the risk 
assessment and analysis method, namely OCTAVE-small. Up to this point, this chapter 
has served the purpose of putting this research study into context. The next major section 
of this dissertation is Part II, Literature Review consisting of Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
 
  
41 
 
PART II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
  
42 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
3. INFORMATION SECURITY RISKS OVERVIEW 
 
 
 
  
 
 
PART I 
INTRODUCTION 
AND RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
PART II 
LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
 
PART III 
EMPIRICAL 
STUDY 
 
PART IV 
CONCLUSION 
43 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
All assets in an organisation are exposed to a certain level of risk due to various threats. 
Information systems assets seem to be the most affected. Threats to information systems 
assets may be due to natural events, accidents or intentional acts and tend to cause harm to 
these assets (Elky, 2009). Under these circumstances, managing information security risk 
becomes a big challenge for any organisation which deals with permanent, temporary 
storage or transfer of information (Tiwari, 2010). Regardless of the nature and source of 
threats, it remains the responsibility of the owners of assets to limit or manage risks from 
these threats to the extent possible. The best way of counteracting risks is by conducting a 
proper risk management exercise for the CISs.  
 
The first step in attaining the objectives of this study was to gather data that was used to 
establish the types of information security risks to which secondary schools CISs were 
exposed to, and the security controls in place to counter each identified risk. In order to 
achieve these objectives, a detailed literature review was done on information security 
risks, threats and vulnerabilities.  
 
Common threats and threat sources associated with CISs are presented. Information 
security breaches arising from some of the threats are also discussed from a global 
perspective and then contextualised to secondary schools situations. Possible security 
controls to these security threats are discussed in subsequent chapters. The chapter 
addresses research sub-objectives 1 and 2 formulated in Chapter 1. 
 
The outline of this chapter is as follows: the introduction highlights important concepts of 
information security risks; a general overview of risk factors; threats, exposure and 
vulnerability. Information security breaches are also identified as the discussion unfolds. 
The conclusion summarises the main ideas of this chapter and then links with Chapter 4.  
 
3.2. WHAT IS INFORMATION SECURITY? 
Information security is 
 the practice of ensuring that information is only read, heard, changed, broadcast and 
otherwise used by people who have the right to do so (Kite, 2009); 
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 the preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information 
(Theoharidou et al. 2005); 
 the methodology used to protect information and information systems from 
unauthorised access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction. It 
pertains to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data in various forms 
(print, electronic, or other forms) and can be applied by any type of organisation 
(corporations, financial institutions, hospitals, military, and governments) (South 
African Centre for Information Security, 2010 ).  
 
Confidentiality is the protection of information against theft and eavesdropping (Chen, 
2009). Integrity is the protection of information against unauthorised modification and 
masquerade (Elky, 2006; Chen, 2009). Availability refers to dependable access of users to 
authorised information, particularly in light of attacks such as denial of service against 
information systems (Elky, 2006; Chen, 2009).  
 
In this study, information security refers to the protection of all elements of an information 
system namely hardware, software, information, people and processes. The importance of 
information security increases as the use of and reliance on information by an organisation 
grows (Kite, 2009). Information security requires a range of skills and knowledge that are 
rarely found in small-scale organisations like high schools. 
 
Information security and risk management are related to a number of important concepts 
that need to be explored. Section 3.4 is a detailed exploration of the important concepts. 
 
3.3. INFORMATION SECURITY RISK, THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES 
Literature reveals that consensus exists on what a risk is and clearly distinguishes it from a 
threat. A risk is the potential that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or 
group of assets to cause loss or damage to the asset (Ciechanowicz, 1997). In this regard, a 
risk is the potential for an unwanted event to occur and is a function of the likelihood of 
that unwanted event occurring and its consequences (Siu, 2007). Tiwari (2010) 
substantiate this by arguing that an information security risk is any possible threat that 
exploits vulnerabilities in the asset of an organisation to cause disruption to the 
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organisational routines and processes in one way or the other. Generally, a risk is any 
event, occurrence or actions that may prevent an organisation from realising its ambitions, 
plans and goals (Alhawari, Karadsheh, Talet & Mansour, 2012). A risk occurs when there 
is a likelihood of a given threat-source exercising a particular potential vulnerability in the 
asset, and results into an impact of adverse effect on the organisation (Elky, 2006). From 
these definitions, it could be argued that a risk is associated with a threat exploiting a 
potential weakness in the protection of an asset and has negative effects on the 
organisation concerned.  
 
A risk arises from three conditions called risk factors (contextual problems), namely the 
existence of a threat (hazard), exposure of an asset to that threat and the vulnerability in 
the asset (Pare, Scott, Jaana & Giroud, 2008; Tiwari, 2010; Alhawari et al. 2012). A threat 
can be a natural or man-made occurrence, individual, entity, or action that has or indicates 
the potential to harm life, information, operations, the environment, and/or property 
(United States of America Department of Home Security DHS, 2010). The existence of a 
threat implies that there exists the capability and intention of an adversary to undertake 
actions that could be detrimental to an organisation‟s interests (Elky, 2006). A threat 
transforms to a hazard when presented with an opportunity to utilise an asset‟s existing 
vulnerability. In this case a hazard is a single event or series of events characterised by the 
magnitude and likelihood of occurrence (Metras, 2008). Hazardous conditions or events 
can be triggered by nature, intentionally or accidentally by humans, which could cause 
disruptions, harm or loss of service provided by an information system. Figure 3.1 shows 
the Crichton (2009) risk triangle of hazard, exposure and vulnerability commonly used to 
show the relationship that leads to risk.   
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Figure 3.1: The risk triangle  
Source: Crichton (2009) 
 
An information security exposure is a system configuration issue, mistake in software or a 
problem according to some reasonable security policy that allows access to information or 
capabilities that can be used by an attacker as a stepping stone into the system or network 
(Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures CVE, 2012). Exposure refers to the state of 
leaving an asset without protection against something harmful. In this case an asset is in 
the condition of being subject to some detrimental effect or harmful condition (Aven, 
2012). Crichton‟s risk triangle suggests that the broader the base of the triangle (exposure) 
the greater the risk to which an asset is exposed. A threat can only attack an asset if a 
vulnerability, a flaw or weakness exists in that asset and could be exploited by an 
adversary to cause damage to an organisation‟s interests (Tiwari, 2010). Vulnerability is a 
combination of the attractiveness of a facility as a target and the level of deterrence and 
(or) defence provided by the existing security controls (Renfroe & Smith, 2011). 
Therefore, vulnerability is the degree to which the exposed elements of an information 
system will suffer a loss, from the impact of a hazard. A threat-source does not present a 
risk when there is no vulnerability that can be exercised (Stoneburner et al. 2002). 
 
This discussion indicates that information systems assets are always at risk and it is 
imperative for information systems users to be aware of the types of risks so that 
appropriate decisions are made to safeguard the assets for the smooth running of an 
organisation.   
 
Exposure 
 Risk 
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The Crichton risk triangle plays a vital role in this study as it illustrates the link between 
threats to information systems assets, their exposure to these threats and vulnerabilities 
that could be exploited by threats. To aid the Crichton triangle is the United States 
Department of Commerce Office of Security OYS (2011) conception of asset, threat and 
vulnerability links that lead to risk, shown in Figure 3.2. This is based on the formula: 
 
Risk = Impact x (Threat x Vulnerability). 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Asset, threat and vulnerability diagram  
Source: OSY (2011) 
 
Vulnerabilities in information systems‟ assets are apportioned to flaws or weakness in 
system security procedures, design, implementation or internal security controls that are 
likely to be exploited and result in security breaches or a violation of the system‟s security 
policy (Elky, 2006; Goel & Chen, 2008; Tiwari, 2010). In the long run, the flaws in the 
information asset are likely to be accidentally triggered or intentionally exploited by 
threats.  
 
The following section is a brief outline of common information systems assets likely to be 
found in various organisations.  
 
3.4. COMMON INFORMATION SYSTEMS ASSETS 
An information system asset is anything of value that an organisation needs in order to 
accomplish its mission (Ciechanowicz, 1997). Information systems comprise of both 
tangible and intangible assets (Goel & Chen, 2008). Tangible assets include software, 
hardware and data while intangible assets include reputation, operations, trust and morale 
 
Risk 
 
Threat 
Vulnerability 
Likelihood of  
Unwanted  
Event 
 
Asset Impact of 
unwanted event 
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(Tohidi, 2010), and information technology services (Microsoft TechNet, 2006). There are 
critical and non-critical information system assets depending on how important are the 
operations that each asset is supporting. These vary from organisation to organisation 
(Goel & Chen, 2008). Security breaches of more critical assets have greater effects, 
damage or disruptions to the operations of the organisation, than less or non-critical assets 
(Goel & Chen, 2008). Literature surveyed indicates that some of the information systems 
assets found in small-scale organisations match those found in large-scale organisations.  
 
Microsoft TechNet (2006) provides a comprehensive list of common information systems 
assets and their ratings. Table 3.1 is a customised list of common information systems 
assets in various organisations. The asset values used are based on how critical an asset is 
in the attainment of organisational objectives. 
 
Table 3.1: Common information systems assets 
Asset class Name Description Asset value 
T
a
n
g
ib
le
 
Servers Hardware Critical 
Desktop computers Hardware Non-critical 
Mobile computers Hardware Critical 
Cell phones Hardware Non-critical 
End-user application software Software Non-critical 
Routers Hardware Critical 
Antiviruses Software Critical 
Network switches Hardware Critical 
Operating systems Software  Critical 
Firewalls Software / hardware Critical 
Removable media (tapes, CD-ROMs, 
DVDs, portable hard drives, PC card 
storage devices, USB storage 
devices) 
Hardware Non-critical 
Power supplies Hardware Critical 
Uninterruptible power supplies Hardware Non-critical 
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Asset class Name Description Asset value 
Air conditioning systems Hardware Critical 
Air filtration systems Hardware Non-critical 
Other environmental control systems  Non-critical 
Human resources data Information Critical 
Financial data Information Critical 
Employee passwords Information Critical 
Employee personal contact data Information Non-critical 
In
ta
n
g
ib
le
 
Reputation   Critical 
Goodwill   Non-critical 
Employee moral   Non-critical 
Reputation   Critical 
Employee productivity   Critical 
S
er
v
ic
es
 
E-mail/scheduling  Non-critical 
Instant messaging  Non-critical 
Enterprise management tools  Critical 
File sharing  Critical 
Storage  Critical 
Source: Microsoft TechNet (2006) - Customised 
This list forms the basis on which secondary schools‟ CISs assets will be identified. The 
next section discusses common information security threats and possible sources.  
3.5. COMMON INFORMATION SECURITY THREATS AND SOURCES 
Information security risks have been found to be a result of many different threats-sources 
such as natural disasters, security breaches, poorly designed software, third-party vendors, 
unstable computing environment and project fail-users (Elky, 2006; Alhawari et al. 2012). 
Authors in information security categorise these various information security threats as 
natural, human or environmental threats (Kite 2009). Elky (2006) provides a summary of 
common threats to information security in CISs regardless of the nature and size of an 
organisation. Table 3.2 is a summary of common security threats and sources  
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Table 3.2: Common threats to information security 
Threat/threat 
sources 
Description 
Acts of nature 
 
All types of natural occurrences (earthquakes, floods, fire) 
that may damage or affect an information system or 
application. Any of these potential threats could lead to a 
partial or a total system outage, thereby affecting availability 
Accidental disclosure The unauthorized or accidental release of classified, personal, 
or sensitive information that affects confidentiality 
Intentional alteration 
of software or 
alteration of data 
An intentional modification, insertion, deletion of operating 
system or application system programs, whether by an 
authorised user or not. This compromises the confidentiality, 
availability, or integrity of data, programs, system, or 
resources controlled by the system. 
Bandwidth usage The accidental or intentional use of communications 
bandwidth for other than intended purposes. 
System configuration 
error (accidental) 
An accidental configuration error during the initial installation 
or upgrade of hardware, software, communication equipment or 
operational environment. 
Malicious software 
and infections 
Use of malicious code, such as logic bombs, Trojan horses, 
trapdoors, and viruses infect crucial system files and data. 
This compromises confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
Theft of data or 
computer hardware 
Unauthorised copying of personal information or records by 
an individual. Physical removal of computing hardware from 
designated points without authorisation, or through burglary. 
Telecommunication 
malfunction/ 
interruption 
Any communications link, unit or component failure sufficient 
to cause interruptions in the data transfer via 
telecommunications between computer terminals, remote or 
distributed processors, and host computing facility. 
Electrical interference/ 
disruption 
An interference or fluctuation may occur as the result of a 
commercial power failure. This may cause denial of service to 
authorized users (failure) or a modification of data 
(fluctuation). 
Source: Elky (2006) 
Most of the threats shown on Table 3.2 pose information security breaches and may cause 
risks security in information systems (Cate, 2005; Potter & Beard, 2010). Small-scale 
51 
 
organisations, particularly schools may find it difficult to identify or detect and decisively 
deal with threats/threats sources before they impact negatively on the information systems.  
 
3.6. INFORMATION SECURITY BREACHES 
An information security breach is a situation where an individual intentionally exceeds or 
misuses network, system, or data access in a manner that negatively affects the security of 
the organisation‟s data, systems, or operations (Kassner, 2009). Information security 
breaches in an organisation take many forms and occur in a wide variety of settings 
depending on the intention of the attacker and the possible existing vulnerabilities (Cate, 
2005). The most prevalent information security breaches on large and small-scale 
organisations as identified by Cate (2005), Kite (2009), Schmidt (2011), and Potter and 
Waterfall (2012) are summarised below: 
 system failure or data corruption (Kite, 2009); 
 infection by viruses or other malicious software (Kite, 2009; Potter &Waterfall, 
2012); 
 theft or fraud involving computers, for example a person stealing an unsecured 
organisation laptop containing personal information (Cate, 2005; Kite, 2009); 
 other incidents caused by staff employed by the organisation (Cate, 2005); 
 attacks by an unauthorised outsider (including hacking attempts) on an 
organisation‟s computerised records containing personalised information; and 
 an organisation disposing off records containing personal information into a trash 
dumpster without properly destroying the personal information by shredding, 
erasing, or otherwise modifying the personal information in the records to make it 
unreadable or indecipherable through any means (Schmidt, 2011; Potter & 
Waterfall, 2012). 
A technical report on security breaches by Potter and Waterfall (2012) indicates that 
small-scale organisations also suffer from major security breaches. The report alludes to 
the use of social networks and externally hosted software services as having moved the 
Internet use beyond just websites and email but as a vehicle to change the computing 
environment. However, Potter and Waterfall (2012) also argue that the changing 
computing environment has created new vulnerabilities, which criminals are adapting their 
techniques by exploiting these vulnerabilities. 
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Small-scale organisations, such as secondary schools are likely to fall prey to some of 
these security breaches through commission, omission, oversight or ignorance on the part 
of the school management and users of CISs. Individuals, who access school information 
systems, authorised or not, have different motives likely to have serious consequences on 
these assets. Table 3.3 lists possible vulnerabilities. 
 
Table 3.3: List of vulnerabilities in information systems assets 
High level 
vulnerability class 
Brief description of the vulnerability 
Physical 
  
Unlocked doors 
Unguarded access to computing facilities 
Insufficient fire suppression systems 
Flammable materials used in construction 
Flammable materials used in finishing 
Unlocked windows 
Walls susceptible to physical assault 
Interior walls do not completely seal the room at both the ceiling and 
floor 
Facility located in a flood zone 
Hardware 
Missing patches 
Out-dated firmware 
Misconfigured systems 
Systems not physically secured 
Management protocols allowed over public interfaces 
Software 
Out of date antivirus software 
Missing patches 
Poorly written applications 
Deliberately placed weaknesses 
 Vendor backdoors for management or system recovery 
 Spyware  
 Trojan horses 
Configuration errors 
 Manual provisioning leading to inconsistent configurations 
 Systems not hardened 
 Systems not audited 
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High level 
vulnerability class 
Brief description of the vulnerability 
 Systems not monitored 
Media Electrical interference 
Communications 
Unencrypted network protocols 
Connections to multiple networks 
Unnecessary protocols allowed 
No filtering between network segments 
Human 
Poorly defined procedures 
Insufficient incident response preparedness 
Manual provisioning 
Insufficient disaster recovery plans 
Testing on production systems 
Violations not reported 
Poor change control 
Stolen credentials 
Source Microsoft TechNet (2006) -Customised 
During the proposed risk assessment and analysis exercise, this study will also attempt to 
ascertain whether these vulnerabilities exist in secondary schools‟ computerised 
information systems assets.  
 
3.7. CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed information security risks and cited a number of security threats 
and breaches most likely to impact negatively on an information system regardless of the 
nature and size of the concerned organisation. The literature reviewed shows that a 
tripartite link of threat, exposure and vulnerability to information systems assets could lead 
to risks. The types of information security risks, threats, exposures and vulnerabilities that 
exist within the context of an organisation were delineated in an effort to determine the 
factors that drive such risks. Security breaches have been described as either intentional or 
unintentional. The discussion indicates that human beings are the major cause of security 
threats and breaches in organisations that use CISs. 
In an attempt to achieve the objectives of this study, this chapter forms the basis for 
subsequent chapters to explore different types of threats, exposures and vulnerabilities. 
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Chapter 4 discusses the risk management process alluding to a standardised framework, 
the AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 before exploring the OCTAVE-small risk method in 
Chapters 5 and 6. This is intended to examine the process of risk management using a 
framework which allows integration of any risk management methodology to practically 
perform risk management exercise. 
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4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Risk management is a basic management activity that helps an organisation to meet its 
objectives through the allocation of resources to undertake planning, make decisions and 
carry out productive activities (Shortreed, Hicks & Craig, 2003). With the aid of a risk 
management process, secondary schools can identify risks, perform risk assessment and 
analysis, and then put in place possible security controls to reduce or eradicate the risks in 
their CISs. Unlike other management activities, risk management focuses on a number of 
issues with uncertainties that managers have to deal with. These uncertainties include, as 
cited by Shortreed et al. (2003): 
 uncertainties that an organisation faces on a daily basis;  
 uncertainties in the probability of occurrence of events;  
 uncertainties in the value to the organisation of consequences of events; and  
 other uncertainties that fall outside the normally expected range of variation.  
It becomes imperative for an organisation to conduct a risk management exercise so that 
the management has a clearer picture of the impending risks to which its assets are 
exposed. A risk management exercise is carried out within a risk management framework 
using appropriate risk management methodologies and tools (Shortreed et al. 2003; Elky, 
2006). In view of this argument, this study used the AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 risk 
management framework.  
 
A risk management framework is an essential philosophy for approaching any security 
work (McGraw, 2005). A risk management framework is a description of an 
organisational specific set of functional activities and associated definitions that define the 
risk management system in an organisation and the relationship to the risk management 
organisational system (Shortreed, 2008). Therefore, a risk management framework defines 
the processes and the order and timing of processes that will be used to manage risks. 
There are many information security risk management frameworks available today 
applicable to different situations. The AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 is one such information 
risk management framework that has been used in various circumstances with much 
success as reported in a number of studies.  
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The purpose of this chapter is to discuss a risk management framework including its 
processes as exemplified by the AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 risk management framework 
and describe how the framework will be used with a selected information security risk 
assessment and analysis tool, namely the Operationally Critical Threats, Assets and 
Vulnerability Evaluation for small-scale organisations (OCTAVE-small).  
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: the introduction, risk management definitions, 
an insight into the AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 framework, concentrating on the risk 
management process. Components of the framework which are important to this study are 
examined under different subtopics.  
 
4.2. RISK MANAGEMENT 
Different authors define risk management differently. Risk management is: 
 a systematic and analytical process whereby an organisation identifies, reduces 
and controls its potential threats and losses (Stoneburner et al. 2002); 
 a process of identifying, controlling and minimizing or eliminating security risks 
that may affect information systems for an acceptable cost (Theoharidou et al. 
2005);  
 a systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices to the 
tasks of communicating, consultation, establishing the context, identifying, 
analysing, evaluating, treating, monitoring and reviewing risk (Shortreed , 2008); 
 a systematic process of setting the best course of action under uncertainty by 
identifying, assessing, understanding, acting on and communicating risk issues 
(Tiwari, 2010; Tohidi, 2010). 
 
In this study, risk management is defined as an on-going systematic process carried out by 
an organisation in order to identify, analyse, assess, evaluate, monitor and communicate 
risks in its information system assets with the aim of putting in place mechanisms to 
reduce the loss due to threat attacks when they occur.  
 
The principal goal of information security risk management is to help an organisation 
better manage risks associated with its missions by ensuring the implementation of correct 
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data security standards (Tohidi, 2010). A properly conducted risk management programme 
allows an organisation to determine the magnitude and effects of the potential loss, the 
likelihood of such a loss actually happening and security controls that could lower the 
probability or magnitude of loss (Tiwari, 2010). Regardless of the size of an organisation, 
the management should understand what risk is, its causes and how to mitigate it when 
there is a high chance of the occurrence of an attack. Schools should be prepared to use the 
risk management processes to identify and reduce risks associated with their CISs assets.  
 
To undertake this feat, an appropriate risk management framework should be put in place 
prior to selection of the risk management tools to be used. The following section 
scrutinises a given risk management framework, AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009.  
 
4.3. RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
There are several models of information security risk management processes in use today. 
The majority of such models are suitable for large and commercial organisations that have 
strong financial bases. One of the most popular risk management models is the AS/NZS 
4360:2004, now AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009. The AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 risk 
management process consists of three major elements; a risk management workflow, 
monitor and review, and communication and consult. The latter two continuously interact 
with the steps of the risk management workflow. The risk management workflow 
comprises of a sequence of steps that an organisation has to undertake when exercising a 
risk management programme. The first step in the workflow is establishing context, 
followed by risk assessment, subdivided into risk identification and risk analysis, and risk 
evaluation.  
 
The model in figure 4.1 depicts the risk management as an iterative and cyclic process. 
Rainer et al. (1991) cite two reasons why the risk management process is cyclical: the 
presence of new external threats for information systems assets generated by the changing 
computing environment, and new internal threats which are exposed by the security 
surveillance and audit process on information technology assets. These authors encourage 
the management to periodically conduct risk management exercises to re-evaluate the 
organisation's exposure to threats that may cause loss.  
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Figure 4.1: AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009: The model of risk management process 
 
The AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 major components are briefly discussed in subsections 
below. 
 
4.3.1. Establishing the risk management context 
The first step in risk management is to establish the context for information security risk 
management within an identified organisation, in this case the secondary schools. This 
process helps the risk management team to understand the structure, capabilities, goals, 
strategic objectives and operational processes of the concerned organisation (Elky, 2006; 
Tiwari, 2010). Establishing context means defining the bounds of what one wants to 
analyse for risks, whether a strategic or operational plan, industrial or administrative 
process, program, project of other management initiative (Edwards, 2010). When 
management establishes the context, it seeks to articulate an organisation‟s objectives, 
defines the external and internal parameters to be taken into account when managing risks, 
and sets the scope and risk criteria for the remaining processes (Brass, 2011). The 
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importance of establishing the context for any risk assessment is based on the fact that the 
risk assessor is most likely to develop a thorough understanding of the environment in 
which an organisation exists and operates (Wawrzyniak, 2006; Brass, 2011). This also 
provides the framework for managing the risk management process itself. The output of 
establishing of context is the scope statement that sets the general parameters for 
undertaking the risk management process.  
 
4.3.2. What is risk assessment? 
Risk assessment in information security is a means of providing decision makers with 
information needed to understand factors that can negatively influence operations and 
outcomes and make informed judgments concerning the extent of actions needed to reduce 
risk (GAO/AIMD-00-33, 1999). Similarly, Hoo (2000) regards risk assessment as the 
process of identifying, characterising, and understanding risks; that is, studying, analysing, 
and describing the set of outcomes and likelihoods for a given endeavour. In the AS/NZS 
ISO 31000:2009 risk assessment is depicted as a three-step process that comprises of 
identifying, analysing and evaluating risks. This means that risk assessment is the overall 
process of identifying the sources of potential harm (hazard) and assessing both the 
seriousness (consequences) and the likelihood of any adverse outcome that may arise 
(Meek, 2005).  
 
During risk assessment the risk management team identifies all sources of potential harm 
to their information systems assets. Once all risks have been identified the team then 
analyse each risk by assessing the chances of the occurrence of each identified harm and 
the consequences if harm does occur (Meek, 2005). A risk assessment exercise also 
involves evaluating existing physical, environmental security and security controls by 
assessing their adequacy relative to the potential threats of the organisation (Wold & 
Shriver, 1997; O'Donnell & Best, 2005). This implies that an assessment goes further than 
an analysis by including an evaluation whose main objective is to quantify or qualify the 
results of the analysis examination with regard to the exposure of the assets to the hazard 
(Elky, 2006; Kirupakar, 2007; Siu, 2007). Secondary schools can utilise risk assessment as 
a means of auditing the potential for unwanted situations to occur within their CISs. This 
may enable school management to make concrete decisions on steps which should be 
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taken in order to minimise the possibility of the situation arising, thereby preserving the 
reputation of the school. 
 
An effective risk assessment leads to the development of effective and informed risk 
management strategies which in turn reduce the likelihood of serious incidents and/or 
losses and could thereby significantly reduce costs (Wold & Shriver, 1997; O'Donnell & 
Best, 2005; Kirupakar, 2007). Therefore, risk assessment seeks to establish the level of 
risks so that appropriate protection measures are taken to reduce the risk to a level 
acceptable to the management of the organisation or to eliminate all risk if possible 
(Broderick, 2001; Elky, 2006; Tiwari, 2010). The first step in risk assessment is risk 
identification, discussed in subsection 4.3.2.1 below. 
 
4.3.2.1. Risk identification 
Risk identification is a deliberate and systematic effort to identify and document key risks 
in an organisation (National Treasury Republic of South Africa NTRSA, 2007). The main 
objectives of risk identification are to identify, categorise and document risks that could 
affect the information system of an organisation (Federal Highway Administration 
FHWA, 2007; Carothers, 2009). This activity enables management to understand what is 
at risk within the context of an organisation‟s explicit and implicit objectives at the same 
time generating a comprehensive inventory of risks based on the threats and events that 
might prevent, degrade, delay or enhance the achievement of the objectives (NTRSA, 
2007). By performing a risk identification exercise beforehand, secondary schools would 
benefit by preventing potential disruptions in their operations due to threat attacks.  
 
The risk identification process results into specific deliverables, namely information 
security risk and critical registers, which are used as the foundation for the risk analysis 
(Elyse, 2007; Carothers, 2009). The register is a list of all possible risks, their location, 
time frame, root causes, and scenarios (GAO/AIMD-00-33, 1999; FHWA, 2007; Panda, 
2009). The implication is that an organisation can hardly have an accurate active risk 
management strategy unless there is a risk identification process. 
 
A number of techniques are used in a risk identification process. Carothers (2009) cites ten 
risk identification techniques frequently used in information systems security risk 
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management in different types of organisations. After a critical analysis and matching of 
each technique to what this research intends to achieve only seven techniques seem to be 
viable. These are checklists, physical inspection, and brainstorming, interviewing system 
users, observing the system flaws during operations, flowcharts, and procedures and 
policies (Carothers, 2009).  
 
Checklists are the most commonly used method of identifying information security risks 
(Taylor & Azadegan, 2007). These tools allow systematically identification of as many 
exposures, perils, and hazards as possible (Carothers, 2009). Checklists are standardised, 
therefore their use reduces human errors when identifying risks and this makes them easy 
to use by non-risk management personnel with minimal training (Taylor & Azadegan, 
2007). Well-developed checklists can serve as reminder lists and help researchers to 
ensure consistency and completeness in the risk identification exercises (Taylor & 
Azadegan, 2007; Toolsjournal, 2010). Therefore, the use of security checklists could also 
reduce the chances of omitting key security features. Due to lack of risk management 
expertise in secondary schools, checklists seem to be one of the most appropriate 
techniques for identifying information security risks in CISs. However, the use of 
checklists as the only method of risk identification is associated with a number of 
disadvantages. Taylor and Azadegan (2007) argue that using checklists leads to over-
reliance on an enumerated list that may lead to the idea that once the checklist is complete, 
risk identification is also complete. Secondly, if these tools were poorly developed or 
incomplete, their effective use in identifying security risks would be questionable (Steele 
& Wargo, 2007). Another weakness for information security checklists is that they hardly 
cover all areas or operations because they do not prioritise information security exposures 
that they identify especially new security exposures or flaws (Carothers, 2010). Despite 
these weaknesses, checklists remain valuable tools in this research and will be used in 
conjunction with other risk identification methods in the initial risk identification stage. 
 
Physical inspection is another useful method for identifying risks in an information 
system where risk assessment is being conducted for the first time (Taylor & Azadegan, 
2007). The use of physical inspection techniques allows the risk assessors to have face-to-
face conversation with the users of the information systems at their work places 
(Carothers, 2009). This affords the risk the researcher an opportunity to have a very clear 
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and precise picture of the risk environment of the organisation in which CISs are being 
used. Physical inspections present the risk assessor with a chance to find new hazards in 
an information system (Toolsjournal, 2010). The commonly used physical inspection 
technique of risk identification is a physical walk-about inspection of the operations in a 
work area or by observing the work, methods and tasks being performed within a 
workplace (Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism DEAT, 2006). Physical 
inspections can help the researcher to observe the activities or operations performed by 
CISs users that are likely to pose as threats to these information systems. Secondly, 
physical inspections place the researcher in a better position to observe the computing 
environments that pose as threats. The researcher also gets an opportunity to discuss with 
the CISs users about their operating environment and information security problems they 
encounter that always impact negatively on their work. The drawback of physical risk 
inspection is that it is expensive in terms of time and money (Elky, 2006; Toolsjournal, 
2010), and the results may become doubtful due to changes in the location or process 
being investigated (DEAT, 2006). However, in this research, the locations and processes 
being studied will remain unchanged for a longer period of time. This will make the use of 
physical inspection in conjunction with the checklist technique very useful.  
 
A substantial discussion of the participatory observation and interview methods has been 
made in Chapter 2 as a result the next subsection focuses on risk analysis. 
 
4.3.2.2.  Risk analysis 
Risk analysis is a crucial step in risk assessment which follows immediately after risk 
identification. The process of risk analysis involves further identifying security risks, 
determining their magnitude and identifying the corresponding areas that need security 
controls (Ciechanowicz, 1997). Risk analysis makes it possible to identify the most 
probable threats to an organisation and analyse the related vulnerabilities of the 
organisation to those threats (Wold & Shriver, 1997). Therefore, information security risk 
analysis is a multi-step process of determining exposure to security threats that an 
organisation faces (Goel & Chen, 2008). Risk analysis is based on threat and vulnerability 
analysis (Siu, 2007; Tiwari, 2007). Threat analysis is an examination of possible threats to 
each asset while the vulnerability analysis looks at the weaknesses in security that might 
enable a successful attack against the assets (Hoo, 2000; Goel & Chen, 2008). The output 
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of risk analysis is the likelihood of a risk and the consequence in case of risk occurrence 
(Siu, 2007). 
 
Although risk analysis is a complex process, there is an underlying mechanism that 
supports common sense paradigm (Ciechanowicz, 1997). This paradigm postulates that if 
a set of assets is of high value to an organisation and if the likelihood of a threat occurring 
is high and if there is a vulnerability that can be easily exploited by the threat then the 
level of risk is high (Ciechanowicz, 1997; Putvinski, 2012). Similarly, if a set of assets is 
of low value to an organisation and if the likelihood of a threat occurring is low and if 
there are no vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the threat then the level of risk is low 
(Ciechanowicz, 1997; Putvinski, 2012). 
  
The common sense paradigm can be used in determining dependencies between assets, 
threats, and vulnerabilities either qualitatively through less expert opinions or 
quantitatively using empirical data subjected to rigorous mathematical computations (Goel 
& Chen, 2008). This paradigm is a simpler technique that can be used to determine 
whether a critical information systems asset being examined is under security threat or not. 
A risk analysis process culminates to a risk evaluation exercise which provides 
information used by school management to make decisions on what steps to take in view 
of identified risks. Risk evaluation is the subject of subsection 4.3.2.3 which follows. 
 
4.3.2.3. Risk evaluation 
Risk analysis provides an outcome which is a basis for decision making on which risks 
need treatments and in which priority they should be treated. Therefore, risk evaluation is 
the process of comparing the results of risk analysis against risk criteria to determine 
whether the level of risk is acceptable or tolerable (Shortreed, 2008). The main purpose of 
evaluating risks is to determine whether the risks which have been identified are 
acceptable or unacceptable. Any risk determined to be acceptable should be monitored and 
periodically reviewed to ensure it remains acceptable (Australian Capital Territory 
Insurance Authority ACTIA, 2004). On the other hand, risks regarded as unacceptable 
should be treated immediately using risk treatment strategies or putting in place 
appropriate security controls reducing the risk to acceptable levels (ACTIA, 2004).  
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After the completion of a risk assessment process information system users and the 
management are expected to understand: 
 what is at risk;  
 the assets and value at risk - as associated with the identity of information assets 
and with the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of information assets; 
 the kinds of threats that could occur and consequences associated with them; 
 risk mitigation analysis. What can be done to reduce risk to an acceptable level; 
 risk mitigation costs and associated cost; and 
 whether suggested risk mitigation activities are cost-effective (ACTIA, 2004; 
Shortreed, 2008).  
An effective risk assessment and analysis method assists an organisation to determine the 
appropriate security controls to meet its information security needs. However, in real 
world risk evaluation scenarios make it difficult for risk analysts to work out the complex 
relationships between security controls (Lo & Chen, 2012). Risk analysts from diverse 
backgrounds produce subjective assessments and analyses based on their specialised 
standing, duties and job positions (Lo & Chen, 2012). Therefore, schools have to do their 
own risk assessments and analysis depending on the expertise and information systems 
assets at their disposal. The process of risk evaluation leads to decisions on risk treatment, 
a decisive step in the risk management programme. The immediate subsection 4.3.3 is 
dedicated to risk treatment. 
 
4.3.3. Risk Treatment 
Risk treatment is a process that consists of selecting and applying the most appropriate 
risk controls in order to be in a position to modify the risk, with the aim of avoiding the 
damages intrinsic to the risk factor or of making use of the advantages it could provide the 
organisation (Hoo, 2006; Shortreed, 2008). Literature on risk management discusses four 
prominent risk treatment strategies that are commonly used; risk avoidance, acceptance, 
transference and treatment (ACTIA, 2004; Meek, 2005; Elky, 2006; Dorian, 2012). The 
main objective of risk management is the implementation of appropriate risk mitigation, 
risk transfer and risk recovery measures to reduce business exposure by balancing control 
investment against risk (Abdullah, 2006). The knowledge of these risk treatment strategies 
is important in assisting management in selecting the most appropriate strategy for an 
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identified risk in their computerised information system. The following subsections briefly 
discuss each treatment strategy.  
 
4.3.3.1. Risk avoidance 
Risk avoidance is the practice of removing the vulnerable aspect of the system or even the 
system itself (Elky, 2006), because some risks may only return to acceptable levels if the 
activity is terminated (The State of Queensland TSQ, 2011). Risks to information systems 
exist from many known and unknown threat-sources and as a result attempting to avoid it 
becomes virtually impossible. It is extremely difficult for an organisation to avoid risks to 
its sensitive information while still providing access to authorised users, applications and 
systems (Navarro, 2001). This situation applies to secondary schools where risk avoidance 
may be difficult due to the fact that a number of users access the school network for a 
number of reasons. Therefore, the management should explore other risk treatment 
strategies.  
 
4.3.3.2. Risk acceptance 
Risk acceptance is the practice of simply allowing the system to operate with a known risk 
(Elky, 2006). This normally applies to:  
 low risks that are most likely not to cause any disruptions in the near future; and 
 those risks that have an extremely high cost to mitigate. 
 
When an organisation decides to accept a risk, it does so with the knowledge that, should a 
particular vulnerability be exploited, the impact on this organisation is such that the 
organisation will continue despite this impact (Navarro, 2001). Risk acceptance by 
secondary schools should be based on informed decisions on the likely consequences of 
such an option. 
 
4.3.3.3. Risk transference 
Risk transference is the process of allowing one party to accept the risk on behalf of 
another (Elky, 2006). When this strategy is used an organisation transfers or shares the 
risk with a third party, normally a trusted security company (Navarro, 2001). The trusted 
security partner takes on some of the information security risks. This enables the affected 
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organisation to concentrate on its core activities with reduced risks. This has cost 
obligations for both organisations. The protected organisation pays for the security 
services offered while the security provider also pays for any loss incurred by the 
protected organisation. Some organisations insure their computing assets and the insurance 
company replaces all damaged equipment. This setup is suitable for profit making 
organisations as the insurance organisations might make demands that schools might find 
too exorbitant to meet. It is difficult for schools to transfer risks due to these costs. This 
might force schools to avoid, accept or attempt to treat risks to which their information 
systems are exposed. 
 
4.3.3.4. Treating the risk 
The purpose of treating or controlling a risk is to reduce, if not totally eliminate the 
adverse impacts of the known or perceived risks inherent in a particular undertaking, even 
before any damage or disaster takes place (Gundlach, 2011). Treating risks occurs when 
an organisation proactively takes measures to reduce the vulnerability of an asset to 
successful exploitations of vulnerabilities in it (Navarro, 2001). This strategy enables the 
activity or action to continue within the organisation, but action is available to reduce the 
risk to an accepted level (Elky, 2006). Mitigation of risks often requires management to 
select appropriate security controls, procedures or mechanisms to either prevent a risk 
from occurring or detect a risk before or after it has occurred (Dorian, 2012). Most of the 
information security controls are technical in nature and include hardware and software 
tools that restrict access to buildings, rooms, computer systems and programs in order to 
prevent improper use (Sveen, Torres and Sarriegi, 2009). Some of these security controls 
are too technical or expensive to be implemented in small-scale organisations with already 
stretched human and financial resources as a result alternative affordable security controls 
have to be used.  
 
There are four different types of security controls commonly used in risk treatment, 
namely detective, preventive, corrective and directive (Rainer et al. 1991; Consultative 
Objective and Bi-functional Risk Analysis COBRA, 2005; O'Donnell & Best, 2005; Elky, 
2006; Metras, 2008; Gundlack, 2011; Dorian, 2012).  
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 Detective security controls identify and characterise an incident while in progress 
and alert the system user or security system about the intruder during an event or 
process (Rainer et al. 1991; Metras, 2008; Dorian, 2012). Detective security 
controls are designed to identify unfavourable events after they have occurred 
(TSQ, 2011). Intrusion detection security controls in intrusion detection systems are 
popular examples (COBRA, 2005; Elky, 2006; Sveen et al. 2009). These security 
controls are only appropriate when it is possible to accept the loss or damage 
incurred. In such a situation, an organisation is likely to lose reputation. In the 
context of secondary schools, fraud can be detected after it has occurred or detect 
marks alterations after learners have been promoted to other grades. 
 
 Preventive security controls are designed to limit the possibility of an undesirable 
outcome being realised (Elky, 2006; Sveen et al. 2009; TSQ, 2011). These security 
controls are intended to prevent an incident from occurring. This is achieved by 
locking out unauthorized intruders, separation of duty, installing security cameras to 
deter criminal activity (Dorian, 2012; TSQ, 2011). These strategies can be 
implemented in secondary schools but have financial implications to these 
organisations.  
 
 Corrective security controls are mechanisms designed to correct undesirable 
outcomes which have been realised (Rainer et al. 1991; Sveen, et.al., 2009; TSQ, 
2011). Examples of corrective security controls include rotating staff positions, 
internal audit review of preventative and detective controls, or a change to 
management procedures (Elky, 2006). After the event, corrective controls limit the 
extent of any damage caused by the incident by recovering the organisation to 
normal working status as efficiently as possible. These controls are suitable for 
secondary schools in the event that an attack occurs unexpectedly. 
 
 Directive (deterrent) security controls are designed to ensure that a particular 
outcome is achieved (Elky, 2006; Gundlack, 2011; TSQ, 2011). They are 
particularly important when it is critical that an undesirable event be avoided, 
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particularly in critical information systems. Figure 4.2 shows threat-attack-risk 
security controls.  
 
 
Figure 4.2: List of security controls and how they relate to attacks: 
Source: COBRA (2005) 
The major purpose of risk treatment strategies is to reduce the risk level of unacceptable 
risks to an acceptable level or the target risk level (ACTIA, 2004). This means that 
management has to define criteria for describing acceptable levels of risks for their 
organisations. This could be difficult for secondary schools due to lack of expertise 
pertaining to CISs. However, the risk controls in a computerised information system can 
be used as a guide to the acceptable risk level that the management in each school expects. 
This study seeks to establish what controls are in place for risks identified in secondary 
schools, and this will be done in Chapter 7. Once risks have been assessed there is a need 
to consult other members of the organisation who use the same information systems to 
communicate the outcome of the risk assessment so that collective decision will be taken 
on how to treat risks.  
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4.3.4. Communication and Consult 
Successful risk management relies on communication with all stakeholders in order to 
improve the level of understanding and treating risks. Risk communication involves an 
interactive dialogue between users and risk assessors and risk managers which actively 
informs the other processes (Meek, 2005). In this study information on risks and control 
measures identified by the risk assessment and analysis process will be communicated 
using appropriate copies of risk assessments available to management and all the CISs 
users concerned.  
 
4.3.5. Monitor and Review  
Effective risk management requires a reporting and review structure to ensure that risks 
are effectively identified and assessed and that appropriate controls and responses are in 
place (The Association of Insurance and Risk Managers AIRMIC, The National Forum for 
Risk Management ALARM and The Institute of Risk Management IRM, 2002). This step 
ensures that an organisation‟s risk management programme remains relevant and all input 
data, including likelihood and consequence, are up-to-date. Based on the AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009, the monitoring and reviewing relates to all of the five elements of the risk 
management workflow. The importance of the monitoring and review process is to 
provide assurance that there are appropriate controls in place for the organisation‟s 
activities and that the procedures are understood and followed (AIRMIC, ALARM & 
IRM, 2002). Furthermore, risk monitoring and review ensure that the responses are 
performing adequately throughout the life cycle of the system, facility or activity 
(Campbell, 2008). Monitoring and review exercises depend on audits or the results of 
previous analyses and evaluations which secondary schools involved in this study might 
hardly have. The monitoring and review process is essential in determining whether: 
 the measures adopted result in what was intended (AIRMIC et al. 2002; Elky, 
2006); 
 the procedures adopted and information gathered for undertaking the assessment 
were appropriate (AIRMIC et al. 2002; Elky, 2006); and 
 improved knowledge would have helped to reach better decisions and identify 
what lessons could be learnt for future assessments and management of risks 
(AIRMIC et al. 2002; Elky, 2006); 
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In schools, users of CISs should be given responsibility to oversee the process and develop 
reporting procedures, discussing and helping to implement solutions, as well as monitoring 
the solutions for effectiveness. This is likely to help in monitoring and reviewing the 
effectiveness of the control measures on an on-going basis. 
 
4.4. CONCLUSION 
CISs are always exposed to a variety of risks which could be identified by carrying out a 
risk management exercise. Risk management is an on-going systematic process that helps 
an organisation to identify, analyse, assess, evaluate, track and communicate risks in its 
information system assets, to enable the management to put security controls in place to 
reduce the loss due to threat attacks. Risk management implemented by an organisation 
depends on a risk management framework that an organisation chooses. The AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009 is a very popular framework that an be used to understand risk assessment and 
analysis method. The AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 risk management framework has been 
depicted as comprising three interacting components; the workflow, monitor and review, 
and communicate and consult. When this framework is adopted, three major tasks are 
performed; establishing the context, assessing risks and treating risks. Risk assessment has 
been discussed taking into account its importance in this whole process. Risk analysis has 
also been identified as an important aspect of risk assessment. A number of risk treatment 
and control options have been discussed. Issues arising from these control measures have 
also been discussed. The discussions have been left open for further exploration depending 
on the risk assessment and analysis methodologies to be used.  
 
This study uses a qualitative risk management methodology, namely the OCTAVE-small 
methodology as discussed in chapters 5 and 6. The next chapter, Chapter 5 elaborates on 
risk assessment and analysis methodologies in general. 
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5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Information security risk management is generally viewed as a highly technical process 
that may require expensive equipment and specialist assistance (Kite, 2009). On many 
occasions small-scale organisations tend to use common sense in risk management or even 
abandon the practice altogether (Panda, 2009). Risk management leads to the 
understanding of the risks to which CISs could be exposed to. There are various risk 
management methods and tools from which an organisation can possibly choose 
depending on expertise at its disposal. These methods are categorised as quantitative and 
qualitative respectively.  
 
Chapter 2 discussed the research methodology for this study, which is a qualitative case 
study based on the interpretive paradigm; Chapter 3 outlined information security risks 
and Chapter 4 explored a risk management framework. In order to implement data 
generating techniques, this study has to utilise a particular risk assessment and analysis 
technique. The main purpose of this chapter is to discuss risk assessment and analysis 
techniques justifying the choice of the qualitative methodology used in this research study. 
Important aspects regarding qualitative risk assessment and analysis methods are 
exemplified by the Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation 
method. For each discussed method, advantages and disadvantages are given and 
contextualised to the school situation. 
 
The structure of this chapter includes an introduction, a discussion of risk management 
methods as quantitative and qualitative and the conclusion. 
 
5.2. QUANTITATIVE METHODS 
Quantitative risk management methods used in information systems are derived from risk 
methodologies used by financial institutions and insurance companies (Elky, 2006). These 
methods use mathematical and statistical tools in an attempt to assign specific numbers to 
the costs of controls and the amount of damage that can take place to an organisation‟s 
assets (Nosworthy, 2000; Lo & Chen, 2012). An organisation opts to use a lot of time in 
developing complex mathematical models to achieve an acceptable level of risk by 
physically calculating the threat frequency and the likelihood of occurrence (Nosworthy, 
2000). To achieve this, values are assigned to information systems assets, business 
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processes, recovery costs and impact. These methods, therefore, measure risk in terms of 
direct and indirect costs (Elky, 2006). Quantitative risk management methods require a 
large amount of preliminary work to collect precise values of all elements, including asset 
values, threat frequency, control effectiveness, and control costs (Lo & Chen, 2012). 
These risk assessment and analysis methods consider information systems risk exposure as 
a function of the probability of a threat and the expected loss due to the vulnerability of the 
organisation to this threat (Nosworthy, 2000; Feng & Li, 2011). When an organisation 
decides to use a quantitative method, individuals involved in the risk assessment and 
analysis process ought to reach consensus regarding the value of information technology 
assets and probability estimates (Rainer et al. 1991). 
 
Popular examples of quantitative risk assessment and analysis methods are Annualised 
Loss Expectancy (ALE), Courtney's method, Livermore Risk Analysis Methodology 
(LRAM), and Stochastic Dominance (Rainer et al. 1991; Hoo, 2000; Elky, 2006; 
Beachboard et al. 2008). The basis of these quantitative methods is on regarding loss 
exposure as a function of the vulnerability of an asset to a threat multiplied by the 
probability of the threat becoming a reality. To illustrate how quantitative methods are 
used, the ALE method is chosen as an example because it looks less intimidating than 
other quantitative methods.  
 
When the Annualised Loss Expectancy (ALE) is used, the initial step is listing all 
information systems or information technology assets (Hoo, 2000). Potential threats to 
those assets are analysed along with the loss that would result from the realisation of those 
threats (Rainer et al. 1991; Beachboard et al. 2008). Each asset‟s vulnerability to a threat 
is expressed as a probability of occurrence per year. The expected loss per year from a 
particular threat/vulnerability pair is obtained by multiplying the probability of occurrence 
per year by the expected loss (Rainer et al. 1991; Elky 2006). The sum of all individual 
asset expected losses represents the total information systems security risk exposure. This 
is the figure which management use to make a decision to spend for security and 
preventive measures if necessary. This complex process is carried out by experts from 
within or outside the organisation. The Annualised Loss Expectancy model is represented 
by the formula below.  
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Where vulnerability = Vi = probability of occurrence per year, and expected loss = 
ELi = expected loss of ith threat/vulnerability pair. 
Quantitative risk assessment and analysis methods can provide a measurement of the risk 
impacts‟ magnitude that can be used in the cost-benefit analysis of recommended controls 
(Stoneburner et al. 2002). This makes these methods more advantageous over qualitative 
ones. Mathematical formulae used in these methods are easily verifiable and makes the 
methods to be viewed as being objective (Rainer et al. 1991; Lo & Chen, 2012). 
Therefore, an organisation that decides to use quantitative methods capitalises on this 
objectivity in risk assessment and analysis (Karabacaka & Sogukpinar, 2003). Besides 
objectivity of quantitative risk assessment methods, Meek (2005) argues that these 
methods are assessor independent, compatible with statistical interrogation, allow 
comparisons of risk assessment and analysis results; and allow formal incorporation of 
some types of uncertainty. If schools had expertise in risk management, they could 
possibly benefit from these methods.  
 
The success of quantitative methods depends heavily on the availability of good and 
reliable data for the analysis, which is very hard to obtain (Thiagarajan, 2003; Beachboard 
et al. 2008; Tiwari, 2010). Lack of good quality data used in estimating probabilities of 
occurrence or loss expectancies is a big problem when the assessments are performed (Lo 
& Chen, 2012). Performing a quantitative risk assessment and analysis for information 
technology-based information systems is not cost-effective for two reasons: the difficulties 
in identifying and assigning a value to existing assets, and lack of statistical information 
that would make it possible to determine frequency of occurrence of attacks on 
information systems (Elky, 2006). The disadvantage of quantitative methods is that of 
depending on the numerical ranges used to express the measurement which may result to 
distorted or unclear meaning of the quantitative risk assessment and analysis outcome 
(Stoneburner et al. 2002).  
 
Confronted with this situation, an organisation which chooses to conduct risk assessment 
and analysis using quantitative methods has to overcome numerous difficulties. From the 
onset, identifying all possible relevant threats and reliably estimating the probability of 
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occurrences would prove to be extremely difficult if not impossible (Ding, 2002; 
Beachboard et al. 2008; Katsikasa, 2009). The process of estimating costs associated with 
different types of system failures or compromises is also an inexact process that gives rise 
to inaccuracies in the final calculations of asset exposures to the risks (Karabacaka & 
Sogukpinar, 2003).  
 
Therefore, it is clear that the choice of risk management method depends on the 
understanding and appropriate application of that method in a given organisational 
context. The latter represents a daunting task particularly to resource and expertise 
constrained small and medium-sized enterprises (Beachboard et al. 2008). This situation is 
even worse in secondary schools where personnel with baseline computing skills are only 
concerned with the use of CISs regardless of the perennial security risks associated with 
these information systems assets.  
 
Coupled with this is the issue of financial constraint that has to be overcome by these 
organisations. Risk assessment and analysis conducted using quantitative methods are 
generally more expensive and demand greater experience and advanced tools than those 
conducted using qualitative methods (Rot, 2008). Therefore, this researcher advocates the 
use of qualitative risk assessment and analysis methods for secondary schools‟ CISs, 
discussed in the next section. 
 
5.3. QUALITATIVE METHODS 
Research indicates that most of the quantitative risk assessment and analysis techniques 
are either too difficult to understand or use by small-scale organisations (Alberts & 
Dorofee, 2001). Subsequently, these organisations may resort to unsanctioned methods or 
avoid carrying out a risk management exercise completely (Beachboard et al. 2008). 
Therefore, small-scale organisations require simple and participatory risk assessment and 
analysis methods mostly in the qualitative category.  
 
Qualitative risk assessment and analysis assume that there is already a great degree of 
uncertainty in the likelihood and impact values and defines them in subjective or 
qualitative terms (Elky, 2006). Since qualitative methods depend to a great extent on the 
analyst‟s experience, the process and the results of the security risk assessment are 
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relatively subjective in nature (Feng & Li, 2011). A qualitative risk management method 
also indicates a more subjective approach in which the threats are given a ranking of 
none/low, medium, high or very high mainly based on the knowledge and judgement of 
those doing the analysis (Nosworthy, 2000). When a qualitative method is used, the 
probability data are not required, only the estimated potential loss is used (Feng and Li, 
2011). In contrast to quantitative risk assessment methods, qualitative risk assessment 
methods are based on judgment, intuition and experience of the team that conducts this 
exercise (Lo & Chen, 2012). This makes qualitative risk assessment and analysis methods 
suitable for use in secondary schools where there is no expertise in risk management. 
There is a high possibility that when school managers and CISs users develop a culture of 
risk management, they may explore other risk management methods.  
 
Qualitative risk management methods determine the impact and likelihood of the 
identified risks in a rapid and cost-effective manner than the quantitative methods (Rainer 
et al. 1999; Elyse, 2007). These methods assess the effects of the identified risk factors, 
creating priorities that can be used to decide on how to solve the potential risk, depending 
on the impact they could have on the information systems (Mazareanu, 2007). Most 
qualitative methods are simple and easy to use with less technical people in any 
organisations (Panda, 2009). Qualitative methods express risks in terms of descriptive 
variables or adjectives instead of precise monetary terms, therefore, requiring less time, 
finance and effort to implement (Rainer et al. 1999; Karabacaka & Sogukpinar, 2003). 
This makes them simple because they utilise the language which non-technical people are 
familiar with. Therefore, qualitative risk assessment and analysis methods are a better 
choice for use in schools where there are no risk management personnel.  
 
A risk matrix is normally used when a qualitative risk assessment method is implemented 
(Elky, 2006; Renfroe & Smith, 2011). A risk matrix is a combination of the impact of loss 
rating and the vulnerability rating qualitatively determined by risk assessors (Renfroe & 
Smith, 2011). The vulnerability to threat are ranked as very high, high, moderate or low 
while the impact of loss is ranked as devastating, severe, noticeable or minor. Table 5.1 
shows a possible matrix used for identifying risk levels when a qualitative method is used.  
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Table 5.1: Matrix Identifying levels of risks 
 
 
 
Vulnerability to threat 
Very High High Moderate Low/None 
Im
p
a
ct
 o
f 
lo
ss
 Devastating H H H H 
Severe H H M M 
Noticeable H M M L 
Minor M M L L 
Source: Elky (2006) and Renfroe and Smith (2011) 
Explanations on Table 5.2 are used to interpret the ratings in the matrix on Table 5.1  
Table 5.2: Interpretation of the risk ratings 
H 
High risks that need immediate implementation of recommended security 
risk controls to mitigate these risks  
M 
Moderate risks where control implementation should be planned in the near 
future. 
L 
Low risks in which control implementation will enhance security, but is of 
less urgency than the above risks. 
Source: Elky (2006) and Renfroe and Smith (2011) 
These qualitative measures can easily be understood compared to the quantitative ones. 
These measures also bring about some standardised guidelines to regulate the manner in 
which different users will use the qualitative tools. 
 
A number of qualitative risk management techniques can pose serious problems in 
secondary schools due to a number of glitches associated with them. The Hazard And 
Operability study (HAZOP), Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) or Failure Mode 
and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and Central Computer and Telecommunications 
Agency Risk Analysis and Management Method (CRAMM) either require highly trained 
technical teams to perform risk assessment and analysis, labour intensive or strong 
financial bases (Lander, 2004; Mraz & Huber, 2005; Rausand, 2005; Rot, 2008). 
Secondary schools hardly have such expertise and financial bases. This makes the use of 
these methods unsuitable by secondary schools. However, not all qualitative risk 
assessment and analysis techniques require highly technical people or strong financial 
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support. The OCTAVE method provides an easy, cheap and viable means of achieving the 
same objectives that any of the other methods is capable of. 
 
The Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation risk management 
technique is concerned with all risk components that include assets, threats and 
vulnerabilities (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001). OCTAVE is a comprehensive method to assess 
and analyse information security risks based on information technology asset type and is 
ideal to be used by internal organisation resources to perform threat/technology risk 
assessment and analysis (Storms, 2003). A number of studies on OCTAVE as an 
information security risk management technique cite the merits of using this technique in 
organisations of different sizes regardless of the technical skills the personnel have (Panda, 
2009). One important benefit of OCTAVE is that it is participatory and self-directed (Pyka 
& Januszkiewicz, 2006; Panda, 2009). When this technique is used, different stakeholders 
have a chance to actively get involved in the risk assessment and analysis activities, 
thereby improving their decision making process concerning the protection and 
management of information systems resources (Pyka & Januszkiewicz, 2006).  
 
Qualitative risk management methods have their own disadvantages such as being inexact 
and subjective (Rainer et al. 1999; Karabacaka & Sogukpinar, 2003). Furthermore, lack of 
specific quantifiable measurements of the magnitude of the impacts, makes a cost-benefit 
analysis of any recommended controls difficult when qualitative risk management 
methods are used (Stoneburner et al. 2002). However, Elky (2006) and Elyse (2007) 
suggest that the use of unbiased and accurate data can improve the credibility of the 
outcome of a qualitatively conducted risk assessment and analysis exercise. Rot (2008) 
summarises the advantages and disadvantages of quantitative and qualitative risk 
assessment and analysis techniques as shown on Table 5.3 below. 
 
Table 5.3 below indicates that qualitative risk management methods have more advantages 
than quantitative methods. Qualitative methods also have fewer disadvantages than 
quantitative methods. Their simplistic, easy to use, time saving and financial sustainability 
makes them potentially viable for small-scale organisations. Regardless of the cited 
demerits of qualitative methods in general, this study finds it plausible to implement the 
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OCTAVE risk assessment and analysis technique. A detailed discussion of the OCTAVE 
method is presented in Chapter 6. 
Table 5.3: Advantages and disadvantages of quantitative and qualitative methods of 
risk assessment and analysis 
Item  Quantitative methods  Qualitative methods 
 
Advantages 
 They cater for the definition 
of consequences of incidents 
occurrence quantitatively 
which facilitates the 
realisation of cost benefits 
analysis during the selection 
of protection strategies 
 They give a more accurate 
image of risk. 
 Allow ordering of risks 
according to priority.  
 Allow determination of 
areas of greater risk in a 
short period of time 
 Can be conducted in shorter 
time and with less 
expenditure  
  Analysis is relatively easy 
and cheap. 
 
Disadvantages 
 Quantitative measures depend 
on the scope and accuracy of 
defining measurement scale.  
 Results of analysis may be not 
precise and even confusing.  
 Normal methods must be 
enriched in qualitative 
description (in the form of 
comments, interpretations).  
 Analysis conducted by 
application of those methods 
is generally more expensive, 
demanding greater experience 
and advanced tools. 
 It does not allow for 
determination of 
probabilities and results 
using numerical measures.  
 Costs-benefits analysis is 
more difficult during the 
selection of protections. 
 Achieved results have 
general character. 
Source: Rot (2008) 
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5.4. CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed risk management methodologies justifying the selection of the 
OCTAVE-small method derived from qualitative methods. The choice of a risk 
management method for this study was influenced by a number of factors such as the 
unavailability of risk management personnel, finance, types of risks and size of 
organisation concerned. Quantitative and qualitative risk assessment and analysis methods 
have been used in other projects to solve information security risks. It has been illustrated 
that each category of methods has its own advantages and disadvantages. Quantitative 
methodologies are objective and verifiable due to the use of mathematical formulae. 
Besides complexities, quantitative methods are also expensive for small-scale 
organisations that have constrained budgets. Only organisations with experts in risk 
management may implement them. Therefore, using quantitative methods in schools is not 
cost effective. Qualitative risk assessment and analysis methods provide a rapid and 
cheaper alternative to quantitative methods. However, some of the qualitative methods are 
as difficult as quantitative for use in high schools where there are scarce information 
security personnel. After weighing selected qualitative methods, this research study 
justifiably selected the OCTAVE risk management method. The OCTAVE method 
provides an alternative from which different organisations depending on the experience of 
the personnel they have could possibly conduct a risk assessment and analysis exercise. 
Unlike quantitative methods, qualitative methods are criticised for being too subjective 
and difficult to verify their results. 
 
Having selected the risk management method for this study, effort is directed at describing 
that method and how it would be used in this study. Chapter 6 explores the OCTAVE risk 
assessment and analysis method and how one of its variants, OCTAVE-small will be used 
in this research study.  
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6.1. INTRODUCTION 
Organisations that are concerned about their information assets security explore and 
examine various risk management methods to ensure that they provide adequate security 
to their information systems (Storms, 2003). Some information security risk management 
methods tend to be incomplete, expert-driven or both (Panda, 2009), making them difficult 
and inappropriate to implement with small-scale organisations (Alberts & Dorofee, 2003; 
Beachboard et al. 2008). In large commercial organisations there are teams of experts for 
information security risk management while small-scale organisations like secondary 
schools hardly have the capacity to do so. Small-scale organisations require user friendly 
information security risk management methods that can be implemented by a team or an 
individual from within the same organisations. The Operationally Critical Threats, Assets 
and Vulnerability Evaluation is designed to meet this end (Woody, Coleman, Fancher, 
Myers & Young, 2006). This study utilises the OCTAVE risk assessment and analysis 
method to study CISs in two selected secondary schools. 
  
Chapter 5 dealt with quantitative and qualitative risk assessment and analysis techniques 
in which the use of a qualitative method in this study was justified. The OCTAVE risk 
assessment and analysis method was indicated as the most viable method for this study. 
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to elaborate on the OCTAVE risk assessment and 
analysis method, outlining its components and how it will be applied in this research 
study. The chapter also describes how data collection methods discussed in Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 4 were applied with the OCTAVE technique. 
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows: a brief introduction, definition of OCTAVE, key 
features and different types of OCTAVE, the application of OCTAVE-small to this 
research, and finally the conclusion. 
 
6.2. WHAT IS OCTAVE? 
Operationally Critical Threats, Assets and Vulnerability Evaluation is a qualitative risk-
based strategic assessment and planning method for information security (Panda, 2009). It 
is a process-driven methodology to identify, prioritise and manage information security 
risks (Alberts & Dorofee, 2004). OCTAVE is a collection of techniques and tools for 
identifying and managing information security risks (Alberts, Behrens, Pethia & Wilson, 
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1999). Accordingly, OCTAVE is a comprehensive evaluation method that allows an 
organisation to identify the information assets that are important to its mission, the 
threats to those assets, and the vulnerabilities that may expose those assets to the threats 
(Panda, 2009). This is the specific objective of this research study. 
 
In general, the OCTAVE method is designed to provide complete information 
for information security risk management (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001). OCTAVE 
includes all components of risk (assets, threats, and vulnerabilities) and as a result an 
organisation gets sufficient data to fully match its information security risk protection 
strategy unlike conventional methods (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001; Panda, 2009). This 
implies that OCTAVE is a risk assessment and analysis method driven by operational risk 
and security practices where information technology is examined only in relation to the 
information security practices (Sosonkin, 2005). 
 
Unlike other risk management approaches that highlight technological risk only, and also 
led by experts who evaluate systems, OCTAVE focuses on security practice, it is self-
directed, and stresses on organisation-wide strategic issues. Table 6.1 shows a comparison 
of the OCTAVE method and other risk assessment methods (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001; 
Sosonkin, 2005) 
Table 6.1: Comparison of OCTAVE and other risk assessment methods 
 OCTAVE  OTHER EVALUATIONS  
Organisation evaluation  System evaluation  
Focus on security practices  Focus on technology  
Strategic issues  Tactical issues  
Self-direction  Expert led  
 
OCTAVE also defines assets as including people, hardware, software, information and 
systems (Violino, 2010).  
 
6.3. OCTAVE AS A FUNCTIONAL METHOD 
Risk assessment and analysis methods are classified as temporal, comparative or 
functional (Campbell & Stamp, 2004; Woody et al. 2006). Temporal methods focus on 
86 
 
technology systems using actual tests, comparative methods concentrate on a specific 
standard and functional methods balance the other two by applying tests and standards 
(Alberts, Dorofee, Stevens & Woody, 2003; Campbell & Stamp, 2004). The OCTAVE 
method is classified as a functional method whose strength is based on the fact that 
specific threats, assets, vulnerabilities and controls important to the context of the 
organisation are included (Alberts et al. 2003; Campbell & Stamp, 2004; Woody et al. 
2006).  
 
A study by Campbell and Stamp (2004) indicates that an organisation can successfully 
implement a selected risk management programme by balancing two crucial factors 
namely the knowledge of the method and contextual knowledge. These two factors help to 
define who should lead the risk management programme in an organisation. From this 
perspective, experts lead when methodology knowledge is critical, and system owners lead 
when contextual knowledge is critical (Campbell & Stamp, 2004). Based on this view, 
OCTAVE is classified as mid-level because it balances the two extremes (Woody et al. 
2006). This allows some organisations to apply the OCTAVE method unassisted while 
others enlist specialists to supplement their knowledge of security risk management 
(Woody et al. 2006). This research study seeks to apply the OCTAVE method without 
assistance from experts but using non-technical personnel; the users of CISs in secondary 
schools.  
 
Panda (2009) discusses three variants of OCTAVE, namely OCTAVE
(SM)
, OCTAVE-
small and OCTAVE-Allegro. OCTAVE
(SM)
 is the original OCTAVE method, which forms 
the basis for the OCTAVE body of knowledge (Alberts et al. 2003; Panda 2009). 
OCTAVE-small is for small-scale organisations while OCTAVE-Allegro is a streamlined 
information security risk assessment and analysis methodology suitable for any 
organisation regardless of its size (Richard, Caralli, Stevens, Young, & Wilson, 2007; 
Panda, 2009). This study utilises OCTAVE for small-scale organisations (OCTAVE-
small) to study secondary schools‟ CISs. The rationale for choosing OCTAVE-small 
variant is dealt with in section 6.4 below. 
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6.4. FEATURES AND BENEFITS OF THE OCTAVE METHOD 
There are four basic features of OCTAVE that distinguishes it from other risk assessment 
and analysis methods namely, self-direction, workshop-based approach, using an analysis 
or collaborative team and catalogues of information (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001; Pyka & 
Januszkiewicz, 2006).  
 
Self-direction implies that people from within the same organisation assume 
responsibility for setting the organisation‟s security strategy (Woody et al. 2006), which 
is, what this study seeks to attain. An organisation without an in-house capability to 
perform information security risk assessments and analysis always outsources experts to 
perform these vital services on its behalf (Alberts et al. 1999). The users of information 
systems in such an organisation are often isolated from the decision-making process and 
rely mainly on the judgment of external experts (Alberts and Dorofee, 2004). These users 
do not know the underlying thinking process used by the experts as a result they do not 
understand or know whether the risk assessment performed for their organisation is 
adequate (Alberts et al. 1999; Alberts & Dorofee, 2001). In such situations, the 
responsibility is shifted from users to the experts, who are not accountable to the 
organisation (Alberts and Dorofee, 2001). The OCTAVE-small method can assist an 
organisation to address such problems. When OCTAVE-small is used, the system users 
are responsible and accountable as they lead the evaluation and decision making processes 
(Pyka & Januszkiewicz, 2006). This study utilises a small team of information system 
users (the collaborative team) to manage the process. This is intended to actively involve 
the users in the decision-making process (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001). 
 
A collaborative team is an interdisciplinary team that comprises of representatives from 
both the mission-related and information technology areas of an organisation (Alberts & 
Dorofee, 2001). This team performs a number of OCTAVE activities such as risk 
identification, analysis and evaluation (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001; Panda, 2009). The size 
of the collaborative team is determined by the size of the organisation and the scope of 
evaluation (Woody et al. 2006). This study is based on secondary schools whose 
employees are less than eighty and the computing facilities are run by single-small 
departments that include mission related personnel. In such cases, Alberts et al. (2003), 
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Sosonkin (2005) and Pyka & Januszkiewicz (2006) suggest the use of a team of between 
three and five people, preferably the users of the information systems.  
 
Alberts and Dorofee (2001), Sosonkin (2005) and (Panda 2009) provide basic tasks that 
the OCTAVE-small collaborative team should achieve as: 
 identifying critical information assets; 
 identifying the organisation‟s information security risks; 
 focusing risk analysis activities on identified critical assets; 
 gathering any supporting data that are necessary; 
 analysing threat and risk information to determine priorities; 
 developing a protection strategy for the organisation; 
 developing mitigation plans to address the risks to the organisation's critical 
assets;  
OCTAVE uses a workshop-based approach for gathering information and making 
decisions (Alberts and Dorofee, 2001; Sosonkin, 2005; Panda, 2009). This is done through 
Phases 1 to 3 in OCTAVE 
(SM)
 and Processes 1 to 4 in OCTAVE-small. Each activity 
provides key information for the whole process. OCTAVE also relies upon the catalogues 
of information namely:  
 catalogue of practices - a collection of good strategic and operational security 
practices (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001; Sosonkin, 2005) 
 threat profile - the range of threats that an organisation needs to consider (Alberts 
& Dorofee, 2001; Sosonkin, 2005) 
 catalogue of vulnerabilities - a collection of vulnerabilities based on platform and 
application (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001; Sosonkin, 2005) 
An organisation using OCTAVE compares itself against these catalogues of information in 
order to define all the essential components of information security risk assessment 
(Alberts et al. 1999; Sosonkin, 2005). This further enables an organisation to make 
information-protection decisions based on risks to the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of its critical information assets (Sosonkin, 2005; Panda, 2009). OCTAVE 
gives an organisation a comprehensive, systematic, context-driven approach to manage its 
information security risks (Pyka & Januszkiewicz, 2006).  
 
The benefits of using OCTAVE-small are: 
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 self-directedness - small teams of organisational personnel from different 
departments and information technology work together to address the security needs 
of the organisation (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001; Pyka & Januszkiewicz, 2006); 
 flexibility - each OCTAVE method is tailored to the organisation's unique risk 
environment, security and resiliency objectives, and skill level (Sosonkin, 2005; 
Pyka & Januszkiewicz, 2006; Panda 2009). This study adopts OCTAVE-small 
tailored for small to medium-scale organisations, thus justifies its use in secondary 
schools, one of the objectives of this research study; 
 evolving – OCTAVE-small advances an organisation toward an operational risk-
based view of security and addresses technology in a business context (Sosonkin, 
2005; Pyka & Januszkiewicz, 2006; Panda, 2009).  
 
6.5. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE USE OF OCTAVE-SMALL  
The size and layering of an organisation‟s computerised information system is a major 
determinant in choosing the type of OCTAVE method for a particular organisation (Panda, 
2009). A large and multi-layered hierarchical organisation that has sections which 
maintain their own information technology infrastructure and employees above eighty 
adopts OCTAVE
(SM)
 (Siu, 2007; Panda, 2009). A small organisation with flat-layered 
hierarchical structure and employs less than eighty is recommended to use OCTAVE for 
small-scale organisations (OCTAVE-small) (Alberts & Dorofee, 2002; Sosonkin, 2005) or 
OCTAVE Allegro. OCTAVE-small is suitable for small-scale organisations such as 
secondary schools because it is less complex than OCTAVE
(SM)
 and can be implemented 
by users who are not experts in risk management. 
 
The fact that OCTAVE-small approach uses an asset-based information security risk 
assessment means that information security risk is carefully considered based on the 
organisational and technological vulnerabilities that threaten a group of mission-critical 
assets (Woody et al. 2006). In order to attain the objectives of this study, OCTAVE-small 
will provide answers to these questions: 
• What critical information systems assets do secondary schools have? 
• What critical information assets in secondary schools require protection? 
• What threats or vulnerabilities are the school CISs assets be protected against? 
• What is the level of information security breaches in these CISs assets? 
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• What level of protection is needed to mitigate risks? 
• What is the impact on CISs if the existing protection fails? 
Answering these questions assists the researcher to gather full sets of data that could 
possibly match mitigation strategies to their information security risks. This could also 
enable management to decide on information protection based on risks to the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of critical information assets (Panda, 2009).  
 
Table 6.2 is a list of questions which were used to assist the researcher to decide whether 
to or not to use OCTAVE-small in this study as suggested by Alberts and Dorofee (2003).  
Table 6.2: Check-list for the applicability of OCTAVE-small to this study 
 Item Choice 
Yes No 
1.  Is the organisation being studied small?  √  
2.  Does the organisation have a flat or simple hierarchical structure?  √  
3.  Is there a group of three to five people who have a broad and deep 
understanding of the organisation and also possess these skills 
  
3.1.  Problem-solving ability √  
3.2. Analytical ability √  
3.3. Ability to work in a team √  
3.4. At least one member with leadership skills √  
3.5. Ability to spend a few days working on this method √  
4.  Do secondary schools outsource all or most of their information 
technology functions? 
√  
5.  Do secondary schools have a relatively simple information technology 
infrastructure that is well understood by at least one individual in the 
organisation? 
√  
6.  Do secondary schools have limited familiarity with vulnerability 
evaluation tools within the context of information-related assets or are 
they unable to obtain the use of this expertise from current service 
provider to interpret results? 
√  
7.  Do secondary schools prefer a highly structured method as opposed to an 
open-ended method that can be more easily tailored? 
 √ 
Source (Alberts & Dorofee, 2003) with modification 
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An assessment of secondary schools based on this table shows that most of the answers to 
the questions were YES. This makes OCTAVE-small the most suitable methodology for 
this study.  
 
6.6. THE OCTAVE-SMALL METHOD 
The OCTAVE-small method is a modification of the OCTAVE
(SM)
 approach intended to 
meet the needs of small and less hierarchical organisations (Panda, 2009). This method is 
tailored to the more limited means and unique constraints typically found in small-scale 
organisations (Alberts et al. 2003). OCTAVE-small has the same three phases described in 
the OCTAVE
(SM)
 method but streamlined to four processes instead of the phases (Alberts 
et al. 2003; Panda, 2009). In this study, OCTAVE-small processes were further modified 
to suit the CISs and level of skills of the personnel in secondary schools. Figure 6.1 is a 
diagrammatic representation of the OCTAVE-small method. 
 
Figure 6.1: The processes of OCTAVE-small  
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Each OCTAVE-small process is briefly discussed below. 
 
6.6.1. Process 1: Identifying critical organisational information 
In this initial step of OCTAVE-small, the collaborative team identifies the organisation‟s 
important information-related assets and produces a set of impact evaluation criteria and 
the current state of the organisation‟s security practices (Woody et al. 2006; Panda, 2009).  
A list of CISs critical assets will be produced. This study will gather such information 
from the collaborative team members who are the users of information systems namely the 
school managers and administrative-educators. This information will be obtained through 
interviews, observations, inspections and possibly meetings with the users. Information 
obtained will be used to build asset-based threat profiles described in process 2.  
 
6.6.2. Process 2: Identifying threats to information systems critical assets  
The key characteristic of OCTAVE-small is the identification and analysis of threats to the 
organisation‟s assets (Alberts and Dorofee, 2001). This process involves an evaluation of 
organisational aspects in which the information system users from within the organisation 
contribute their perspectives on what is important to the organisation‟s information-related 
assets and what is currently being done to protect those assets. The collaborative team 
consolidates the information, selects assets that are critical to the organisation, and 
identifies the threats to these assets (Alberts & Dorofee, 2003). For each identified 
information asset, collaborative teams define the security requirements and then build a 
threat profile for each asset (Panda, 2009). 
 
In this study, the collaborative team will build a threat profile by following these three 
steps suggested by Alberts and Dorofee (2003):  
 grouping the information previously obtained from the different users of CISs; 
 selecting critical assets; and  
 creating a threat profile for each critical asset. 
 
Threat profiles could successfully be built from threat scenarios which are based on known 
threat sources and their typical threat outcomes and by grouping together threats with a 
common theme (Storms, 2003). In this study, OCTAVE-small will enable the 
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collaborative team to use the standard categories of threats suggested by Alberts and 
Dorofee (2001), Storms (2003), Elky (2005) and Panda (2009), listed on Table 6.3 below.  
 
Table 6.3: OCTAVE-small standard threat categories 
Threat Category Description 
Human actors using 
network access 
These are network-based threats to an organisation‟s critical 
assets. They require direct action by a person and can be 
deliberate or accidental in nature. 
Human actors using 
physical access 
These are physical threats to an organisation‟s critical assets. 
They require direct action by a person and can be deliberate or 
accidental in nature. 
System problems These threats are problems within an organisation‟s information 
technology systems. For example hardware defects, software 
defects, unavailability of related enterprise systems, viruses, 
malicious code  
Other problems These threats are problems or situations that are outside the 
control of an organisation. For example, natural disasters, such 
as floods, earthquakes, storms and fire. Such threats could 
affect an organisation‟s information technology systems as well 
as interdependency risks such as the unavailability of critical 
infrastructures (telecommunications, electricity). Other types of 
threats outside the control of an organisation can also be 
included here. Examples of these threats are power outages or 
broken water pipes, 
Source: Alberts and Dorofee (2001) and Storms (2003) 
 
The collaborative team will also determine whether the resulting outcomes or effects of 
identified threats lead to: 
 disclosure or viewing of sensitive information; 
 modification of important or sensitive information; 
 destruction or loss of important information, hardware, or software; and  
 interruption of access to important information, software, applications, or 
services. 
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Alberts and Dorofee (2003) suggest that each category of threats could conveniently be 
represented as a visual tree structure build around the properties of the identified threat. 
For example, Figure 6.2 below is a diagrammatic representation of the visual tree structure 
of category of threats due to actors when using the network to access the critical assets of 
an organisation. Due to the complexity of OCTAVE-small threat tree diagrams, this study 
used simple customised tables to build asset threat profiles 
 
Figure 6.2: Threat profile for critical asset accessed through network 
Source: Alberts and Dorofee (2001) 
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6.6.3. Process 3: Identify infrastructure vulnerabilities  
After building threat profiles, the collaborative team concentrates on the computing 
infrastructure. The main objective is to identify key information technology systems and 
components related to each critical asset that are part of the computerised information 
system. The key components are tested for weaknesses (technology vulnerabilities) that 
could lead to unauthorised action against critical assets (Alberts & Dorofee, 2003). This is 
a high-level review of infrastructure and technology-related practices done to refine the 
threat profiles. For example, the collaborative team will analyse the access paths in the 
systems that support the critical assets and determine how well their technology-related 
processes are protecting those assets (Woody et al. 2006). Physical inspections will be 
conducted on computer hardware and accessories in order to identify weakness that may 
be exploited by threats. 
 
6.6.4. Process 4: Conduct risk analysis and develop protection security strategy and 
mitigation plans 
Once infrastructure vulnerabilities are identified, the collaborative team identifies all risks 
to the organisation's critical assets, analyses them and then decides what action to take. At 
this point, the team creates a protection strategy for the organisation and mitigation plans 
to address the risks to the critical assets based upon an analysis of the information 
gathered. During risk analysis, all identified risks will be qualitatively evaluated for the 
impact and likelihood of occurring (Alberts & Dorofee, 2003; Panda, 2009). An 
organisation-wide protection strategy and risk mitigation plans based on security practices 
will be developed from the evaluation outcomes (Alberts & Dorofee, 2003). Each 
OCTAVE-small process has its own output as shown on Table 6.4.  
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Table 6.4: Summary of possible outputs for each OCTAVE-small process 
OUTPUT 
Process 1  Process 2 Process 3 Process 4 
• Critical assets 
• Security 
requirements for 
critical assets 
• Areas of concern 
and impact 
descriptions 
• Current security 
practices 
Current threats and 
vulnerabilities 
• Key components 
for critical assets 
• Current 
technological 
vulnerabilities for 
key components 
• Risk measures 
• Risks to critical 
assets 
• Protection strategies 
• Mitigation plans 
Source: Panda (2009) 
Each output on Table 6.4 will be attained after conducting a series of practical activities 
defined in each OCTAVE-small process. The risk assessment and analysis activities are 
described in Chapter 7. 
 
In order to perform a risk management exercise using OCTAVE-small method, some 
preparations should be done before hand. These are explored in section 6.7. 
 
6.7. PREPARATION GUIDELINES 
OCTAVE-small provides a module containing all preparation activities that are suggested 
before starting the risk management programme (Alberts et al. 2003).  
 The first and foremost preparation is senior management sponsorship. OCTAVE-
small clearly states that senior management sponsorship should be sought prior to 
the undertaking of the process. This sponsorship is required to encourage staff 
participation, allocation of resources and support of implementation of the 
outcomes (van Niekerk, 2005); 
 The selection of the team is the next preparation activity in OCTAVE-small. In 
this study, the team would be composed of CISs users with skills listed in Table 
6.2;  
 Training of at least one team member on OCTAVE-small to create a circular 
reference, as the creation of the team would already have required some study of 
the implementation guide (van Niekerk, 2005); 
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 Setting the scope of the evaluation to allow the team to identify which areas of 
the organisation are to be evaluated (van Niekerk, 2005). In this study, CISs was 
the subset of school units selected for evaluation; and 
 Creating schedule for the activities to be carried out. OCTAVE-small worksheets 
are provided to offer guidelines of workshop or activity duration, depending on 
the experience of the team. Table 6.5 shows the duration of the undertaking.  
Table 6.5: Duration of OCTAVE-Small 
Phase  From  To 
Preparation  4 days  8 days, 4 hours 
Build asset-based threat profiles 1 day 2 days, 6 hours 
Identify infrastructure vulnerabilities 3 hours  1 day 
Develop security strategy and plan 1 day 5 days, 1 hour 
Total  6 days, 4 hours  17 days, 3 hours 
Source: Alberts & Dorofee, (2004) 
OCTAVE-small risk management is expected to generate data in all its processes using a 
variety of techniques. Section 6.8 examines the data gathering techniques used in the 
OCTAVE-small and then link them to those discussed in chapters 2 and 4. 
 
6.8. DATA GENERATING TECHNIQUES FOR OCTAVE-SMALL 
Successful implementation of OCTAVE-small requires data for threats, vulnerabilities and 
exposures of the CISs assets. In this study, the main data collection technique was 
participatory observation in which the researcher with the help of the collaborative team 
documented all possible threats, vulnerabilities and exposures in the systems and risk 
incidents that occurred. This was aided by physical inspections of the CISs and their 
operational environments. Interviews were conducted with some sampled users of these 
systems. Chapters 2 and 4 discussed the data collection techniques in detail. A variety of 
data generating instruments were used in this study, ranging from observation 
schedule/checklists, inspection checklists and interview schedules. The use of these 
instruments is dealt with in Chapter 7, which deals with data gathering, the practical 
component of this research. 
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The OCTAVE-small risk management method has its weaknesses that need to be 
overcome during its implementation. Such constraints are briefly discussed in the 
immediate Section 6.9 below. 
 
6.9. CONSTRAINTS POSED BY OCTAVE-SMALL METHOD 
There are a number of constraints associated with the use of OCTAVE-small risk 
management method. This list exemplifies the constraints. 
 OCTAVE-small requires high-quality preparation workshop or meetings (expert 
knowledge of the business activities) in this case high schools. However, 
OCTAVE-small is based on the knowledge of employees, rather than on 
measurements and formal proofs (Bozo & Ruzic 2009; Bozic, 2012). 
 OCTAVE-small recommends at least four business units, one of which must be 
the Information Technology department (van Niekerk, 2005). However, this 
restriction is questionable, in that many small-scale organisations tend to be made 
of only one or two business units. In this study, most schools are generally 
treated as two units namely academic and administrative.  
 OCTAVE-small risk assessment may take many workshop or meeting sessions 
that could prove to be a heavy load and one that most busy organisations would 
find difficult to accommodate (Jones & Ashenden, 2005). This makes it too 
difficult to keep the momentum of going in the process if the workshops are 
spread out over too long a period of time (Jones & Ashenden, 2005). However, 
OCTAVE-small recognises that the number of workshops held depends on a 
range of factors, including the scope of the assessment and the resources 
available for its completion.  
 
Above all OCTAVE-small can be performed either in a workshop-style, collaborative 
setting or by an individual while being supported by guidance, worksheets and other data 
generating tools (Stevens, 2005; Richard et al. 2007). When OCTAVE-small is 
implemented in this way, it gives the researcher a leeway to expeditiously carry out the 
research with minimum problems in the chosen area of study. Furthermore, this helps to 
place an information security risk assessment within which the organisation can align its 
processes while ensuring that it follows the principles of OCTAVE-small (Jones & 
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Ashenden, 2005). Therefore, in this research study, OCTAVE-small was implemented in a 
collaborative setting that allowed the research to take place in naturalistic settings. This 
was also intended to give the CISs users a chance to actively participate in the risk 
management programme. 
 
6.10. CONCLUSION 
In order to conduct a successful risk management exercise, the most appropriate risk 
management method was selected from a plethora of the existing methods. A number of 
factors that influence the choice of such a method were discussed in this chapter. This 
study implemented OCTAVE-small because it was suitable for flat-layered information 
systems of an organisation with less than eighty employees. The OCTAVE-small method 
is a qualitative risk-based strategic assessment and planning method for information 
security and is a process-driven methodology that identifies, prioritises and manages 
information security risks. OCTAVE-small is a self-directed and workshop-based method 
in which a small team from within the organisation performs the risk assessment and 
analysis exercise. The OCTAVE-small method has four processes which involve 
identifying critical information assets, identifying threats to those critical assets, 
identifying current asset vulnerabilities, and performing risk evaluation and putting in 
place appropriate risk management strategy for that particular organisation. The use of the 
OCTAVE-small method provides the users of CISs with an opportunity to participate in 
all risk management exercises taking place in their organisations. This also empowers the 
users by encouraging them to be involved in decision making about the security posture of 
their organisations.  
 
Threat profiles can be created using visual trees that show the critical asset, how it is 
accessed, who accesses it, the motive and the outcome. Four major categories of threats 
have been theoretically identified and the ways they could be used to build profiles are 
identified. However, in this study, simple customised tables were used instead of tree 
threat profiles. Data for this study were generated through observation, inspections and 
interviews of the participants, users of CISs. The next chapter, Chapter 7 focuses on 
empirical research in which data are generated, analysed, presented and interpreted. 
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7.1. INTRODUCTION 
The importance of information security risk management has been emphasised throughout 
the preliminary chapters of this study. A risk management exercise is essential to any 
security improvement initiative because it can generate an organisation-wide view of 
information security risks at the same time providing a baseline for improvement (Alberts 
et al. 2003). This implies that an effective information security risk management exercise 
considers both organisational and technological issues and examines how CISs users 
manage and use their organisation‟s computing infrastructure on a daily basis. This study 
is an initiative to afford secondary schools managers and CISs users an opportunity to 
perform risk management exercises for their CISs using the OCTAVE-small risk 
management method. Subsequently, secondary schools are expected to actively plan how 
to apply good security practices to address organisational and technical vulnerabilities that 
are likely to impact negatively on their information systems assets, hence improve service 
delivery. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to report on the empirical risk management case study 
undertaken in two selected secondary schools in Thohoyandou Cluster, Vhembe District. 
 
The structure of this chapter includes background context of the two secondary schools 
involved in this study, an overview of data collection methods used for the case study. 
This is followed by identification of critical assets for CISs, threats, vulnerabilities and 
risk components in accordance with OCTAVE-small. Data is presented, analysed and 
interpreted qualitatively. Tentative findings are given thereof. Organisational 
vulnerabilities are treated first followed by technical vulnerabilities. A detailed description 
of the structured analysis of various threats, vulnerability and risk components is also 
given. Overall risk analysis is done and then followed by protection strategies and 
mitigation plans. A conclusion to the chapter is given at the end as a summary of what has 
been discussed in this chapter. 
 
7.2. DESCRIPTION OF SCHOOLS INVOLVED (SCHOOLS A AND B) 
Both Schools A and B (names withheld) are Government Further Learning and Training 
(FET) schools located in Thohoyandou Cluster, Vhembe District (Limpopo Province). The 
schools are in peri-urban suburban area and have high learner enrolments. The 
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organograms of these schools are similar because they are prescribed by the Department of 
Education (DoE). Figure 7.1 shows the Organogram in general. 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Schools A and B Organogram structure 
 
Each secondary school had the following functional structures: 
 a permanent administrative staff (all educators); 
 permanent and temporary teaching staff; 
 permanent general staff; 
 learners from Grade 8 to 12; and 
 a relatively large information technology infrastructure manned by administrative 
educators who were responsible for on-site computer and network maintenance and 
upgrades. The computers were located in different rooms and offices. Some 
computers were used for administrative purposes and others used for teaching 
purposes.  
This research targeted those computers used for administrative purposes especially in the 
computerisation of information systems. 
 
7.3. PREPARATORY ACTIVITIES 
The success of the OCTAVE-small method depends on the financial and human resources 
support given to the collaborative team by the management (Alberts and Dorofee, 2003; 
Harper, 2002). In this research study school management provided support in the form of 
human resource and information systems assets. The compositions of the collaborative 
PRINCIPAL 
DEPUTY PRINCIPALS 
HODS ACCOUNTING OFFICER 
EDUCATORS ADMINISTRATOR 
LEARNERS GENERAL WORKERS 
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teams in the two secondary schools were similar. Table 7.1 is a summary of the 
collaborative team composition. 
 
Table 7.1: Composition of the collaborative team 
Team 
member 
Area of 
specialisation 
Information 
Technology skills 
Duties performed 
Administrative 
educators 
Records 
management 
both 
computerised 
and manual 
Basic hardware 
and application 
software skills 
In charge of all computerised 
records and custodian of 
information technology assets. 
Installs and configures 
hardware and software in all 
office computers. 
Accounting 
Officer 
Accounting 
and basic 
computer skills 
Fairly good user of 
computing 
facilities 
Very good in 
problem solving 
Finance officer and custodian 
of all computerised and 
manual financial records. 
Deputy 
principal 
Education and 
management 
Good operational 
skills in selected 
packages. Very 
good problem 
solver 
Maintains a small database for 
staff records and hard copies 
of learner records. Uses 
Custom software to capture 
learners‟ marks. 
Researcher Information 
systems 
Hardware and 
software expert 
An outsider given the role to 
organise the collaborative 
team and facilitate meetings. 
 
7.4. DATA COLLECTION 
This study targeted all information assets that were used in CISs. These included: 
 data or information collections such as databases, data files, policies, standards, 
procedures, information archives, disaster recovery/continuity plans or digital 
records;  
 software assets such as application software for office automation, system software 
and custom software (locally developed programs);  
 physical assets, such as computers (desktops, servers, laptops, portable digital 
assistance, tablets), communication equipment (modems, hubs), storage media 
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(removable disks, CDs/DVDS), and some facility equipment (generators, power 
supplies, air conditioners). 
 
Data was generated through participatory observations, physical inspections and interview 
techniques discussed in Chapter 2 and 4. Alberts et al. (2003) argue that security concepts 
are embedded in OCTAVE-small worksheets and allowing the use of worksheets by less 
experienced personnel makes them (worksheets) more viable. These authors also 
encourage those who intend to use the OCTAVE-small method to customise the 
worksheets and implement them according to the organisation being studied. Therefore, 
complex and lengthy OCTAVE-small data collection worksheets were customised and 
integrated with the observation schedule, inspection checklist and interview schedule 
designed by the researcher. Customised OCTAVE-small worksheets were easy to use and 
relevant to the problem being studied. 
 
7.5. OUTPUTS AND THE OCTAVE-SMALL METHOD 
In this study, outputs define the results that collaborative teams achieved during the risk 
management exercise performed at each school. Alberts and Dorofee (2003) suggest that a 
particular output should be generated by a given activity in a definite OCTAVE-small 
process. Each output was then mapped onto the relevant OCTAVE-small process as 
shown in Table 7.2.  
Table 7.2: Mapping of outputs to the OCTAVE-small method 
Output  Implementation in the OCTAVE-small method 
Critical assets for 
CISs 
Process 1: Data was gathered through an asset identification 
and inspection checklist and interview of two key users of CISs 
in each school. This included members of the collaborative 
teams who eventually identified critical assets. 
Organisational 
security practice to 
safeguard critical 
assets and areas of 
concern 
Process 1: Data gathered through interviews of system users 
including collaborative team members 
Security 
requirements for  
critical assets 
Process 2: Users of CISs defined security requirements for 
their important assets. The collaborative team used this 
information to establish the security requirements for the school 
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Output  Implementation in the OCTAVE-small method 
critical assets. 
Current security 
practices 
Process 2: Users of information systems assets contributed 
their views on security practices currently being used by each 
school. Two users completed a simple security checklist. 
Follow-up discussions on key issues were made. Collaborative 
teams consolidated security practices 
Threats to critical 
assets 
Process 2: Collaborative teams inspected critical information 
systems assets to identify threats. Users of CISs were observed 
using assets and also interviewed on areas of concern. The 
collaborative teams used these areas of concern as input to 
create a threat profile for each critical asset in tabular form 
Current 
organisational 
vulnerabilities 
Process 3: Users of CISs contributed their views on missing or 
inadequate security practices in the schools (organisational 
vulnerabilities).  
Key components Process 3: Collaborative teams identified key components of 
the computing infrastructure. The teams used the critical assets 
and the threats to select key components. 
Technical 
vulnerabilities 
Process 3: Each collaborative team evaluated each key 
component using vulnerability evaluation tools like Windows 
Defender and antivirus. Manual checks for vulnerabilities on 
the network and computers were performed 
Risks to critical 
assets  
Process 4: Each collaborative team identified the potential 
impact of the threats to critical assets. A list of risks was 
produced in tabular form. 
Protection strategy Process 4: Collaborative teams developed possible protection 
strategy for organisational security improvement. The strategy 
was based on organisational and technological vulnerability 
information. 
Risk mitigation 
plans 
Process 4: Collaborative teams developed risk mitigation plans 
to reduce the risks in CISs critical assets. Each team selected 
mitigation actions based on the organisational and 
technological information security risks identified throughout 
the evaluation process. 
Source: Alberts and Dorofee (2003) with modification 
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The following sections describe what took place during each process based on activities 
which were carried out. The first process involved identifying critical assets in CISs in 
secondary schools. 
 
7.6. PROCESS 1: IDENTIFY CRITICAL ASSETS IN COMPUTERISED 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS 
This process was carried out according to OCTAVE-small guidelines by Alberts et al. 
(2003). Data pertaining to information systems assets, current protection strategy practice 
and existing organisational vulnerabilities were gathered through interviews, observation, 
inspection checklists and OCTAVE-small customised worksheets. Information systems 
assets for each school were compiled, and then teams held discussions to compile lists of 
critical assets for each school. 
 
7.6.1. Activity 1: Identify information system assets in secondary schools 
The main purpose of this activity was to identify and locate all information systems assets 
used to support administrative activities. Observation checklists, interview schedules and 
inspection checklists were used to collect data from two key users of information systems 
in both schools. The interview also included security aspects of the information systems 
that the users experienced when they used identified assets. A sample of interview 
transcription is given in Appendix 4. An inspection checklist was also used to verify 
interview results. Two collaborative team members from each school completed an 
inspection checklist for their school. Data pertaining to information systems assets for 
each school were summarised and presented on Tables 7.3a and 7.3b below.  
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Table 7:3a: Asset identification and inspection checklist Secondary School A 
 Important Asset Type Location 
1.  Custom software 
applications 
Application/software Server – reception 
2.  Learners CASS Mark and 
Schedules 
Information  Server – reception 
3.  Educators‟ information Information Vice Principals‟ offices 
4.  Subject allocation lists Information Vice Principles‟ offices 
5.  Asset management System Application/Software Server – reception 
6.  Computers /Laptops Hardware Offices 
7.  Modem Hardware Vice principal‟s office 
8.  Switches/hubs Hardware Tea room  
9.  Compact Disks Hardware Strongroom 
10.  Financial information: 
Creditors payments and 
school fees information 
Information  Strongroom  
Accountant‟s computer 
11.  Network cables Accessories Administration block 
Table 7:3b: Asset identification and inspection checklist Secondary School B 
 Name of Asset Type Location 
1.  Custom software 
application 
Application/Software Laptops in Strongroom and 
vice principal‟s computers 
and staffroom computers 
2.  Learners‟ CASS Mark 
Schedules 
Information Office Computers & laptops 
in strong room 
3.  Educators‟ personal 
information 
Information Vice Principals‟ computers 
4.  Subject allocation lists Information Vice Principles‟ offices 
5.  Asset management System Application/Software Vice Principals‟ computers 
6.  Computers/ Laptops Hardware Offices 
7.  Modem Hardware Office 
8.  Compact Disks Hardware Strongroom 
9.  Switches Hardware In the corridor of 
administration block  
10.  Network cables Accessories Administration block 
11.  Financial information Information Accounting Officer‟s 
Computer 
 
Information on Table 7.3a and Table 7.3b shows that the two secondary schools had 
similar information systems assets used in their computerised information systems. School 
A had both wired and wireless LANS, which were in good state. School B had a wired 
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LAN only. The LANs were supported by broadband internet connections. All the assets 
indicated above were important for the operations of the schools. Each collaborative team 
proceeded to select critical assets for its school. 
 
7.6.2. Activity 2: Selecting critical information systems assets 
Discussions by collaborative teams led to the compilation of lists of critical assets for each 
school. The two lists were comparatively similar and were collapsed into a single list, 
Table 7.4. Reasons for selecting an asset as being critical are also given alongside.  
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Table 7.4: Critical assets in both secondary schools 
Critical asset Justification for its selection 
Learners‟ CASS 
marks database 
It stores CASS marks for all learners used for progress reports 
and final promotion at the end of the year. This information 
needs to be strictly secured from any changes, loss or viewing by 
unauthorised individuals. It also needs to be always available to 
school management. 
Financial 
information: 
Creditors‟ records, 
school fees, salary 
records for general 
workers 
This information is highly confidential and could only be 
accessed by the principals and Accounting Educator. SARS tax 
numbers, amount payable, service rendered or products 
delivered, payments information should be confidential and 
while retaining its authenticity. Its availability to the principals 
and auditors was also very important.  
Custom application  It is used in data capturing and processing. Learners‟ 
computerised records are only accessed through this application. 
Its modification may result to unavailability of records 
management and disruptions. 
Computers used in 
the administration 
offices 
Most of the information is stored in these computers. The 
computers are used to access, retrieve, process and output the 
needed information. 
Modems and hubs Provide interconnection of all computers used in the school. 
Hubs provided connectivity and a means of accessing 
information on the server-computer and other computers with 
vital information. Modems were used for internet connections 
Educators personal 
information 
This information was supposed to be confidential and could only 
be accessed by the principals and administrative educators. 
Educator‟s persal number, SACE numbers, SARS tax numbers, 
sensitive reports on staff misconducts, monthly salaries.  
 
Table 7.4 shows six information systems‟ critical assets for the two secondary schools 
involved in this study. Justification for selecting an asset as critical is also given. After 
identifying critical assets, the teams proceeded to evaluate organisational security practice 
taking into account the critical assets at hand.  
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7.6.3. Activity 3: Evaluate organisational security practices 
A simple checklist was used to gather data on the state of information security from CISs 
users‟ point of view. This was intended to establish information security awareness among 
the users of CISs and the overall current security practices. One deputy principal and 
administrative educator from each school completed a checklist for their schools. Table 
7.5 is a summary of results for security practices in both schools. 
Table 7.5: Organisational security practices for Schools A and B 
 Item Schools A and B 
1.  Information security 
policy 
No written security policies  
2.  Risk management Neither of the school does risk management 
3.  Access account 
management 
No procedures to manage access accounts 
4.  Configuration 
management 
No control Plan 
5.  Password authentication No enforcement rules, optional, shared passwords 
6.  Network security policy No written internet or network policy.  
7.  Modems policy No policy in place.  
8.  Cryptographic capability No such capabilities existed.  
9.  System administration Administrative educator acts as a systems 
administrator mainly for software and hardware 
maintenance.  
10.  Incident response 
capability  
No policy for this. No training for users and 
systems administrator. Schools did not keep records 
for precious information security incidents.  
11.  Viruses and malware 
policy 
No policy. Use of virus protection mechanisms, but 
this is not mandatory. Some users could recognise 
virus effects, but other users were ignorant of 
viruses and their effects. Users were unable to clean 
malware 
12.  Contingency planning There is no contingency plan in place. Schools did 
not have UPSs to cater for unplanned power cuts. 
13.  Backups policy There is no backup policy but the backup is done 
periodically by any user who feels a need to. 
14.  Maintenance policy There is no policy. Maintenance was done by 
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 Item Schools A and B 
Administrative educators when there were problems 
or schools employed outsiders to do maintenance.  
15.  Media sanitisation Rarely done. No policy for this. Only hard copies 
are burned or dumped at school dump sites. 
16.  Physical security policy No written physical security policies in both 
schools. However, all doors and windows to rooms 
with information assets are burglar barred. Modems 
and hubs are poorly secured can be removed easily. 
No zoning of the area where information systems 
are used. 
17.  Personal security policy There are no documented information security 
orientation courses for employees. No documents 
signed for non-disclosure of critical information. 
18.  Training and awareness 
programmes 
No documented programmes for training and 
awareness on information security. No training and 
awareness of information security were provided to 
information systems users 
  
The results on organisational security practices on Table 7.5 indicate that both schools did 
not have written policies concerning information security. Besides physical security 
controls being enforced, the results indicate a deficiency in the security practice of the two 
schools that left critical information assets at risk from threats. Lack of training or 
awareness in information security was evident in both schools. It could be argued that 
information security was given little or no priority in both schools. Although schools 
appreciated the importance of CISs, there was clear evidence that their current 
organisational security practices disregarded this fact. This undermined the crucial role 
played by CISs assets in these schools. 
 
Information systems users raised concerns pertaining to current security practice in the 
schools. The areas of concern are presented on Table 7.6. 
Table 7.6: Areas of concern for critical information systems assets 
Asset Areas of Concern 
Learner CASS Disclosure 
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Asset Areas of Concern 
marks database Some of the authorised users had a habit of accessing information they 
were not authorised to use. At times, legitimately accessed information 
was inappropriately distributed to wrong individuals like learners and 
community people who used it to attack school management during 
general meetings. 
Modification 
Authorised users intentionally entered erroneous marks to the 
advantage of some learners.  
Authorised users deliberately gave their friends access to confidential 
records, at times, they were influenced to modify the marks.  
The risk of an outsider‟s intrusion into the CASS database was more 
likely to occur because the inbuilt firewall systems on the server-
computers were wrongly configured. 
Interruption/loss 
If the Administrative educators went on leave, some important 
functionality of the database and custom software could not be used.  
Custom software used on CASS database was incompatible with 
Windows 7 and crashed frequently disrupting capturing of marks.  
Power outages and other external events were likely to result in denial 
of access to CASS marks database. This essentially caused delays in 
the processing of termly schedules and reports. 
Loss/destruction 
Accidental or deliberate loss of any important information was a 
concern when unauthorised users deleted files while using the 
computers meant for administrative purposes. 
Educators‟ 
information 
Disclosure  
Authorised users unintentionally or intentionally disclosed confidential 
educator financial information to friends. 
There was no physical security in the reception where server-
computers and sensitive information were kept. Unauthorised persons 
could wander in and see confidential information displayed on the 
workstations in these rooms. 
Loss/destruction, modification 
Authorised and unauthorised users could change or delete the 
information on educators upon opening files. Educators employed by 
schools end up receiving wrong salaries or not receiving any salaries at 
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Asset Areas of Concern 
all. Incorrect information on insurance claims ends up being sent to 
SARS. 
Financial 
records and 
service 
provider‟s 
information 
Modification  
Deliberate modification of the records resulted in schools getting poor 
services or substandard products from dubious providers. Some 
amounts on receipts were wrongly captured, understated or overstated 
and double payments made. 
 
Loss/destruction 
Invoices or receipts were being misplaced and could not be traced for 
verifications during auditing. This resulted in unpaid credits or double 
payments for the same product 
 Disclosure 
Unauthorised users disclosed sensitive financial information they come 
across. Some information was printed and distributed unofficially to 
authorities 
 
 
Computers 
Loss /destruction 
Computers and hardware were easily moved by authorised and 
unauthorised persons. Hard disks could be replaced or damaged during 
these movements. Critical information would be lost. At times hubs 
went missing. Unauthorised users used memory sticks infected with 
viruses on administration computers thereby infecting them with 
different malware. 
 
 
 
Custom 
software 
Modification 
Custom software for accessing CASS database used a shared password 
which could easily be obtained from authorised users. Unauthorised 
users could use it to gain access to the database and modify learner‟s 
marks. 
Disruption 
Schools complained of recurrent crashing of custom software on some 
computers. This caused unnecessary delays in processing of reports 
and results analyses.  
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Asset Areas of Concern 
Loss/ Destruction  
Software installation folders could easily be deleted over the network. 
Software was prone to malware attack 
Network  Disruption 
Network down-time was high due to hub problems  
 
Information on Table 7.6 indicates that there were many concerns raised by CISs users 
that affected the security of the critical assets hence their use. The main concerns arose 
from unaccounted modification of critical information by some authorised users, divulging 
of critical information to unintended people and disruption of services due network 
problems.  
 
The foregone activities identified critical assets and determined current security practices 
in both secondary schools. Security concerns pertaining to critical assets were raised by 
CISs users. The information obtained from these activities was then used in Process 2 
which identified threats to critical assets.  
 
7.7. PROCESS 2: IDENTIFY THREATS TO CRITICAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
ASSETS 
In this process, collaborative teams identified security requirements for critical assets and 
threats to those critical assets. Data were gathered using customised OCTAVE-small 
worksheets. Some data were obtained from the interviews previously held in Process 1. 
 
7.7.1. Activity 4: Identifying security requirements for critical assets 
Discussions of security requirements led to the determination of the most important 
security requirements for each critical asset. The results for both schools were summarised 
and presented on Table 7.7 below. 
 
Information on Table 7.7 indicates that the learners‟ CASS marks database should retain 
its integrity throughout. Only one authorised person, the administrative educator was 
supposed to alter those marks. This was confirmed by what the administrative educator in 
School A said about modification of CASS marks:  
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“In the event that one of the principals or data “capturer” makes changes to any of the marks 
using data capturing software or application on any other computer besides the server-computer, 
the program will report the changes and it is me who can confirm or reject the changes after 
verifying the mark affected. The only problem we have is that the system does not record 
somewhere the mark that would have been deleted. I have to look for the original marks schedule. 
These changes must be authorised by the deputy principal. If the changes are made on the server-
computer, then it is difficult to detect this anomaly. The learner will benefit at the end”, 
(Administrative educator 1). 
 
Table 7.7: Current security requirements for critical information systems asset 
Critical asset Security requirements descriptions Most important 
security 
requirement 
Learners 
CASS marks 
database 
Only one authorised person was supposed to 
modify CASS marks once they were saved. No 
unauthorised person should modify this 
information 
Integrity 1 
Cass marks should be accessible at any time 
they are needed (at least 5 hours a day) 
Availability  2 
Only authorised persons can view marks Confidentiality 3 
Financial 
records / 
information  
Only the Accounting Officers should be 
authorised to modify this information with 
permission from the principals.  
Integrity 1 
Only authorised persons should view these 
records. 
Confidentiality 2 
Should be accessible all the time it is needed Availability  3 
Educators 
personal 
Information 
and Salaries  
Alternations should be made by an authorised 
person.  
Integrity 1 
Only authorised persons can view this 
information.  
Confidentiality 2 
Should be accessible all the time the 
information is needed 
Availability 3 
Custom 
software  
Should always be available and can be used by 
authorised persons 
Availability 1 
Computers  Should always function perfectly during school 
hours 
Availability 1 
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Critical asset Security requirements descriptions Most important 
security 
requirement 
Should be used by authorised personnel. No 
unauthorised person should use administrative 
computers 
Integrity 
confidentiality 
2 
3 
Routers and 
hubs  
Should always be on during the day  Availability 1 
 Key:  1 = Most important security requirement,  
  2 = Second most important security requirement 
  3 = Third important security requirement 
 
In School B, the Administrative educator echoed the same sentiments in an interview: “We 
are always surprised that at the end some mark tampering would have occurred in some 
cases when we crosscheck for each learner”, (Administrative educator 2). It seems that 
schools find it difficult to maintain integrity of information stored in computers due to a 
number of known and unknown threats.  
 
7.7.2. Activity 5: Identifying threats to critical assets 
Collaborative teams examined threats and threat sources to each identified critical asset. 
Data were collected using customised OCTAVE-small threat profile worksheet. A number 
of mitigating factors led to customisation of OCTAVE-small worksheet:  
 reducing the amount of paper work to be done and the time needed to gather data 
compared to when the conventional worksheets were used; 
 some of the areas examined by the conventional OCTAVE-small did not apply to 
secondary school situations where there were no records of previous information 
security risk management exercises; and 
 making the instrument user friendly to the collaborative team members.  
This was in line with Alberts et al. (2003), Woody et al. (2006) and Panda (2009) who 
encourage organisations to customise OCTAVE-small worksheets to their needs. The 
results of this activity are shown on Table 7.8.  
 
Table 7.8 below shows common threats/threat sources that were found in CISs critical 
assets in both schools. The effects of the identified threats on each critical asset and their 
overall impact on the schools are also documented on the above table. A number of 
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threats/threat sources were related to human being actions, malware and environment in 
which the assets were used. The majority of the threats impacted negatively on school 
productivity, reputation and finance. The three information security requirements were 
also compromised. Information integrity and availability of critical assets were the most 
affected. 
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Table 7.8: Summary of threats/threat sources from asset risk profiles 
Asset 
affected 
Threat/threat source Possible threat effect or impact on asset Potential impact on the school operations/ 
mission 
Learner 
CASS marks 
Database  
Unauthorised users who 
accessed the server-computer 
over the network. 
Deletion of database – availability 
affected 
Modification of records – integrity was 
compromised 
Productivity was disrupted; financial loss through 
re-installation of software; distrust of school 
managers by learners and parents affected school 
reputation. 
Authorised users who accessed 
server-computer over network 
deliberately modified marks. 
Information integrity compromised.  Some learners were promoted on the basis of 
falsified marks; school reputation was affected 
when learners with forged results were demoted. 
Unauthorised users gained 
physical access to server-
computers and printed fake 
school reports. 
Exposure impinging negatively on 
confidentiality. Information integrity at 
risk  
Schools‟ reputation severely damaged when 
learners get results which mismatch their 
performances and fake results on school reports.  
Employees replacing, 
disconnecting or hiding hubs 
Database availability to other computers 
is severely affected. Increases marks 
capturing time and leads to errors in data 
entry. 
Disruption of operations that used the database. 
Productivity decreased. The schools lost money in 
replacing the hubs or paying workers overtime. 
Untimely and persistent system 
crashes 
Destruction or corruption of files affected 
availability of systems. 
Productivity was affected. Data were recaptured. 
Delays in meeting targets were experienced.  
Defective hard drive Destruction of database, files 
irretrievable. Availability is severely 
affected 
Productivity affected, loss of finance through 
buying new hard disks, hiring technicians to 
replace them. 
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Asset 
affected 
Threat/threat source Possible threat effect or impact on asset Potential impact on the school operations/ 
mission 
Malware (Viruses and Trojan 
horse) 
Infected database files and creating 
shortcuts. Corrupted records. Cleaning 
virus deleted the database files. 
Availability was affected 
Data capturing and report printing were delayed. 
Reputation of schools was compromised.  
Custom 
application 
software 
Unauthorised users gain 
physical access and 
deliberately uninstall custom 
software 
Mark capturing, processing and reports 
severely affected. Availability is 
compromised 
Productivity and reputation were seriously 
affected. Termly marks capturing, mark schedules 
delayed. Schools have to pay the proprietor to 
reinstall system 
System crashes Custom software sensitivity to system 
crashes corrupted it. Reinstallation was 
needed. Unavailability persisted for long 
time 
Productivity is affected; report printing differed to 
a later date. Payments to be made to the proprietor 
for reinstallation 
Custom software 
incompatibility with Windows 
7 
System hanging when the Custom 
software was loaded. Availability was 
affected 
Leads to loss of finance due to reconfiguring 
charges.  
Expired licences System availability is affected. Records 
cannot be captured or processed.  
No productivity in terms of CASS marks until the 
school pays for the licence renewal.  
Virus and Trojan horses Prone to virus attacks. Some of its files 
are detected as malicious code by some 
antivirus. Affect availability. Users 
deleted some files as prompted by 
antivirus. 
Schools pay for the malware removal, 
maintenance of the system. Schools always 
victims of bogus technicians who replace genuine 
components with pirated ones or sell fake 
antivirus. 
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Asset 
affected 
Threat/threat source Possible threat effect or impact on asset Potential impact on the school operations/ 
mission 
Financial 
Records 
(creditors 
payments 
and learners 
fees) 
Unauthorised users used 
physical access to financial 
records when Accounting 
educator left workstations 
unattended.  
The users could view and modify 
financial information for learners or 
creditors. Both confidentiality and 
integrity were affected 
Loss of revenue due to double payment or 
uncollected fees. Unpaid creditors may disrupt 
services in the school. Some users discuss about 
the amounts paid to some creditors, this discredits 
the school. 
Virus and Trojan horses Data corruption compromises integrity. 
Accounting software failed to load, 
needed reinstallation; availability was 
affected. 
All school operations that depend on this 
information asset are either suspended or slowed 
down. School reputation with creditors was likely 
to be negatively affected.  
Computers Unauthorised removal of 
hardware  
Disrupts network and makes it 
unavailable 
Productivity was affected negatively 
Theft of computer components 
by authorised and unauthorised 
users 
Permanent loss of data and computers 
unusable. Availability was compromised  
Productivity and financial loss by schools 
Poorly air-conditioned rooms 
resulting to high temperatures 
Computers overheating and crashing. 
Systems become unavailable  
Productivity and reputation of schools at stake 
Power outages Destroys hardware. Computers become 
unusable. Availability was compromised 
Loss of data and money as computer needs to be 
replaced 
Network 
bandwidth 
Illegal connection of laptops 
and other portable devices to 
the school network 
Accessibility of server-computer by 
applications on workstations serious 
impaired. Availability compromised. 
Productivity for that particular day seriously 
negatively affected.  
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In both schools CASS marks databases were on server-computers and were shared so that 
three other computers (Administrative educators and two Vice Principals) accessed 
databases over the school LANs. Custom application software, another critical asset, was 
being used to access the database. In School A, the LAN consisted of more than twelve 
computers while at School B, there were 10 computers. There were two major weaknesses 
with these two critical assets; all users shared one password which each school was unable 
to change; and shared folders on the server-computer were visible over the LAN. Figure 
7.2 shows the LAN architecture for School A obtained after running the network device 
discovery program from a LAN workstation in one of the staffrooms being used by 
educators for various purposes.  
 
 
Figure 7.2: LAN architecture for School A from staffroom 
 
Figure 7.3 shows fourteen computers and media devices on School A LAN. 
 
Figure 7.3: Computers on LAN in School A  
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Computers of interest were: 
 ADMIN – the server-computer in which the CASS marks database was stored; 
 adminRamukumba – a workstation storing financial information for the school. 
This computer was used solely by the accounting officer 
 TECHNICAL-PC – a workstation in the vice principal‟s office that contained 
educator‟s information, mark schedules and installed with custom software to 
access the database on server-computer.  
 MANENAOFFICE – a workstation in another vice principals office. This 
computer stored sensitive educators‟ information. It was also installed with the 
custom software to access the database. 
 USER-PC – a workstation used by the Administrative educator to access the 
server-computer. The computer stores many types of documents used for the 
operation of the school.   
 LIVHU – PC, USER-PC and EDU are computers illegally connected to school 
LAN 
 
When ADMIN computer was accessed using a computer in a staffroom important folders 
were displayed as shown on Figure 7.4 below.  
 
 
Figure 7.4: Shared folders on the ADMIN Computer 
Important learners‟ CASS information is stored in Previous Schedules and Reports and 
Vanguard folders. The contents of these folders are also accessible as shown in figure 7.5 
below.  
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Figure 7.5: Files in School A database  
 
Some of these files could be opened and data modified or deleted over the LAN. There 
was a high possibility that unauthorised and authorised users accessed the CASS database 
over the network and modified marks without being detected. This could lead to loss of 
integrity, confidentiality and availability.  
 
Besides the learners‟ CASS database, all other critical information assets were accessible 
physically. Further observations and interviews revealed that there were serious concerns 
pertaining to threats and threat sources in critical assets. Table 7.9 shows areas of concern 
that were raised by users and management. 
Table 7.9: Areas of concern pertaining to threats in critical assets 
 Area of 
concern 
arising from 
Affected 
information 
systems asset  
Cited examples Effects on critical 
information system 
asset 
1.  Insiders 
using 
network 
access 
Learners‟ CASS 
database 
Educators‟ 
profile 
information 
Authorised users modified 
learner marks 
illegitimately 
Discussion of learners or 
educators with outsiders 
Integrity and 
confidentiality were 
compromised 
2.  Outsiders 
using 
network 
access 
Learners‟ CASS 
database 
Unauthorised modification 
of records or deleting 
important files 
Integrity and 
availability were 
always compromised  
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 Area of 
concern 
arising from 
Affected 
information 
systems asset  
Cited examples Effects on critical 
information system 
asset 
3.  Insider using 
physical 
access 
Learners‟ CASS 
Database 
 
Financial 
records 
 
Network hubs 
 
Backup disks 
Tempering with marks of 
learners. Copying, 
printing, deleting or 
altering records 
Deleting it or changing 
subject allocation  
Hubs were off or data 
cables were disconnected 
Misplaced or scratched to 
make them unreadable 
Renders marks 
unreliable 
Confidentiality, 
availability and 
integrity were 
compromised. Asset 
no longer available 
and creates chaos at 
school 
Disrupts network, 
networked resources 
no longer available. 
Backup files no 
longer available. 
4.  Physical 
configuration 
problems 
Information 
 
Hubs  
 
 
Data cables 
 
Information on screen 
always visible to 
unauthorised users. 
Hanging where they can 
easily be removed or 
stolen 
Dangled outside where 
passers-by could destroy 
them 
Loses confidentiality 
Loss of networked 
resource availability 
Loss of networked 
resources 
5.  Software 
defects 
Custom software 
 
Hides some of the 
important forms 
Miscalculates values 
Availability of the 
system is impaired. 
Unreliable results 
were produced.  
6.  System 
crashes 
Custom 
Software 
 
Operating 
systems  
Occasionally hangs when 
entering data 
Crashes when running 
custom software 
Availability is 
impaired and data is 
lost. 
7.  Hardware 
defects 
Hard disks 
Memory sticks 
External hard 
Irrecoverable data loss 
occurred. Whole system 
disappears.  
Availability 
seriously 
compromised 
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 Area of 
concern 
arising from 
Affected 
information 
systems asset  
Cited examples Effects on critical 
information system 
asset 
disks Required formatting 
resulting in loss of 
valuable information 
 
Loss of important 
data  
8.  Malicious 
code 
Financial 
Information in 
files 
Creates shortcuts for 
existing folders and data 
files. The original files 
disappear and cannot be 
opened. File corruption 
occurs 
Information 
availability is lost. 
Data integrity is 
threatened 
9.  Other 
problems 
Information Users forgetting names of 
files containing crucial 
information 
Availability is 
affected 
 
Identification of threat to information systems assets was completed successfully and 
results were presented in various tables then analysed and interpreted accordingly. 
Attention was then focussed on Process 3, infrastructure vulnerabilities identification. 
7.8. PROCESS 3: IDENTIFY INFRASTRUCTURE VULNERABILITY 
The goal of vulnerability identification is to determine the weaknesses or flaws in a system 
(Walsh, 2011). The activities performed in this section targeted technical vulnerabilities, 
vulnerabilities associated with computer hardware or software used in CISs. Technical 
vulnerabilities are weaknesses found in the technological infrastructure that could lead 
directly to unauthorised actions (Woody et al. 2006). To accurately identify 
vulnerabilities, Walsh (2011) encourages the team to first assess existing security controls 
in the systems of interest. In this research study collaborative teams resolved that if a 
control was missing then it was obvious that there was vulnerability in that component. 
The first activity was identification of key components of systems of interest, then 
examining access paths to critical information assets. This led to analysis of technology 
related processes.  
 
7.8.1. Activity 6: Examining access paths 
The examination of access paths involved identifying the key components of systems of 
interest that were closely related to critical information systems assets. Collaborative 
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teams identified Learner CASS mark databases, financial records and computers as the 
most important critical assets for each school. It was concluded that the CASS marks 
database was most likely to be attacked from external and internal because it was on the 
LAN, while financial records were likely to be attacked from internal only. Certain 
information systems assets were likely to be used in these attacks. Such assets were 
referred to as key components. The key components included the server-computer, routers, 
hubs, data cables, the office workstations, educator‟s laptops and learners‟ mobile devices. 
It was established that most of the personal computers and laptops connected to School A 
LAN were able to access CASS marks databases on the server-computer. Access paths to 
critical assets were provided by class components which were studied.  
 
Table 7.10: Systems of interest and key classes of components 
RECORDS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
System(s) of interest Learners‟ CASS marks database  
Key classes of 
components used to 
access this critical 
asset 
Server-computer 
Desktop workstations  
Laptops  
Router 
Hubs 
Networking components (Both Ethernet and Wireless LANs) 
Storage devices 
COMPUTERISED SCHOOL FINANCIAL RECORDS 
System(s) of interest Financial information 
Key classes of 
components used to 
access this critical 
asset 
Desktop workstations 
Laptops  
Router 
Hubs 
Storage devices 
Personal Computers (workstations and laptops) 
System(s) of Interest Personal computers were themselves the system of interest 
(they were) also a subsystem of the other systems such as 
Learner CASS marks database and financial information. 
Key classes of 
components used to 
access this critical 
asset 
Desktop workstations share same network components as the 
information assets above 
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Table 7.10 shows the system of interest and the key classes of components for each of the 
critical assets which the collaborative teams identified for evaluation. Reasons for 
selecting each system of interest and its class components are also given on the above 
table. 
 
Table 7.11 shows systems of interest that were closely associated with critical information 
systems assets for the two secondary schools studied. On-site workstations, laptops and 
cell phones could possibly be used to launch attacks on data mainly through the internal 
networks. Information and data files stored on server-computer‟s hard drives were mostly 
prone to attacks through the internal network access points. Information and data on some 
workstations could be attacked through physical access methods that required the attacker 
to physically get hold of the system on which data were stored. Network devices like hubs 
and routers could either be disabled or removed to disrupt the network services thereby 
negatively affecting the availability of the critical assets such as CASS marks databases. 
Table 7.11: Key classes of components and reasons for their selections 
 Class of Component Reason for selection 
Server-computer CASS database stored and processed on the server-
computer. 
Networking components Router / hubs provide connectivity and main access to 
LAN and internal/external access. 
Security components Firewall – key part of security for external access to 
office computers. 
Desktop workstations Used for all internal access to server and other desktop 
computers. 
Financial records are stored on a desktop workstation 
Laptops Used for internal and external access to the server 
computer 
Storage devices Provide storage media for the critical information 
Wireless components Provide connectivity and illegal access to school LAN  
 
After establishing systems access paths, physical security checks on each critical 
information systems assets were performed taking into account the environment in which 
the assets were located and used. An observation checklist was used and the results are 
displayed on Table 7.12 below. 
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Table 7.12: Observation results for physical security threats 
Asset Location Threats identified 
Learners 
CASS 
marks 
Databases 
Server-
computer 
Authorised users showing unauthorised users how to 
access the databases over the network 
Unauthorised users having access and tampering with 
files and information on the database or even deleting 
database files 
Financial 
information 
Financial 
Admin 
Computer 
Authorised users accessing records they are not 
authorised to view or modify 
Unauthorised users who have motives to modify or 
delete records 
Personal 
computers 
Offices Curious authorised users opened files with sensitive 
information and even modified or deleted files.  
Unauthorised users gain access through dubious means 
and tamper with data stored in the databases. 
Overheating results from poor air-conditioning damaged 
data storage systems  
Users‟ indiscriminate formatting of hard disks led to 
loss of vital data and information.  
Power supplies damaged by power surges 
Power cuts resulting to complete or partial data loss 
Network 
hubs 
Tea room Tea room users unplugging the hub from power supply 
or even removing them from hangers, unplugging data 
cables. At times school hubs were replaced with 
malfunctioning hub from outside 
Unauthorised users plugging their laptops on extra ports 
to gain access to the School LANS 
Routers Office Authorised and unauthorised users gain access to MAC 
address used to enter the wireless network. 
Software 
disks 
Strongroom Authorised users misplacing backup or installation disks 
resulting in loss of valuable software, data and 
information 
Unauthorised users get software disks from authorised 
users and make pirated copies for their personal gains  
Backup 
disks 
Strongroom Authorised users forgetting to label disks with backup 
data. Disks end up in hands of unauthorised users. Data 
files not password protected or encrypted 
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Information on Table 7.12 shows that threats to critical assets did exist. The observations 
made were consistent with previous data on the main threats to the critical assets. 
 
It was also observed that the Ethernet LAN spent most of the time down due to the 
problems of the hub. Checks on the hub indicated that it was frequently unplugged by staff 
members who used the same power socket for cooking purposes. Figure 7.6a shows the 
hub in the tea room in School A.  
 
Figure 7.6a: Switch connected together with water mugs in the tea room 
Unsecured hub could easily be stolen / replaced with another or damaged if dropped on the 
hard floor. Another threat arose from the dangling data cables that could easily be snapped 
into pieces or dragged on the ground during sweeping, shown in Figure 7.6b 
  
 
Figure 7.6b: Network hub closer to a refrigerator in tea room 
 
Hub connected together with cooking utensils in the tea 
room. The hub is vulnerable 
Unsecured data cables on hub closer to a fridge   
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Figure 7.7 shows a router in the vice Principals‟ office in School A. It was observed that 
the occupant of this office spent most of the time outside the office while the office door 
was unlocked. Unauthorised users utilised this chance to obtain the Media Access Control 
(MAC) address from the router and used it to plug their laptops or mobile devices to the 
wireless network. 
 
Figure 7.7: Unsecured router in unsecured office 
Simple system vulnerability checks were performed on hardware and software. The 
vulnerability checks were done while information systems assets were in use. An 
observation checklist was used to collect data during the systems vulnerability checks. 
Table 7.13 shows results for system vulnerability checks on the server-computers and 
other key components to the critical information assets. 
 
Table 7.13: Observed vulnerabilities in the information systems 
Target area Observed Vulnerabilities Comments 
Access to 
computers and 
servers 
No passwords on 
computers storing critical 
information  
Easy access to data files likely to lead to 
deletion or modification of information 
Access to 
custom software 
Authorised users used a 
single password 
Misuse of password by authorised users 
led to malicious attack by unauthorised 
users 
Databases 
visible over the 
LAN 
The database was visible 
to all computers on the 
LAN. 
Deletion or copying of files over the 
network. 
Access to Easy to open tables and Deletion of files by unauthorised user 
Router 
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Target area Observed Vulnerabilities Comments 
databases reports over the network 
Access to data 
in tables 
Data can be inserted, or 
edited directly over the 
network. 
Data modification.  
Firewall settings Firewalls disabled or 
wrongly configured. 
Intruders or authorised users capitalise on 
this to gain access to sensitive information 
using portable devices 
Antivirus 
installations 
Installed but out-dated or 
expired licences.  
Some computers not 
installed with antivirus 
Could not detect new viruses 
 
Easily infected and become sources of 
viruses 
Illegal 
downloaded and 
installed 
shareware like 
games 
Shareware downloaded 
from the Internet allowed 
users to play games on 
computers holding critical 
information. 
Create security weakness that malware 
can utilise 
Malware Most detected malware 
could not be cleaned 
easily. 
Infected computer were either very slow, 
information was also corrupted. 
Network 
bandwidth 
Excessive use YouTube to 
view music videos by 
authorised users 
Wastage of data bundles leading to school 
paying high Internet costs 
System restore 
points 
Disabled Cannot restore computer in case of crashes 
System 
maintenance 
Rarely done, no registers 
of vulnerabilities kept 
Same attacks recurred frequently but no 
written records were made 
Security of 
wireless LAN. 
Less secured MAC 
address easily accessible. 
Illegal connections of laptops and portable 
devices such as cell phones on LAN 
Security of 
Ethernet LAN 
No security password 
needed 
Unauthorised connections successful from 
offices 
Windows 
defender 
Turned off, disabled /out-
dated 
No vulnerability scans done 
Web-based e-
mails 
Frequently used on all 
administration computers 
Users download attachments which at 
times contained viral infections  
Internet 
connection 
All computers access 
internet 
Extensive use of the web and 
downloading of materials from dubious 
sites not monitored 
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Simple security vulnerability and virus scans were performed on server-computers using 
RegClean Pro, Windows Defender and antiviruses. The results of the vulnerability 
scanning using RegClean Pro and AVG PC analyser are shown on Figures 7.8a and 7.8b 
below. Results for malware scans are displayed on Table 7.14. 
 
Figure 7.8a: Vulnerability scan results for School A Server-computer 
The scan result showed 576 registry-related errors on the server-computer making it 
highly vulnerable to attacks. Correction of these errors resulted in the server-computer 
crashing after restart.  
 
Figure 7.8b: Vulnerability scan for School B Server-computer 
 
The following figures also show results of basic vulnerability scanning done on server-
computers in both schools. Windows defender and installed antiviruses (AVG and Norton) 
were used. In School A, the Windows Defender on the Server-computer was turned off. 
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Users were ignorant of the existence of Windows Defender. A number of malware was 
detected when Windows defender was used to scan the computers. Scan results are on 
Figure 7.9a and the result of cleaning the malware are shown on 7.9b, 7.10 and 7.11.  
 
Figure 7.9a: Malware scan on School A server-computer  
 
   
Figure 7.9b: Cleaning process and final results server-computer School A 
 
    
Figure 7.10: Malware scanning and cleaning for School B Computer 
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Figure 7.11: Virus scanning results – Administrative educators‟ computer School A 
The information on malware displayed on the above figures is a clear indication that 
critical assets such as data/information and application software were under threat. Table 
7.14 is a summary of the most common malware found in computers in Schools A and B. 
Table 7.14: Summary of malware scanning 
School Class of 
Component 
Tool/ 
Method 
Results Vulnerability Summary 
A 
Server-
computer 
Windows 
Defender 
- trojandownloader.win32
/adload.da 
Severe: injects harmful code 
to Windows‟ svchost.exe file 
- PWS:Win32/Fareit: Severe: Password stealer 
- Win32/TrojanDownloade
r.Bredolab.AA 
Server: downloads and 
execute files 
- rogue:Win32/Winwebsec 
(System Care antivirus) 
Severe: Phishing software. 
Stops other programs to be 
executed 
Norton 
antivirus 
- Suspicious.Cloud 5 Severe: makes a computer 
vulnerable to remote attacks 
that lead to identity theft; can 
block malware removal tools 
and system utilities such as 
Task Manager 
B 
Server-
computer 
Windows 
Defender 
- trojanDownLoader:Win3
2/Beebone.IW 
Severe: Downloads and 
installs other software silently 
- rogue:Win32/Winwebsec Severe: Phishing software. 
Stops other programs to be 
executed 
Antivirus Expired  No protection 
Source: Microsoft help and support (2013) 
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Computers infected were observed to be slow in booting, loading applications and 
processing records. Technical information on detected malware indicated that: 
- Trojan Downloader: Win32/Adload.DA silently downloads other programs from 
remote locations, sends users links that point to a Trojan code or malicious web 
address (Pilici, 2013). Its execution causes injection of harmful code to Windows’ 
svchost.exe file (Pilici, 2013). The Trojan also infects wmicucit.exe by injecting its 
code to the last section of it. It is polymorphic in nature and endangers other 
executable files located on removable USB drives and network shared drives. 
- PWS:Win32/Fareit is used to steal sensitive account information such as server 
names, port numbers, login IDs and passwords from clients' files, cloud storage 
programs or a host of installed files from the affected computer and sends it to a 
remote attacker in which a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) component. DDoS: 
Win32/Fareit.gen!A, is then commanded to perform flooding attacks against servers 
or computers holding sensitive information.  
 
Basic vulnerability scanning provided the teams with insights into the inherent threats to 
CISs. Most of the vulnerabilities were severe as they caused loss of data and disruptions 
that led to reduced productivity and negative impact on school reputation. The teams 
progressed to the next activity of analysing technology-related process.  
 
7.8.2. Activity 7: Analyse technology-related processes 
This activity focused on the problems that were related to technology and their effects on 
the CISs. Data was gathered using an observation checklist. The results obtained are 
shown on Table 7.15 below.  
 
The results on Table 7.15 above indicate that CISs in both secondary schools were 
vulnerable to threat attack. Many serious deficiencies in the software or hardware 
contributed to these vulnerabilities. Most of the problems related to technology were 
frequently experienced and had negative impact on the school operations that relied on 
CISs. Secondary schools had no controls in place to prevent attacks through these 
vulnerabilities. 
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Table 7.15: Frequently encountered hardware and software problems 
Problem Effects Control 
in place 
Hard disk failures Loss of data, disruptions None 
System crashes Loss of data and productivity time None 
Power failure Hardware damages, data loss and disruptions None 
Network down time Disruptions due to loss of availability None 
Malware Data loss, system crashes, hiding files, disruptions Antivirus 
Wrong system 
configurations 
System crashes leads to disruptions and data loss None 
Operating system 
related 
System crashes leads to disruptions and data loss None 
Software conflicts System crashes, loss of service, disruptions None 
Corrupted files Loss of data and/or system crashes, disruptions Backup 
System hanging Loss of service leads to disruptions None 
Damaged backup 
disks 
Loss of data, productivity affected None 
Missing hardware System unusable, loss of service, disruptions None 
Formatted hard 
disk 
Loss of data and software, system unusable, 
disruptions 
None 
Missing files Loss of data, disruptions None 
Modified records Loss of integrity None 
Inaccessible or 
irretrievable files 
Loss of data leads to service disruptions None 
 
Process 3 identified infrastructure vulnerabilities by examining weaknesses in the 
hardware, software and systems being used in CISs in each school. The major 
vulnerabilities were then noted through data analysis and interpretation. Activities carried 
out in Process 3 concluded major data collection. Information from Processes 1, 2 and 3 
was then used to conduct risk analysis and developing protection strategies and mitigation 
plans, discussed in Process 4. 
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7.9. PROCESS 4: CONDUCT RISK ANALYSIS AND DEVELOP PROTECTION 
STRATEGIES AND MITIGATION PLANS 
Activities performed in this process were intended to identify, analyse and evaluate risks 
to critical information systems assets. It also examined protection strategies and mitigation 
plans that schools could implement to safeguard the critical information systems assets 
utilising the resources available in view of the identified risks.  
 
7.9.1. Activity 8: Identifying and analysing risks 
Threats/threat sources and vulnerabilities to CISs‟ critical assets were identified in the 
previous sections. In this activity collaborative teams identified, analysed and evaluated 
risks most likely to arise from the observed threat/threat sources and vulnerabilities. To 
achieve this, the impacts of threats and their likelihood of occurring were evaluated using 
qualitative measures of impacts and their likelihood of occurrence. The qualitative 
measures were then used in populating a qualitative risk analysis matrix in 7.9.1.1.3, Table 
7.16. 
 
7.9.1.1. Evaluating impacts of threats and the likelihood of their occurrence 
The initial step to risk identification and analysis involves evaluating impacts of threats or 
vulnerabilities in a critical asset to the mission and objectives of an organisation (Alberts 
& Dorofee, 2003). This is followed by establishing the likelihood of a threat exploiting an 
existing vulnerability in a critical asset. By utilising qualitative measures of the 
consequences/impacts and likelihoods instead of quantitative measures (probabilities) 
collaborative teams were able to evaluate impacts of threats to critical assets.  
 
7.9.1.1.1. Qualitative measures of consequences/impact 
The impact on the school‟s operations (productivity), financial loss or reputation 
(publicity) damage should vulnerability be exploited by a threat was rated using a 
qualitative scale independently used by Baino (2001), Elky (2006) and Renfroe and Smith 
(2011) shown below: 
 High impact – Threats exploit vulnerabilities leading to a significant security 
breach that could result in operational (productivity) or financial loss or reputation 
damage to the school; 
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 Medium impact – Threat exploitation of vulnerabilities that could result in some 
damage or unavailability (denial of service) of a critical asset; 
 Low impact – Threat exploitation of vulnerability that could result in the 
disclosure of information about the internal network structure, systems or sensitive 
information stored in an asset or in transit.  
 
7.9.1.1.2. Qualitative measures of likelihood 
The likelihood associated with a particular risk occurring was determined as a 
combination of vulnerabilities present less the controls implemented to block these 
vulnerabilities or threats from manifesting into risks (Axelrod, 2003). The scale used for 
rating was qualitative and is stated below: 
 High likelihood – a vulnerability was well known, could be exploited using tools 
or techniques that were publicly available that required little technical knowledge 
or experience (Axelrod, 2003; Baino, 2001); 
 Medium likelihood – a vulnerability was difficult to identify, and required some 
degree of research to resolve or customisation of tools or techniques (Axelrod, 
2003; Baino, 2001); 
 Low likelihood – a vulnerability that required a high degree of technical 
knowledge or experience, or utilise tools and techniques that are not readily 
available to most intruders (Axelrod, 2003; Baino, 2001) 
 
7.9.1.1.3. Qualitative risk analysis matrix 
A risk matrix is a combination of the consequences/impact rating and the vulnerability 
exploitation rating qualitatively determined by risk assessors (Axelrod, 2003, Baino, 2001, 
Renfroe & Smith, 2011). The level of risk was determined by analysing the qualitative 
values assigned to the resulting impact of threat and the likelihood of threat‟s occurrence. 
The risk level determination was performed by assigning a risk level based on the 
combination of the assigned impact and likelihood levels. The risk-level matrix was 
created using qualitative measures of the resulting impact of a threat occurrence and 
qualitative measures of the likelihood of threat occurrence. The matrix was then populated 
using a high, medium and low rating system. The risk level matrix was then used in 
determining risk levels in critical assets. Table 7.16 shows the qualitative risk analysis 
matrix used in this study. 
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Table 7.16: Qualitative risk analysis matrix or level of risk 
 LIKELIHOOD 
CONSEQUENCES Low Medium High 
High M H H 
Medium L M H 
Low L L M 
Key: H: high risk, M: medium risk, L: low risk 
Sources: Axelrod (2003) and Baino (2001) 
This study identified and analysed risks according to three security areas namely 
organisational, infrastructure/technology and application-specific risks. Each category of 
risks is briefly discussed below. 
 
7.9.1.1.3.1. Organisational risks 
Organisational risks considered in this research study were: 
 user personal security: risks arising from users‟ deficiencies in information security; 
 user training in information security: risks due to the inability of users to cope with 
current trends in information security; 
 information security policy: risks that arose from the schools‟ lack of information 
security policy that defined different types of information and regulating its use; and  
 physical security policy: risks arising from the inability of schools to provide 
adequate physical protection of critical information systems assets. 
 
7.9.1.1.3.2. Infrastructure risks 
Infrastructure or technology risks relate to security principles identified by Baino (2001), 
Renfroe and Smith (2011) and Taylor, Alexander, Finch and Sutton (2008): 
 authentication: ensuring that only authorised personnel were able to access the 
CISs; 
 intrusion: ensuring that access to CISs was only gained through authorised access 
methods; 
 authorisation: ensuring that access to the CISs and information was restricted to 
those with an authorised requirement for such access; 
 encryption: protecting information in transit and in storage through the use of 
encryption; 
 accountability: Ensuring that access to CISs by users was appropriately recorded;  
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 availability: Ensuring that critical information systems assets were available to 
authorised users all the time;  
7.9.1.1.3.3. Application-specific risks 
These risks applied to the following specific areas unique to secondary schools situations: 
 CASS marks database risks 
 Custom application software risks  
 User administration related risks 
 Operational risks 
 Computerised financial information risks 
 
A comprehensive list of risks for both schools was compiled and the results of risk 
analysis made. The results of the analysis are on Table 7:17 below. These results indicate 
that there were many risks to CISs‟ critical assets. The results also show that there were 
hardly any controls besides expired anti-viruses in some few cases. Risks to critical assets 
that emanated from this exercise were then evaluated in order to produce a risk treatment 
priority list. The risk priority list was needed to guide the collaborative teams in making 
decisions on which: 
 risks needed immediate mitigation;  
 protection strategy to implement for each critical asset; and 
 mitigation strategies needed to be implemented on selected risks. 
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Table 7.17: Summary of risks in school CISs 
Risk item Critical Asset affected Threat outcome (Risk) Control in 
place 
Impact Likelihood Relative 
risk  
ORGANISATIONAL RISKS 
Lack of user personal 
security and training 
Information  Destruction or modification - 
availability or integrity compromised 
No control High High High 
Lack of information 
security policy 
Information Theft, modification and destruction -
availability and integrity 
compromised 
No control High  High  High 
Lack of physical security 
policy  
Hardware, backup media, 
information 
Theft or destruction of hardware,  
modification of information 
No control High High High 
INFRASTRUCTURE OR TECHNOLOGY RELATED RISKS 
Operating system related 
risks 
Custom software Crashes – loss of availability  No control  High High High 
CASS marks database Data corruption - Loss of integrity No control High  Medium  High  
Server-computer access 
permission 
CASS marks  Deletion, modification or disclosure Shared 
password 
High High High 
Secured resources 
availability risks 
CASS marks Visible over the LAN -deletion, theft 
or modification  
No control High High High 
Lack of access control to 
computers 
All information in 
computer files 
Deletion or modification No control High High High 
Exposure No control Medium Medium Medium 
Denial of service Custom software Unavailable No control  High Medium High 
Lack of security incident All information on Destruction, modification  No control Medium Medium Medium 
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Risk item Critical Asset affected Threat outcome (Risk) Control in 
place 
Impact Likelihood Relative 
risk  
handling policy computers/ media 
Malware software 
protection 
Critical information in 
computers and software 
Corruption, Deletion  Expired 
antivirus 
software 
High  High High  
Power cuts or surges Hardware Destruction  No control High Medium High 
Theft of accessories Hardware System unavailability No control High Medium High  
Security procedures for 
new users' risks 
Hardware & information Theft, modification, destruction or 
exposure 
No control Medium Medium Medium  
Unsecured hubs Network Unavailability of connectivity No control High High High 
APPLICATION-RELATED RISKS 
Custom software and Learner CASS Database 
Custom software easily 
uninstalled, deleted, viral 
infected 
Custom software  
CASS mark Database 
Unavailability No control High High High 
Software incompatibility Custom software Unavailability due to system crashing No control High Medium High 
Shared custom password CASS marks database Modification – integrity loss No control High Medium High 
Disclosure No control Medium Medium Medium 
Custom software unable 
to validate data 
CASS marks Data integrity compromised No control Medium Low Low 
Final marks wrongly School reports Data integrity No control High Medium High 
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Risk item Critical Asset affected Threat outcome (Risk) Control in 
place 
Impact Likelihood Relative 
risk  
computed 
CASS database visibility 
on LAN 
Learner marks record Destruction No control High High High 
Modification No control High High High 
Exposure No control High Low Medium 
Financial process risks 
Unsecured computer 
system 
Financial information Theft of hard disks No control High Low Medium 
Unsecured accounting 
system 
Financial records Destruction No control High High High 
Modification No control Medium Medium Medium 
Theft or exposure No control High Low Medium 
Payments being disputed 
Financial information 
 
Integrity No control High Low Low 
Unauthorised payments Modification No control High High High 
Multiple payments Integrity No control High Medium Medium 
Payments not updated on 
time 
Integrity  No control Medium High Medium 
Operational risks 
Inaccurate data capturing All data capturing 
applications  
Data integrity No control Medium Medium Medium 
No authorisation or 
review for changes 
All editable data in the 
computer  
Data integrity No control High Medium Medium 
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Risk item Critical Asset affected Threat outcome (Risk) Control in 
place 
Impact Likelihood Relative 
risk  
Unavailability of 
network 
Networked applications Availability No control High High High 
User administration related risks 
Unauthorised changes to 
system configurations 
All information Integrity  No control High Medium Medium 
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Alberts and Dorofee (2003) advise that when OCTAVE-small methodology is used to 
assess information security risks only the impacts of identified risks have to be evaluated. 
Appendix 5 shows OCTAVE-small risk impact evaluation criteria used to determine the 
risk priority list. Table 7.18 is a risk priority list with regard to risk impacts and the 
urgency with which they should be treated. The impact area in which risks were likely to 
be experienced were reputation of the school, confidence of parents, learners and creditors, 
productivity and financial loss.  
Table 7.18: risk priority in CISs 
Critical asset Risk identified Impact area Impact Recommendation  
Custom 
software 
Non availability 
due to deletion, 
uninstallation , 
malware attack 
Reputation 
Confidence 
Financial loss  
Productivity loss 
High 
High 
High 
High 
Treat risks as a matter of 
urgency 
CASS 
Database 
Non availability 
Destruction 
Modification 
Productivity 
Financial loss 
Reputation 
High 
High 
High 
Treat risks as a matter of 
urgency 
Financial 
Records 
Non availability 
Destruction 
Modification 
Exposure  
Productivity 
Financial loss 
Reputation 
Confidence 
High 
High 
High 
High 
Treat risks as a matter of 
urgency 
Computer 
hardware 
Theft 
Destruction 
Productivity 
Productivity 
High  
High  
Risk require urgent 
attention 
Network/ 
bandwidth  
Non availability 
Hardware theft 
Connectivity 
Productivity 
High 
High 
Risk require urgent 
attention 
Educator 
information 
Deletion 
Modification 
Exposure 
Integrity  
Confidence 
Medium 
Low 
Low 
May not require 
immediate attention but 
need treatment 
 
The priority list, Table 7.18 indicates that most identified risks to critical assets needed 
urgent attention if the CISs were to remain productively functional. After risk evaluation, 
collaborative teams developed mitigation strategies for the identified risks.  
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7.9.2.  Activity.9: Developing protection strategies and selecting mitigation plans 
In this activity, collaborative teams were engaged in two crucial activities namely 
developing protection strategies and selecting mitigation strategies.  
 
7.9.2.1. Developing protection strategies 
A protection strategy defines the strategies that an organisation uses to enable, initiate, 
implement, and maintain its internal security (Alberts & Dorofee, 2003). The principal 
objective of a protection strategy is to provide a direction for future information security 
efforts instead of finding an immediate solution to every vulnerability and concerns 
(Alberts & Dorofee, 2003). An organisation‟s protection strategy leads to a succession of 
steps that an organisation can take to raise or maintain its existing level of information 
security. In this study, collaborative teams examined existing protection strategies each 
school implemented basing on security controls being enforced. The main protection 
strategy for CISs assets in schools was based on physical security, namely burglar barred 
doors and windows.  
 
The proposed protection strategy focused on improving the security posture of the schools 
with regard to CISs critical assets. Table 7.19 shows the strategic area and the proposed 
security strategy. 
Table 7.19: Summary of proposed organisation protection strategy 
Organisational protection strategy 
Strategy Area Strategy 
Security 
awareness and 
training 
Introducing baseline information security training to all users of CISs 
in both schools; 
Providing basic training in physical security to all users of information 
systems asset regardless of their job description; 
Using cheap and readily available information security-training 
material 
Information 
security 
strategy 
Utilising the outcome of this risk management exercise and the 
personnel involved in the research to help schools with information 
security management. 
School management should be actively involved in implementing of 
recommended information security improvement measures. 
Information 
security risk 
School management should clearly define user roles and 
responsibilities and communicate these in writing to all personnel.  
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Organisational protection strategy 
Strategy Area Strategy 
management Administrative educators to prepare an information security status 
report monthly. 
Security 
regulations 
Administrative educators should enforce security regulation to all areas 
related to CISs. School management should sanction users who violate 
information security rules 
Disaster 
recovery plan 
Draft contingency plans and procedures for disaster recovery that all 
users of CISs clearly understand and able to implement 
Physical 
security 
Put in place enforceable physical security procedures that empower 
security guards to perform thorough spot checks for moveable 
information systems assets. 
Develop enforceable regulations on workstations used for 
administrative purpose.  
Specify physical security requirements for computers in administrative 
offices in with respect to their usage requirements.  
Enforcing software installation security procedures to all users of 
computers and ensure they are adhered to by all staff members in the 
schools. 
Clearly specify an individual responsible for software installation, 
computer configurations and hardware movement.  
Installing video cameras in the main building where most information 
assets are stored. 
Information 
technology 
security 
Establish clear procedures for information technology security 
services.  
Encrypting all sensitive information stored in computer storage media.  
Introduce user access rights to restrict access to sensitive information. 
Enforce user password policies that stop sharing of passwords by users 
Enforce user logoff during short breaks or time-off on all workstations 
used for administration purposes. 
Security staff  Schools address incidence management by documenting clear 
techniques and reporting mechanisms for incident identification and 
reporting.  
 
7.9.2.2. Selecting risk mitigation plans 
Risk mitigation plans are intended to reduce the risks to critical assets (Alberts & Dorofee, 
2003, Panda 2009). The main focus of risk mitigation plans for this research was CISs‟ 
critical assets. The mitigation plans were specific to the risks associated with the 
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information systems‟ critical assets found in secondary schools. The suggested mitigation 
plans were within each secondary school‟s human and financial resources means. A 
number of factors influenced the selection of risk mitigation plans namely: 
 identified threats/threat source or vulnerabilities and their risk impact;  
 controls or control required to offset the risk or protect critical asset; 
 the complexity of implementing the controls considering the technical abilities of 
the participating members from each school; 
 the cost of implementing such controls in regard to financial resources of the 
school; 
A summary of proposed mitigation plans for each critical asset is presented on Table 7.20 
Table 7.20: Mitigation plans for critical assets 
Threat Type Actions 
CASS marks database risk mitigation plans 
Users using 
network access 
Enforcing password discipline and reporting password abuse; 
Changing passwords on computers and databases regularly; 
Restricting access to a shared folder that contain the database files; 
Identifying the users who access the database and assigning access 
privileges; 
Database access by other computers should only be through custom 
software; 
Encrypt all marks in the database 
Users using 
physical access 
Use different passwords for each computer 
Activate password protected screen savers as time-out defaults. 
All CISs users should sign a nondisclosure form  
Install a camera in the reception to capture unauthorised users who 
sneak in during awkward times 
System 
problems 
Upgrade system hardware and software components on regular basis. 
Reconfigure computers and software for optimum user support.  
Configure restore points to suitable dates for system restoration 
Use genuine software from licensed vendors 
Restrict unauthorised software installations 
Uninstall all conflicting software from all computers with critical 
information 
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Threat Type Actions 
Malware Educate users on preventing viruses from being introduced into systems. 
Install a trusted antivirus/antispyware and always update the antivirus 
Install operator screen notification of virus activity.  
Configure computers to automatic antivirus update and viral scans 
Configure the server-computers to stop it from accessing the world-
wide-web 
Restrict installation of software by users on their workstation by giving 
all users limited privileges 
Measures Provide compulsory training in basic security awareness for staff 
members who use computers in schools 
Conducting compulsory training in malware scanning and cleaning.  
Custom software risk mitigation plans 
Users using 
physical access 
Create user passwords for the custom software.  
Disguise the software icon on the desktop 
Always close the application when going out for breaks 
Disable mark editing and report printing features on peripheral 
computers. 
System 
problems 
Upgrade operating systems with most recent patches 
Uninstall incompatible software from all computers that run this 
software 
Renew license on time to avoid crashing and shutouts on expiration  
Malware Run up-to-date antivirus programs that are compatible with the custom 
software 
Empty antivirus vaults regularly 
Personal computers risk mitigation plans 
Users using 
network access 
Disable file sharing on all other computers including server-computers 
Configure network password for computers used in school 
administration in addition to individual computer passwords. 
Disable guest user account on all computers used in the school 
administration  
Remove profiles of users who fail to comply with security policy 
requirements. 
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Users using 
physical access 
All unattended workstations should run password protected screen 
savers or require passwords from hibernating. 
Physically secure all computers and accessories to deter unauthorised 
movement. 
Reviewed physical security of all computers used in CISs  
Close all windows to the offices where important computers are found 
System 
problems 
Introduce PC disaster recovery plan in the event of power cuts or surge. 
Use UPs and power surge protector on the server-computers  
Switch off all computers at the end of the day on daily basis. 
Financial accounting information risks mitigation plans 
Users using 
network access 
Remove computer from the network. 
Users using 
physical access 
Computers should be accessed by Financial educator only. Password-
protected computers  
System 
problems 
Practice regular software update 
Make backup and store it in separate rooms 
Malware Avoid use of removable storage media from free flow computers 
Install most recent virus detection software 
Perform malware scans regularly 
Measures Report status for this plan on a monthly at meetings. 
Network infrastructure mitigation plans 
Human actors 
using physical 
access 
Secure the router and the hubs to prevent theft or illegal exchange 
Restrict access to the router by all unauthorised users 
System 
problems 
Isolate hubs from kitchen utensils plugs to provide continuous 
connectivity problems 
Other problems Use network passwords to prevent illegal connections to WLAN 
Remove unused data cables plugged in the hubs in all offices 
Secure all dangling data cables 
 
Information on Table 7.20 shows a number of mitigation plans that were proposed. Most 
of the mitigation plans were within the level of skills of the individuals who were in 
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charge of the computerised information system. Effort was also made to suggest cheap and 
easy and implementable plans.  
 
7.9.2.3. Information security risk treatment 
 Risk treatment involves the selection and application of the most appropriate risk security 
controls or controls intended to modify the identified risks in order to avoid possible 
damages to critical information systems assets (Hoo, 2006; Shortreed, 2008). In this study, 
three risk treatment strategies were adopted based on the severity of the impact of the risk 
on the critical asset, namely risk avoidance, risk acceptance and treating the risk. These 
strategies were discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of this study, 4.3.3. Some treatment 
strategies required controls to be put in place. Table 7.21 shows the results of the risk 
treatment used in this study. 
 
The results of risk treatment on Table 7.21 show that schools chose to treat the risks and 
apply preventive, detective, deterrent or corrective controls to alleviate risks to their CISs 
critical assets. Collaborative team members were given opportunities to use the tools for 
security control and were also taught how to configure passwords on computers and files. 
However, use of passwords on files remained a contentious issue as some users felt that 
they were likely to forget the passwords resulting to inaccessibility of the information in 
the affected files.  
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Table 7.21: Risk Treatment results 
Threat source /vulnerability Risk  Impact Treatment applied /recommended 
Unauthorised users access the 
CASS database over the network 
 
Modification of data leads to 
loss of integrity  
Deletion of data files leads to 
loss or disruption of 
productivity. Reputation of 
schools was under threat. 
High - Avoidance – Disabled list folder contents of the folders with 
CASS databases on the server-computers so that unauthorised 
users will not see the CASS database 
- Preventive controls- segmented the LAN into two and used 
network password to prevent unauthorised access to all 
administrative computers 
- The WLAN access code was reset from default to user defined. 
Authorised users access CASS 
database using the network  
 
Modification of marks 
compromises integrity,  
Deletion of files compromises 
availability and productivity  
High - Preventive controls - Except for the Administrator-educators, 
the modify privilege was disabled for all other authorised users 
to stop them modifying records. 
Unauthorised users using physical 
access to computers with CASS 
database and financial 
information 
Modification of marks – 
integrity was compromised. 
Modification of financial 
records – wrong payments 
leading to financial loss by 
schools  
High - Preventive controls – Access user passwords were set to 
standard user on all computers. Files containing sensitive 
information were also password protected. Recommended 
zoning of critical assets, no unauthorised person to be allowed 
to use critical information systems assets. 
Authorised users using physical 
access to computers with CASS 
database and financial 
Modification of marks  
Deletion of files 
Exposure of sensitive 
High  - Preventive controls – enforced user authentication and 
authorisation. Disabled the guest account 
- Deterrent controls –locking out users who misuse passwords 
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Threat source /vulnerability Risk  Impact Treatment applied /recommended 
information information 
Persistence crashing of custom 
software 
Disruptions /loss of 
productivity as availability is 
compromised (denial of 
service) 
High - Corrective controls – frequent updating of the operating systems 
with relevant patches. Systems should be able to recover from 
these crashes 
- Preventive controls – renewing software licences on time 
system 
- Detective controls – Activate alerts to warn users about pending 
crashes 
Sharing of single password to 
access custom software 
Unaccounted data 
modifications of deletions 
High - Preventive controls – user should have own password to the 
custom software.  
- Detective controls – these warn the Administrative educator of 
possible attempts of logging using unauthorised login details on 
server-computer.  
Infection of computers by 
malware 
Corruption of data files and 
software leads to denial of 
service  
High - Preventive control – installing trustworthy malware software 
- Detective control – updating existing malware to detect new 
malware 
Theft of computer hardware or 
accessories or unauthorised 
disconnections (hubs, hard disks) 
Loss of information 
Loss of connectivity 
Productivity severely affected 
Medium - Preventive controls – physical securing the accessories so that 
they cannot be removed easily. Use surveillance cameras in 
rooms with these assets 
Power surges  Destruction of hardware leads 
to loss of information 
Medium - Preventive controls – installing UPSs to all administrative 
computers. 
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7.10. CONCLUSION  
This chapter gave a detailed account of a qualitative case study on information security 
risk management in CISs conducted in two selected secondary schools. The case study 
was based on the OCTAVE-small risk management methodology. Data were collected 
using participatory observation, inspection checklists, interviews and customised 
OCTAVE-small worksheets. Data were gathered on security practice, threats and 
vulnerabilities of critical information systems assets. Major data sources were 
collaborative team members (users), school managers, information systems assets and the 
environment in which they were used. Collaborative teams participated in data collection, 
discussions during and after each data collection activity and demonstrations using 
computing technology. Only qualitative data were gathered, then qualitatively presented, 
analysed and interpreted. Threats and vulnerabilities in CISs assets were identified, impact 
of these threats and their likelihood were determined qualitatively using a risk level 
matrix. Risks were then identified and analysed, leading to the proposal of protection and 
mitigation strategies. The conclusion to the chapter reflects on the key issues of data 
collection, presentation, analysis and interpretation.  
 
The next chapter, Chapter 8 discusses findings, conclusions, makes reflections and 
recommendations for further studies. 
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8.1. INTRODUCTION 
The main objective of this research study was to assist secondary schools that used CISs to 
develop a set of guidelines they would use to effectively manage information security risks 
in their computerised information systems. In this qualitative case study, data on critical 
assets, threats, vulnerabilities, security practices and controls in CISs in each secondary 
school was collected using a variety of instruments. This study analysed and assessed 
information security risks in critical information systems assets using the OCTAVE-small 
risk management method. Two secondary schools were involved in this case study in 
which users of the CISs took part in the risk management exercise to gain information 
security knowledge and skills required for future use. The outcomes of this research study 
were CISs users who appreciated information security risks and set of simple and easy to 
implement information security guidelines. 
Up to this point, seven chapters have been meticulously compiled focusing on related 
information security risks in information systems. The previous chapter, Chapter 7 
implemented the OCTAVE-small method in data collection from school managers, users, 
CISs assets and the environment in which these assets were used. Qualitative data were 
collected using participatory observation, physical inspection and interview methods in 
which observation schedules, inspection checklists, interview schedules and customised 
OCTAVE-small worksheets were used as data collection tools. Data were presented in 
tabular and dump screen formats. Analysis was qualitatively done in the form of textual 
narrations and descriptions supplemented by extracts from interview transcripts.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a research overview which states and briefly 
discusses the findings of the research study and provide a conclusion based on these 
findings. The chapter further reflects on the educational value of the research to the 
schools that participated in this study and other secondary schools in the same situation 
and suggests areas of further research.  
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: an introduction that gives the purpose of the 
chapter, research overview that discusses findings based on research objectives, 
contribution of the study, conclusion, recommendations and further study. 
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8.2. RESEARCH OVERVIEW AND CONTRIBUTION 
The main objective of this research study was to assist secondary schools that used CISs to 
develop a set of guidelines they would use to effectively manage information security risks 
in their computerised information systems. To achieve this, three sub-objectives stated in 
Chapter 1 provided guidelines for the study. The sub-objectives were explored in various 
chapters of this document and are further examined here to establish the extent to which 
they were achieved. Each of the following subsections explores a particular objective. 
Findings made by this study are stated under the respective sub-objective together with 
brief discussions. 
 
8.2.1. Sub-objective 1 – Systematically gather data on critical assets and information 
security controls in CISs of two secondary schools 
The first objective of this study was explored in Chapter 3 subsection 3.4. The chapter 
surveyed literature on a variety of information systems assets and categorised them as 
critical and non-critical depending on the importance of the operations each asset 
supported in an organisation. Critical information systems assets found in small-scale 
organisations were also presented on Table 3.1. The finding of this research on critical 
information systems assets was consistent with those identified by Microsoft TechNet 
(2006), as discussed in Chapter 3. Secondary schools‟ CISs consisted of many critical 
assets that required protection. Table 8.1 is a summary of the identified CISs critical assets 
found in secondary schools which needed protection against a variety of risks.  
Table 8.1: Summary of critical assets in secondary schools 
Critical asset Category Uses 
CASS marks 
database 
Information Stored all marks and reports per term used for 
individual learner‟s progress and yearly 
promotions 
Custom application  Software Used to capture marks, process mark schedules, 
reports and statistics for use by schools and 
education authorities 
Financial records 
and information 
Information Creditors‟ records, school fees, salaries of part 
time workers and payment records, government 
support funds 
Computers and 
software 
Hardware 
and software 
Used in the administrative offices to store critical 
information. 
Modems and hubs  Hardware Provided internet and LAN connectivity to all 
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Critical asset Category Uses 
computers in the schools 
Educators personal 
information and 
salaries 
Information Used to create educators‟ profiles at school. The 
information included academic qualifications, 
educators‟ reports from heads of departments 
used for quality control, promotion, subject 
allocation and monthly salary processing. 
 
These critical information systems assets supported a variety of important operations in 
secondary schools and this underscored the importance of securing them from threats. The 
purpose of sub-objective 1 was to identify critical assets in CISs in secondary schools. 
Upon achieving this objective, the researcher proceeded to identify information security 
controls that secondary schools implemented to protect the identified CISs critical assets. 
The following sub-section discusses the forms of security controls used by schools to 
protect CISs critical assets.  
 
Chapters 3 and 4 also discussed information systems protection mechanisms that small-
scale organisations could implement to secure their information systems against 
impending risks. In Chapter 7, secondary schools‟ CISs were inspected to determine 
security protection mechanisms being implemented. It was found that the only protection 
mechanism that secondary schools relied on was physical security of computer hardware 
and accessories. This was achieved by using burglar-barred doors and windows intended 
to prevent or deter unauthorised access and theft of computer hardware especially during 
nights and school holidays. Physical security concerns itself with threats, risks, and 
controls to protect facilities, hardware, data, media and personnel (Hansche, 2001; 
Caballero, 2009). The ISO 17799 (2000) stipulates that computing equipment should be 
physically protected from security threats and environmental hazards. Inadequate physical 
security to critical information systems infrastructure and information resources in both 
secondary schools implied that the assets were exposed to various threats. By providing 
adequate physical security to their CISs critical assets, secondary schools would be able to 
restrict physical access to these assets only to authorised personnel who needed access to 
perform authorised functions and operations. Secondary schools failed in this regard as 
evidenced by unauthorised movement of computer hardware by different users. 
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There were no protection mechanisms for data and software in both schools. This was a 
clear indication that school managers and users of CISs were mainly concerned with 
computer hardware instead of data and information that were stored in their computers. 
There were also deficiencies in technical security systems concerning antivirus, 
antispyware software and firewalls. In order to determine the implications of these 
deficiencies, a risk assessment and analysis exercise using OCTAVE-small method was 
conducted as indicated by sub-objective 3. Subsection 8.2.3 discusses findings of the risk 
assessment and analysis performed in the two secondary schools.  
 
8.2.2. Sub-objective 2 - To identify an easy to use risk management methodology that 
non-technical personnel in secondary schools can utilise 
This objective was underpinned by discussions in chapters 4, 5 and 6. Chapter 4 discussed 
risk assessment and analysis in general. Chapter 5 elaborated on quantitative and 
qualitative risk assessment and analysis methods emphasising on their differences along 
with strengths and weaknesses in their implementation by small-scale organisations. 
Chapter 6 examined OCTAVE-small method and its implementation in small-scale 
organisations like secondary schools. The OCTAVE-small method was then implemented 
in Chapter 7 in which data were collected using a blend of risk management 
methodologies such as participatory observation schedules, inspection checklists, 
interview schedules and customised OCTAVE-small worksheets. 
 
The following sub-sections delineate and emphasise findings of this research study that 
show the extent to which this sub-objective was achieved.  
 
8.2.2.1. Organisational security practice 
It was observed that secondary schools lacked proper organisational security practices and 
as a result, CISs assets were accessed and used in the manner determined by users thereby 
making these assets highly vulnerable to a number of threats. Poor organisational security 
practices emanated from lack of information security policies related to physical security, 
personal security awareness and training, access control, disaster recovery plans, and virus 
and malware policies. Lack of security policies on utilisation of information systems assets 
is detrimental to the organisations as both inside and outside users attack the critical 
information that has taken time for an organisation to accumulate (Cappelli & Moore, 
2008). This situation prevailed in the secondary schools where the research was 
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conducted. It was  also observed that managers and users of CISs were not concerned 
about the manner they used critical information systems assets as long as computers were 
working.  
 
8.2.2.1.1. Lack of information security policy 
Lack of information security policies in secondary schools made it difficult for managers 
to clearly determine how CISs assets could be used responsibly while being protected. 
Information security policies were required to highlight restrictions to the disclosure, 
modification, availability or use of critical information in an organisation (Canavan, 2001; 
Doherty & Fulford, 2006; Taylor et al. 2008). In secondary schools, no one was 
accountable or held responsible for any misuse or abuse of information systems assets due 
to lack of such policies.  
 
8.2.2.1.2. Uncontrolled access to critical information 
Secondary schools were unable to identify and separate their critical and sensitive data or 
information from less sensitive data. This had implications on storage and access to 
data/information by various users of the CISs. Schools unknowingly made all information 
available to the public over their LANs. This facilitated unauthorised access to most of 
their critical information over the LANs. By connecting and implementing networks, 
secondary schools had an obligation to take some precautions to reduce the risk of 
unauthorised access to the critical information assets. Information systems users often 
engage in risky behaviours that threaten the security and integrity of the organisation by 
exposing sensitive information or weakening the existing technological perimeter security 
(Hansche, 2001; Cox, 2012). The risk behaviours by some CISs users were either 
deliberate or accidental, but either case had the potential to cause severe damage to 
secondary school reputation, finances and to potentially harm learners.  
 
Computerising information systems in secondary schools seems to have increased direct 
access to all confidential information by authorised and unauthorised users. The critical 
information in these schools was being accessed through unauthorised manner and 
unauthorised modifications performed on it as alluded to by interviewees in Chapter 7. 
There was loss of integrity and confidentiality through modification and disclosure of 
confidential information. All forms of information security violations and breaches by 
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users were potentially damaging secondary schools‟ reputation, financial resources and 
learners‟ confidence.  
  
8.2.2.2. Security requirements for critical information systems assets 
 A set of security requirements for critical information systems assets for secondary 
schools‟ CISs were identified and are listed on Table 8.2. 
 
Table 8.2: Critical assets‟ security requirements 
Critical asset Most important security requirement 
Learners CASS marks database  Integrity, availability and confidentiality 
Custom software  Availability 
Financial information  Integrity, confidentiality and availability  
Computers  Availability information resources 
Routers and hubs  Availability of connectivity 
Educators personal information and salaries  Integrity, confidentiality and availability 
 
Secondary schools participating in this case study did not provide the basic security 
requirements for their CISs critical assets besides physical security protection. This left 
the critical assets severely exposed to threats. 
 
8.2.2.3. The main threats to CISs critical assets 
The main threats to critical assets were authorised and unauthorised users, malware, 
system crashes, errors, access path to critical assets and information security breaches. 
 Authorised users deliberately modified or stole critical information from 
computers they used. In some cases the users deliberately deleted critical 
information to delay or stop important processes from taking place. Authorised 
users also accidentally infected computers with viruses from removable media 
they used outside school. Some authorised users deliberately formatted or 
removed hard disks from computers without backing up critical data and 
information. This posed as a major threat to critical information stored in 
computers; 
 Unauthorised users also deliberately modified, deleted or disclosed critical 
information for various reasons, including embarrassing managers, disrupting 
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certain operations or for financial gains. These users were also found to be 
responsible for removing or replacing hubs, illegal connections of personal 
laptops to the LANs; 
 Malware (viruses and Trojan horses) either from the Internet or externally used 
removable media such as memory sticks were also a major threat to data, 
information and system software. Malware found on many computers was 
reported to be causing havoc by corrupting, deleting, hiding or locking files 
containing critical information.  
  System crashes due to software conflicts, missing patches and operational 
environment were also prevalent making data capturing and processing difficult;  
  Errors in the custom application frequently produced school reports with wrong 
computations and final grades. Incorrect examination results analyses output 
generated by the custom application damaged school management‟s reputation as 
local education authorities, parents and learners expected better quality services 
from these schools. 
 Access paths to critical information provided an unauthorised means by which 
critical information assets could be accessed by users within schools. School 
managers and administrative educators were ignorant of the existence of these 
access paths and unauthorised access to critical information. Illegal connections 
through the Ethernet LANs provided easy access to shared folders and files on 
server-computers. These did not require access passwords and were difficult to 
detect. Workstations in administrative offices which were left unattended also 
provided easy access to critical information. Unauthorised users capitalised on the 
unsecured workstations to modify or print critical information in the absences of 
the office bearers. Unauthorised users also capitalised on unsecured LANs to gain 
access to the administration computers and then launched surprise attacks. These 
used free data cables or extra ports on the hubs or unsecured wireless connections 
to achieve these malicious acts.  
 Information security breaches were committed deliberately or accidentally by 
authorised and unauthorised users of CISs who capitalised on existing 
vulnerabilities. During interviews, users alluded to situations where the 
information they used was deliberately changed by other users. The main breaches 
targeted the CASS marks and financial information. There were strong claims that 
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some inside users stole or modified certain information for financial gains. It was 
also noted that unauthorised inside users used critical assets in a way that was 
intended to harm the schools or individual managers. In some cases stolen 
financial records were used to discredit school managers during meetings. 
 
8.2.2.4. Information security risks 
It was found that CISs critical assets were exposed to risks such as organisational risks, 
infrastructure (technological) related risks and application-related risks. The levels of these 
risks were generally high and impacted highly negative on the CISs, hence school 
operations and reputation. High impact organisational risks were due to lack of important 
policies such as information security policy. Infrastructure-related and application-related 
risks were due to defects in hardware, errors in custom application, incompatibility 
between custom application and operating systems of recent versions, missing operating 
system patches or registry issues. These vulnerabilities led to unavailability, loss of 
integrity and compromise in confidentiality of the critical information that secondary 
schools relied on for their operations. This caused secondary schools to suffer negatively 
in terms of productivity, reputation and financially.  
 
In this subsection, a variety of information security risks to CISs were identified through a 
simple risk assessment and analysis exercise, as a result of this, secondary schools were 
expected to put in place controls to these risks. One of the objectives of this study was to 
suggest generic mitigation strategies that these secondary schools could implement to 
alleviate the identified information security risks. Subsection 8.2.4 elucidates a number of 
generic information security mitigation strategies within the means of secondary schools 
human resources and financial capabilities. 
  
8.2.3. Sub-objective 3 - To deduce generic guidelines that could be followed during 
information security risk management at a secondary school that take into 
account CISs users who were not experts in risk management. 
Risk mitigation strategies were discussed in Chapter 4. The conventional risk mitigation 
strategies tend to be technical in nature and difficult to be implemented by CISs users in 
secondary schools. Such strategies ignore the role played by CISs users in improving 
information security status in small-scale organisations (Panda 2009). The main objective 
of this research study was to assist secondary schools that used CISs to develop a set of 
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guidelines they would use to effectively manage information security risks in their 
computerised information systems. These guidelines were intended to help schools 
implement protection and mitigation strategies that emphasised the active participation of 
CISs users. Besides addressing standard problems, the protection and mitigation strategies 
addressed problems peculiar to schools‟ CISs. This research study developed a  set of 
guidelines that recommended various protection and mitigation strategies intended to 
improve the security of critical assets taking into account the level of skills of the 
personnel responsible in carrying out these tasks. The protection and mitigation strategies 
required that: 
 schools develop enforceable information security policies to govern the use of 
CISs and other computing facilities; 
 all users of CISs and other users of computers be trained in basic information 
security and awareness; 
 all computers in the school used in CISs be removed from the main LAN and 
placed in their own segment; 
 all computers be password-protected; 
 each school appoints an educator to implement the information security policies 
 schools install antivirus and antispyware suite on all computers and carry out 
regular updates 
 schools to configure all internal firewalls to high level to restrict unauthorised 
access to administrative computers by outside computers; and 
 schools to perform information security risk management exercises regularly 
 
The following section, 8.3 are discussions emanating from the above overview and that 
are meant to provide general guidelines that secondary schools can possibly implement 
with great easy in the management of the risks in their information security risks. 
 
8.3. DISCUSSIONS  
 Section 8.2 examined the overview of the research study and detailed the findings as per 
objectives. This section examines various strategies that were found to be applicable to 
secondary schools‟ CISs context. 
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8.3.1. Protection and mitigation strategies  
The levels of risk impact and their likelihood of occurring which are reported in Chapter 7 
were high and some threats had already caused noticeable harm on CISs such as rendering 
the assets unusable, financial loss and damage to school reputation. The suggested 
protection levels for most identified risks were considered to be medium and mitigation 
strategies were also based on simple, effective and manageable mechanisms that required 
active participation of the CISs users and school managers. Threats, vulnerabilities and 
controls have changed and grown in complexity, however, it was important to consider the 
easiest and often cheapest controls before considering large or expensive solutions as 
suggested by Taylor et al. (2008). This approach underpins the recommended protection 
and mitigation strategies that addressed organisational vulnerabilities in information 
security practices in secondary schools and also technological vulnerabilities in CISs 
assets. The recommended protection and mitigation strategies were meant to reduce 
existing risks, detect and prevent threats from utilising vulnerabilities in critical assets and 
a recovery from threat effects. The information security controls are discussed in next 
subsections. 
 
8.3.1.1. Organisational protection and mitigation strategies  
These strategies were meant to address the manner in which CISs critical assets in 
secondary schools were accessed and used. This was based on Caballero (2009)‟s 
argument that organisations that focus on the technical attacks and neglect items such as 
policies and procedures or employee training and awareness were setting information 
security up for failure. Therefore, the strategies discussed below were meant to have far 
reaching positive effects on the schools CISs. The strategies were: 
 Information security policy- This study prompted school managers to set information 
security committees tasked with drafting information security policies. Secondary 
schools were assisted to develop simple information security policies to address CISs 
risks. Information security policies were the basis for the dissemination and 
enforcement of sound security practices within the secondary school context as 
recommended by Doherty and Fulford (2006). The policies addressed the use of 
computing facilities, the movement of computer hardware, access control, incident 
management and penalties associated with violations. This was in line with Williams 
(2008)‟s recommendation that to become the foundation of security culture, 
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information security policy and its dissemination should seek a balance between 
users‟ understanding of the threats, effective deterrents and associated penalties.  
 
 Basic education and awareness training in information security risk management – 
Previous research studies show that information security objectives can hardly be met 
by technical and procedural protection only, but by an educated security attitude of 
managers and employees of an organisation that utilises an information system 
(Rezgui & Marks, 2008). In order to increase information security awareness among 
users, Rezgui and Marks (2008) encourage organisations to enforce information 
security awareness through education and training. In secondary schools, authorised 
and unauthorised users who intentionally or accidentally breached information 
security posed as information security threats. Some of the security violations and 
misuse of critical assets occurred due to information security ignorance on the part of 
the users. For example, Sarkar (2010) argues that authorised users who commit 
security breaches do not think that the violations are unethical because they lack the 
moral inhibitions that are mostly defined by their culture, background and character. 
This implies that CISs users should not be expected to instinctively protect critical 
data and information without the awareness necessary to effectively safeguard 
information (Rezgui & Marks, 2008). Therefore, by encouraging active participation 
of CISs users in collaborative teams, this study ensured that most key users developed 
an appreciation and awareness of information security threats and risks in their CISs. 
The study was also used as a means to attract attention of CISs users and managers to 
information security risk in their CISs and the need to conduct risk management 
exercises regularly. Information system security awareness requires users to 
understand information system security in general and optimally committing to it 
(Rezgui & Marks, 2008). This study also sought to instil a positive attitude of 
information security awareness among the users so that they could use the critical 
assets responsibly to benefit concerned schools. The study also drew the attention of 
the school managers and users to risks inherent in their CISs and prompted them to act 
responsibly in securing these assets using sanctioned procedures.  
 
Besides organisational strategies, the study also focused on other security controls which 
were within the comprehension of the users of CISs in schools. The strategies are 
discussed in the following subsections. 
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8.3.1.2. Technical protection and mitigation strategies 
The OCTAVE-small risk management method encompasses organisational and 
technological protection and mitigation based strategies. Technological protection and 
mitigation strategies emphasise on technical and physical controls of critical assets such as 
hardware, software and information. Technical controls use software and hardware 
resources to control access to information and computing systems, to help mitigate the 
potential for errors and blatant security policy violations (Caballero, 2009). This study 
encourages secondary schools to implement technical controls which are simple and easy 
for novice users of CISs. These included antivirus and antispyware software, data 
encryption, passwords, auto-account logoff, firewalls, systems up-dates and data backups. 
Each user involved in this study was given an opportunity to be acquainted with each 
technical control briefly outlined below: 
 
 Installation of antivirus, antispyware and scanning of malware - Antivirus and 
antispyware software are technical controls that detect, identify, prevent and remove 
malware from a computer system in order to prevent or reduce data corruption, 
destruction or theft. These offer both detective and preventive defence mechanisms 
to data and software stored in computer systems. Therefore, there was need to install 
an antivirus on every computer system within each school. Secondary schools 
involved in this research study were in dire financial problems and could not afford 
to buy antivirus and antispyware software. Schools eventually utilised free 
downloaded Anti-Virus Guard (AVG) 2013 and Avira. Each collaborative team 
member was tasked to download and install antivirus and to scan malware from their 
respective computers. Furthermore, team members were trained on how to update 
antivirus. Another positive contribution made by collaborative teams was 
encouraging other educators to bring their laptops or computers for antivirus 
installations and malware scanning. This enhanced team members‟ skills and 
knowledge in information security awareness. 
 
 Encrypting and password-protecting CASS marks database - Collaborative teams 
recommended secondary schools to password-protect their CASS marks databases 
and encrypt all data in order to prevent direct access to this critical asset by both 
authorised and unauthorised users. Once the data in the database was encrypted, the 
database would be accessed through the custom application. However, the encryption 
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was to be effected by the custom application developer so that encryption and 
decryption of data were performed by custom application during data capturing, 
processing of results and printing of reports. To improve the security of the custom 
application software, the application developer was asked to introduce access 
accounts and privileges for different users. Data capturing was to be done by 
administrative educators while modification of that data could be performed by the 
deputy principals.  
  
 Setting user access rights and auto-account logoff - To restrict user access to 
computer systems, collaborative teams created user access accounts and set access 
rights. User accounts were created on each computer and each user was allocated 
relevant access details. The guest account was disabled and the administrator account 
was used solely for administrative purposes by the educator in charge of CISs 
administration. This was meant to prevent authorised users from creating rogue 
accounts which could be used to illegally access the server-computers. Password-
protected screen savers and automatic logoff were also activated on all computers to 
protect data and software from unauthorised users in the event that the authorised 
users left their workstation unattended.  
 
 Firewalls- A firewall is a software program or piece of hardware that helps to screen 
out hackers, viruses and worms that try to reach a computer over the Internet (Rouse, 
2007; Bauer, 2012). Most computers in the two schools had their firewalls turned off. 
Authorised users were trained on the importance of the firewalls and how to 
configure them. From the onset, all firewalls were turned on and configured as per 
computer usage. 
 
 Systems up-dates - Software update plays a critical role in ensuring that 
organisations keep their computer fully up-to-date with the latest security patches 
and software updates, without unduly compromising reliability, productivity, 
security and data integrity (Galea Francheschini Innovation GFI White Paper, 2005). 
It was imperative for this study to educate and train CISs users in basic software 
updates. The exercise was performed on most updatable software installed on 
computers used in CISs. The update exercise included the Windows operating 
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systems, adobe reader and antivirus software. CISs users were able to perform 
software update checks.  
 
 Backup and restore capabilities - Secondary schools did not perform regular 
backups for their critical data and information as there were no policies or measures 
to compel them to do so. Data backup refers to the copying of data and information 
stored in computer storage media so that these copies may be restored through data 
recovery process after some fatal event (Guidance Consulting Inc, 2012). Backups 
serve two primary purposes namely:  
- disaster recovery: to restore a computer to an operational state following an 
accident; 
- file or data recovery: to recover data or information files after they have been 
deleted or corrupted (Bednash & Halstuch, 2010; Guidance Consulting Inc, 
2012). 
  
Prior to this study, critical information had been left vulnerable due to lack of regular 
backups on which the schools could recover in the event that the original copies were 
destroyed or corrupted. Only a comprehensive disaster recovery strategy where everything 
is backed up on a regular basis may have a chance of returning things to normalcy within 
an acceptable period of time (Mah, 2012). This important security requirement which 
secondary schools have been overlooking was addressed during the study through 
collaborative training of CISs users in basic information security. This research study 
regarded lack of backups as a form of insecurity or vulnerability that was likely to affect 
school operations in due future. Therefore, there was a need to train CISs users on how to 
back-up all vital information they were using.  
 
Besides technical protection and mitigation strategies, this study also focused on physical 
security of the critical assets through implementing a number of physical controls. 
Subsection 8.3.1.3 is a list of physical controls compiled to assist secondary schools to 
attain sustainable information security programmes.  
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8.3.1.3. Physical controls 
The following list of physical controls was compiled to help secondary school managers 
and CISs users to effectively implement these controls to safeguard critical assets they 
possess. 
 physically securing on tables all computers holding critical information; 
 securing all hubs by locking them in small and immovable steel cages, and removing 
unused data cables from them; 
 securing data cables on walls; 
 separating networks into two functional areas; 
 protecting the administrative functional area by using network passwords; 
 removing server-computers from the Internet; 
 possibly installing a surveillance camera in the vicinity of the CISs in receptions; 
 separation of roles and duties to ensure that an individual would not complete a 
number of critical tasks alone; 
 installing physical controls to monitor and protect the physical environment of the 
workplace and CISs facilities; 
 
This study sought to contribute to information security risk management in secondary 
schools by providing a set of guidelines that non-technical users could implement in order 
to manager information security risks in their CISs. Section 8.4 outlines the research 
contribution made so far. 
 
8.4. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION 
The main objective of this research study was to assist secondary schools that used CISs to 
develop a set of guidelines they would use to effectively manage information security risks 
in their computerised information systems. Achieving this objective was the major 
contribution of this research. This section delineates the research contribution in this 
specific important area by providing a summary of guidelines that arose from the empirical 
risk management activities performed in two secondary schools that frequently used CISs. 
The guidelines were derived from the discussions in the previous section 8.3 of this 
research study. The guidelines emphasise on the importance of protection and mitigation 
strategies within reach of secondary schools that utilise CISs. The protection and 
mitigation strategies were categorised as organisation, technical and physical. 
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8.4.1. Organisational information security guidelines 
These guidelines sought to encourage secondary schools to address the manner in which 
their CISs critical assets were accessed and used. The guidelines provided the bases on 
which secondary schools formed their security policies and procedures. They also outlined 
the need to provide users of CISs with security employee training and awareness. The 
guidelines required that schools: 
 
 Develop viable and implementable  school-based information security policy by 
  Setting-up school-based information security committees responsible for drafting 
information security policies commensurate with envisaged risks in respective CISs; 
 Using information security policies as the basis for the dissemination and enforcement 
of sound security practices within the secondary school context as recommended by 
users of CISs; 
 Applying information security policies to address the use of computing facilities, the 
movement of computer hardware, access control, incident management and penalties 
associated with violations; 
 Using information security policy to instil information security culture among users of 
CISs in secondary schools; and 
 Fostering a security culture that balance between users‟ understanding of the threats, 
effective deterrents and associated penalties. 
 
 Provide for basic education and awareness training in information security risk 
management to all CISs users and other users of computers in the schools through: 
 Developing a strong information security awareness and positive attitude among CISs 
users in order to reduce their overreliance on technical and procedural protection; 
 Information security education and awareness activities that encourage active 
participation of CISs users in collaborative teams so that they developed an 
appreciation and awareness of information security threats and risks in their CISs;   
 Instilling a positive attitude of information security awareness among the users so that 
they could use the critical assets responsibly to benefit concerned secondary schools;  
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8.4.2. Technical protection and mitigation strategies guidelines 
Technical protection and mitigation strategies play a crucial role in CISs of an 
organisation. Schools tend to lack personnel with skills to implement them. However, this 
study provides guidelines that secondary schools can implement to offset the problem. 
 Provision of reliable technical protection and mitigation strategies 
 Secondary schools should rely on school-trained CISs users to install antivirus, 
antispyware and scanning of malware. 
 Secondary schools should encourage all educators who have laptops or computers 
to have their gadgets installed with antivirus/malware and scanning.  
 In the event that an outsider is hired, the school should attach at one of its CISs 
users to the hired personnel for monitoring purposes. 
 
 Encrypting and password-protecting critical information marks database  
 Secondary schools need to password-protect their critical information or encrypt 
all data in order to prevent direct access by both authorised and unauthorised 
users. 
 Secondary schools should use authorised software to access their databases.  
 
 Setting user access rights and auto-account logoff  
 Secondary schools should restrict access to their CISs by unauthorised users 
creating user accounts and setting access rights to all accounts. 
 Secondary schools should disable all guest accounts on all computers used in CISs 
to prevent creation of rogue accounts that could be used to illegally access the 
critical information.  
 Secondary schools should activate password-protected screen savers and 
automatic logoff on all computers to protect data and software from unauthorised 
users in the event that the authorised users left their workstation unattended. 
 
 Stringent use of inbuilt firewalls 
 Secondary schools should make sure that all computers used for CISs have 
firewalls that work properly to prevent unauthorised by external computers.  
 Providing a sound training of authorised CISs users on how to activate and configure 
firewalls on their computers.  
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 Frequent systems software update  
 Secondary schools should perform software update on all computers used for CISs on 
regular basis.  
 
 Practice regular backup for critical information and system restoration 
This frequently overlooked security measure need to be taken seriously by secondary 
schools who use CISs.  
 This is achieved by training authorised CISs users on how to back-up vital 
information from their computers.  
 Trained CISs users should perform backups of critical information and should also be 
responsible for keeping the backup media safely for future use.  
  
8.4.3. Physical controls guidelines 
Although secondary schools enforced physical controls more than other controls, there 
were some deficiencies that needed to be addressed in order to improve security of CISs. 
 Use of reliable physical controls 
Secondary schools should implement reliable physical controls that provide CISs assets 
adequate security and also making the environment where assets are used be safe for users. 
These include: 
 Emphasis on physical security of all movable CISs hardware such as personal 
computers, hubs, cables 
 Isolating computers used for CISs floor computer networks; 
 Installing both fire and break-in alarms that will alert school security in the event of 
fire breakout or intruder being detected; 
 Changing locking systems regularly in order to prevent duplication of keys by users; 
 
The guidelines provided were not exhaustive, however, they played a crucial role in 
bolstering information security in secondary schools. These guidelines emphasised much 
on low cost security means that secondary schools could afford in most cases freely.  
 
To conclude the discussions of this chapter, a summary of conclusions is given in section 
8.5 below. 
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8.5. CONCLUSION  
This section reflects on what transpired throughout this research study. Chapter 1 
identified the need by secondary schools to protect their CISs. The study then proposed to 
help secondary schools perform risk management exercise for their CISs after noticing 
that these organisations relied a lot on computing facilities yet they did not have experts to 
deal with information security risks. Chapter 2 outlined the qualitative interpretive case 
study research methodology implemented in this research. Participatory observation was 
the main qualitative data collection technique aided by the interview and inspection 
techniques. Chapter 3 is an overview of information security and this is followed by 
discussions of risk management frameworks in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, the researcher 
discussed quantitative and qualitative information security risk management 
methodologies and justified the use of OCTAVE-small for this research study. The 
OCTAVE-small method was discussed in detail in Chapter 6 and implemented in Chapter 
7. Data were collected, presented, analysed and interpreted in Chapter 7. The findings of 
the study were stated and discussed based on respective objectives in Chapter 8 as 
research overview. The study went further to suggest generic risk protection and 
mitigation strategies that were commensurate with human and financial capabilities of 
secondary schools. 
 
This study concluded that: 
 Secondary schools, like any other small-scale organisations, have critical CISs assets 
that need to be secured;  
 Secondary school managers were committed to information security to safeguard their 
CISs but lacked relevant skills and knowledge to achieve this; 
 Secondary schools should continuously implement proper organisational security 
practice and technical controls to reduce security risks in their CISs; 
 Educating and training of authorised users of CISs in information security plays 
crucial role in the security of CISs‟ critical asset in secondary schools; and 
 The use of the OCTAVE-small method in risk management was effective in 
developing information security awareness among users of CISs who participated in 
this research. 
These conclusions formed the basis on which recommendations to improve security 
controls in secondary schools were made. The subject of the next subsection is 
recommendations for security controls in secondary schools‟ CISs critical assets. 
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8.6. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SECURITY CONTROLS 
The study recommended that secondary schools put in place meaningful information 
security controls beyond those that were instituted during this study. This included the 
need for schools to continue carrying out regular risk management exercises for their 
CISs. The study also recommended that secondary schools: 
 reduce the number of computers which were being used in computerising their 
information systems;  
 disconnect all computers holding critical information from the Internet; 
 supervise authorised users of CISs to reduce intentional information security 
breaches; 
 make use of non-administrative educators who were competent in computing to 
administer all information technology assets and mentor the CISs users in various 
aspects of safe use of these assets; 
 encourage all users of CISs to attend formal basic courses in computing and 
information security that will enrich them in computer operations and proper records 
management; 
 use network passwords for each network segment for CISs and the passwords should 
only be known by responsible administrative educators; 
  educate authorised users to use critical information systems assets responsibly and 
accountably by keeping their passwords confidentially; 
 adhere to information security guidelines developed by the collaborative teams 
Information security challenges that secondary schools have to overcome on daily basis 
have far reaching consequences on these organisations and this warrants further research 
in this area. The ultimate section of this chapter, Further Research is dedicated to this 
cause. 
8.7. FURTHER RESEARCH 
This case study successfully carried out information security risk management exercises in 
two secondary schools‟ CISs using a variant of the OCTAVE risk management strategy, 
streamlined for smaller organisations, namely the OCTAVE-small method. Due to the 
limitations of the original model, several alterations were made to the method so that it 
became suitable for use by CISs users who had baseline computing skills.  
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Due to the success of this research study, it is suggested that this study be expanded to 
study a larger representation of schools in this or other district(s), as well as to all levels of 
schools and other educational institutions. Alternatively, comparative studies of small-
scale organisations, namely profit making and non-profit making could be carried out to 
identify suitable risk management models that are applicable to both categories of these 
organisations. 
 
The most appropriate way to help secondary schools to overcome information security 
risks in their CISs could be developing risk management models which the personnel in 
these organisations will easily comprehend and be able to implement on their own. The 
model would be developed through full participation of secondary schools CISs users at 
all stages of its development cycle. 
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APPENDIX 4: SAMPLE OF INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTIONS  
This is the transcript of an interview that was conducted with deputy principal in School 
A. The interview was tapped using a computer system. This transcript included a number 
of items shown in normal type face while the responses are in italic type face.  
 
Activity 1: Asset identification Interview Transcription 
Name of School: SCHOOL A  . Date: 29 April 2013 
Respondent:… Deputy Principal 1…… Job Description: Management 
 
Part A: Background information 
1. INTERVIER: How long have you been using school information systems assets? 
      DEPT1: I have been using information systems assets for at least 10 years, since 1992. 
2. INTERVIER: Did you receive formal training in using CISs? 
DEPT1: I only received informal training from the donors of the computers, and the 
programs we are using. Formal training needs me to go to university or private college. 
3. INTERVIER: Are you familiar with information security risk management? 
DEPT1: Not much but I hear people talk about it just like what you are saying. I know risk 
management in general, I have never practiced it.  
4. INTERVIER: What are the information system assets that your school has?  
DEPT: There are so many, some of them I don‟t know. I will give those I know or use 
a. Computers in the offices. 
b. Mark schedules in the Vanguard program 
c. Information on educators‟ profiles stored in Excel and Word files 
d. Subject allocation lists for all educators  
e. School termly progress reports on performance of learners and individual educators 
f. Old information on CDs and hard disks of old computers 
g. School fees records in the accountant‟s computer  
h. The administrator –educator is an important asset.  
i. Router for internet 
j. Wireless network 
k. Computerised asset register, hardware, people 
Part B: CISs risk related questions  
5. INTERVIER: What are the school‟s important information systems assets you need to 
protect? 
DEP1: 
a. All computers especially those used for administrative purpose.  
b.  Vanguard records program  
c. Subject Allocation lists 
d. Learners‟ reports schedules in Excel 
e. Back-up disks in the strong room 
f. Payments records in Pastel in the Accountant‟s computer. 
g. Staff information 
h. Router and the network equipment  
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6. INTERVIER: Where are the identified information systems assets located? 
 DEPT1: 
Asset Location 
a. Computers Administration block and staff rooms 
b. Learners‟ marks  In the administrator-Educator‟s computer 
c. Staff information Administrative educator‟s computer 
d. Fee payments Accountant‟s Computer 
e. Creditor information Accountant‟s Computer 
f. Router In the deputy‟s office 
g. Hard copies  In files the administration building 
h. Internet equipment Different offices 
i. Application to access CASs marks  
  
7. INTERVIER: Beside the information systems assets you mentioned above, are there any 
other important information systems assets that your school is should protect? 
 DEPT1: 
a. Printers 
b. photocopiers 
8. INTERVIER: From the assets that you have identified, which are the most important? 
What is your rationale for selecting these assets as important? 
DEPT1 
Asset Reason 
a. Computers The school cannot do without computers. We 
do all our work computers 
b. Vanguard system It‟s handy in data capturing, processing and 
printing reports. 
c. Learners‟ CASS marks in Vanguard 
database 
These marks are needed every year to 
promote learners at the end of the year 
d. Creditors payments information If this information is not available, we may 
pay double. 
e. Router or modem Connects to the internet 
 
f. Network Enables us to connect to computers in other 
offices. 
g. Staff information  This information is used for administration  
 
9. INTERVIER: What have been the security issues since you started using computerised 
information system in terms of:  
a. Hardware failures  
DEPT1: I have computers many times. Sometimes it is very slow does not open files. It 
gives a blue screen or keeps on restarting. One day I found out that my hard disk was 
damaged. I lost all important information. I had to restart typing all information from hard 
copies, but with Vanguard system, we cannot retype every lost mark. Some CDS do not open 
at all. 
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b. Software failure  
i. Operating systems  
DEPT1: My computer has been erased so many times because of hanging. I did not 
know the problems behind that, but the administration educator attended to it. At time 
it could not shut down when I tried to shut it down. Once the information on the hard 
disk is erased it becomes difficult to run the school and attend to learner‟s problems 
especially those that pertain to marks. 
  
ii. Specialised software  
DEPT1: Vanguard is reliable most of the time. However, if the computer is not 
working well it gives us problems. It may not load or miscalculates the figures.  
iii. Generic applications 
DEPT1: There are very few problems. Only that some old files are difficult to open 
on the new Excel or Word. They give unreadable characters.  
 
c. Loss of data integrity, confidentiality or availability through intentionally or unintentionally 
operations due to  
i. your actions  
DEPT1: I forget to close my files when I leave the office to supervisor classrooms.  
Some users who happen to get to my office at times read the information. Some of it 
would be confidential. At times I accidentally delete files or save using the same 
name. I tried to undo but it is difficult once you save using same name. At times I 
forget the file names and lose them and vital information. I also misplace hard copies 
and never recover them. I suspect that someone could be taking them but I cannot tell.  
 
ii. other authorised internal users  
DEPT1: During printing, users mix up and print my open files and take away the 
hard copies. Some of the users are eager to change learner‟s marks on the mark 
schedules if they can get a chance. There are situations when there are unaccountable 
changes in some marks of learners. Vanguard uses one password. Once it leaks, it is 
possible for these some of the users to change information. If someone opens and file 
and changes information, then its intentional.  
 
iii. unauthorised internal users  
DEPT1: I miss a lot of documents, soft copies and hard copies through unauthorised 
users who enter my office and use my computer. These people know all my 
movements. When I come in I do not find them. I cannot lock my office during the 
day people will think I will be absent. 
 
iv. your superiors  
DEPT1: The principal does not use this computer. He has access to Vanguard, but we 
do not know the changes he makes on the mark schedules if any. But I do not think 
that he does so. 
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v. external users  
DEPT1: Normally we do not allow external users to use our computers or have 
access to any information assets except if the person is hired by the school.  
 
vi. malware 
DEPT1: This is a headache. We have big problems with virus. They come from outside 
with users in their memory sticks. I have a lot of files which cannot open or they open 
but with missing information. At times computers have to be formatted because of virus 
problems. 
 
vii. hacking  
DEPT1: I have no idea about tis. You better the Administrative educator. 
 
viii. Unaccountable factors  
DEPT1: At times my computer switches restarts on its own. I lose my files when it 
restarts. I have experienced this for some time. 
10. INTERVIER: How severe did these have on the operations of the school?  
 DEPT1: The school delays in sending schedules or printing reports. At time we may have to 
conduct meetings with sufficient documents. This affect decisions to be made at the same 
time the operations are severely affected especially if CDs containing tests fail to open, we 
suspend the tests and rescheduling is difficult again. Think of a situation the file with the five 
mark schedule disappearing and retyping it.  
11. INTERVIER: Can you briefly describe how you responded to each of these problems?  
DEPT1: The Administrative educator try to solve the problems related to computers. I 
work on those related to hard copies in trying to save the situation. At times we resort to 
hard copies and backups where possible. If the situation cannot be redressed, we hire a 
technician to help. 
12. INTERVIER: What measures do you put in place to secure your workstation when you go 
out for a break? 
DEPT1: There is no mechanism I use for this computer. There are many people who want 
to use it for printing. 
13. INTERVIER: In what condition do you find your workstation when you return from your 
break?  
DEPT1: I do not take this seriously. Sometimes I find it open or someone using it. Files 
could be closed or open. Some files could be missing and find them in the recycle bin 
14. INTERVIER: Do other computer users in school temper with your computer during at any 
time during your presence absence  
DEPT1: Yes, they use it especially those who want to print. Some used to access internet 
from my computer.  
15. INTERVIER: What activities do these perform on your computer?  
DEPT1: Printing, searching internet 
16. INTERVIER: How do you check whether your computer or data has been tempered with?  
DEPT1: No. I am too busy to do that. I expect it to be in perfect condition. 
17. INTERVIER: Do you access to internet on your work station?  
DEPT1: Yes. 
18. INTERVIER: What data recovery method do you use in the event that your computer has 
crashed?  
DEPT1: I do not have any mechanism except using backups. Otherwise I retype all the 
information. 
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19. INTERVIER: What do you do if your computer is infected by a recently deployed virus?  
DEPT1: I do not know what to do. I ask the admin educator to help. 
20. INTERVIER: What would you do if pirated software is installed on your computer?  
DEPT1: Do you think I know what is which software is pirated or not? I just use what is 
there.  
21. INTERVIER: What problems have you encountered with your CISs?  
DEPT1: We lose information due to viruses and hardware problems. We may delay in 
processing of school reports or even entering data. Sensitive information is read by those 
who are not supposed to read it. 
22. INTERVIER: How frequent has each of the problems been? 
DEPT1: I can say many times. It is difficult to say how many times. But it happens. I cannot 
remember because it occurs when we are so busy that you focus on finishing the work. 
23. INTERVIER: What initiative has been made to: 
a. Solve the problem 
DEPT1: Not much has been done. No one is competent enough to deal with the 
situation. Even though, we want things got done and then we move on.  
b. Prevent the problem to occur again 
DEPT1: Do you think there is a way to prevent this? Because the problem may be even 
bigger immediately after a technician has attended to it. When you try to prevent viruses, 
some users who do not know bring them into the school. 
24. INTERVIER: How effective was the initiative made in 
a. Solving the problem 
DEPT1: There is no effective solution. I think we need to training everyone who use 
computers on the issue of viruses and not deleting other people‟s files.  
b. Preventing it from recurring? 
DEPT1: the school has no mechanism for this. 
25. INTERVIER: Do you have full user rights for all customised software?  
DEPT1: I do not think so. I do not have because I cannot change anything even 
reinstallation. Were rely on the suppliers 
26. INTERVIER: How do you deal with those important files which do not open?  
DEPT1: If there are important, we try our level best to open them using various programs. 
But if we fail, we retype the important information and save it correctly 
27. INTERVIER: What would you do if your hard disk fails?  
DEPT1: I refer everything to the Administrative educators. He is the one who will replace it 
or try to repair it. 
28. INTERVIER: Do technicians attend to your computer in your presence?  
DEPT1: No, they either take the computer to their workshops or other private space. They 
do not want us to see what they are doing. At times I do not want to be disturbed they have 
to work somewhere 
29. INTERVIER: How secure is your CISs from 
a. internal intruders  
DEPT1: I do not think it is secured. I am not sure. 
b. external intruders 
DEPT1: we do not have such people around.  
c. unexpected hardware crashes 
DEPT1: it is not secured because we lose such information every time. Normally t is 
replaced with a new one. 
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30. INTERVIER: What mechanisms do you use to detect intrusions in your CISs? 
DEPT1: Nothing in place at all. May be as times goes on will find the appropriate ones. 
31. INTERVIER: What methods of backups do you use and where do you store them?  
DEPT1: we use CDS, Memory sticks, DVDs, hardcopies. CDs are in the strong room. I 
have my memory stick every time. 
 
32. INTERVIER: How do you deal with virus problems?  
DEPT1: I refer this matter to Administrative educator who attends to it. Some I clean if it is 
easy or technicians are hired for this purpose if we have money.  
 
33. INTERVIER: What challenges do you face in securing your CISs?  
DEPT1: They are many. In the CASs mark database we use the same password. Locating 
some information could be difficult at times. Forgetting of password is also a problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
205 
 
APPENDIX 5: RISK IMPACT EVALUATION CRITERIA 
Table AP3.1: OCTAVE-small- Risk Impact Evaluation Criteria 
Impact Area High Medium Low 
Reputation of 
school 
Confidence of 
creditors, parents 
and learners, 
education 
authorities 
 
 
 Reputation 
irrevocably 
destroyed or 
damaged 
 Rating of school by 
district and drops 
drastically. School 
placed under strict 
circuit and district 
supervision 
 Creditors unpaid for 
a long period due to 
missing records 
 Reputation 
damaged; some 
effort and expense 
required to recover 
 Reduction or 
warning of 
reduction of rating 
or accreditation by 
authorising 
organisations 
 
 Reputation minimally 
affected; little or no 
effort or expense 
required to recover 
 No change in rating or 
accreditation by 
authorising 
organisations 
 
Productivity 
 
 School management 
fails to meet 
obligations because 
information is 
inaccessible due to 
systems which are 
down. 
 Critical asset is 
completely rendered 
useless and valuable 
data/information is 
irrecoverable 
 Asset very difficult 
to replace 
 Irrecoverable loss of 
learner 
records/information 
 The system is 
completely 
paralysed and school 
decides to abandon 
its use 
 Fails to print reports 
completely. 
 School 
management 
delayed in meeting 
obligations while 
the system tries to 
recover from threat 
effects. 
 Increases in general 
staff work of 10-
40% for one day 
(duplicating written 
records, 
recapturing marks, 
re-creating mark 
schedules, 
retrieving and 
verifying back-up 
data) 
 Slow in printing 
relevant documents 
misplaced 
information 
 Simple inconvenience 
school management 
that last few hours on 
matters of little 
importance 
 No measurable 
increase in the amount 
of work to be done in 
data capturing and 
redoing mark 
schedules. 
 No noticeable delays 
in submitting 
administrative 
documents to circuits. 
 Parents wait while 
reports are being 
printed 
 Creditors just 
inconvenienced for 
less than a day in 
getting their payments 
Finances 
 
 School loses 10% 
yearly revenue in 
replacing stolen or 
damaged hardware 
 School suffers 10% 
 School loses 5% 
yearly revenue in 
replacing stolen or 
damaged hardware 
 School loses 5% 
 School loses 1% 
yearly revenue in 
replacing stolen or 
damaged hardware 
 School loses 1% 
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yearly revenue loss 
due records 
modification, 
misplacements or 
destruction.  
 School suffers 5% 
yearly financial cost 
malware in cleaning 
by hired personnel. 
 
yearly revenue in 
replacing stolen or 
damaged hardware 
 School suffers 5% 
yearly revenue loss 
due records 
modification, 
misplacements or 
destruction.  
 School suffers 2% 
yearly financial 
costs in malware 
cleaning by hired 
personnel. 
 Partially 
correctable errors 
in funding and 
personnel 
yearly revenue in 
replacing stolen or 
damaged hardware 
 School suffers 1% 
yearly revenue loss 
due records 
modification, 
misplacements or 
destruction.  
 School suffers 
negligible yearly 
financial cost in 
malware cleaning by 
hired personnel. 
 Inconvenient but 
correctable errors in 
funding and personnel  
Other 
(Facilities) 
 Loss of an entire 
facility or building 
due to fire 
 
 
 
 
 False software or 
service providers  
 
 Damage to a 
facility or building 
requiring 
temporary 
relocation 
computing records 
management 
systems 
 Unable to verify 
credentials of 
providers software 
service providers 
 Unable to track 
performance of 
facilities or 
providers 
accurately  
 Loss of air 
conditioning for two 
weeks 
 Negligible impact on 
daily operations 
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APPENDIX 6: DATA COLLECTION ACTION PLAN 
 
Table AP6.1: Data Collection Action Plan for both schools 
Activity Date School 
First collaborative team workshop 22 April 2013 School A 
24 April 2013 School B 
Interviews Deputy principals and 
Administrative educators 
29 April 2013 School A 
06 May 2013 School B 
Second collaborative team meeting 10 May 2013 School A 
10 May 2013 School B 
Inspection of assets 
 
13 May 2013 School A 
14 May 2013 School B 
Critical Assets identification meeting 15 May 2013 School A 
16 May 2013 School B 
Current threats Identification 
And Security requirements meeting 
20 May 2013 School B 
21 May 2013 School A 
Identifying Vulnerability in Technology 
workshop and physical testing 
23 May 2013 School B 
24 May 2013  School A 
Risk identification, analysis and Evaluation 
workshop 
25 May 2013 School A 
27 May 2013 School B 
Mitigation strategies and plans meeting 30 May 2013 School A 
31 May 2013 School B 
Winding up data collection and meeting 04 June 2013 School A 
05 June 2013 School B 
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APPENDIX 7: LETTER OF ADMISSION TO DINF91 
 
